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 Abstract 
 
Subjectivity and Selfhood in Kant, Fichte and Heidegger 
 
Michael Robert Stevenson 
 
 
Kant once said that the “whole field of philosophy” is guided by the fundamental 
question, “What is the human being?”  Kant himself, and even more so his Idealist 
successors, addressed this question by offering transcendental theories of human 
subjectivity.  This dissertation explores the philosophical development of the Kantian and 
post-Kantian theories of subjectivity and their relationship to the often neglected theory 
of selfhood in Heidegger’s Being and Time.  After examining the issues in Kant’s theory 
which were decisive motivating factors for the post-Kantian Idealists—namely the 
metaphysical status of the apperceptive I and the unity of reason—I explore Fichte’s 
metaphysics of subjectivity and his attempt to demonstrate the unity and self-sufficiency 
of reason.  Finally, I argue that the early Heidegger’s theory of finite human existence is 
best understood as an extension of and corrective to the classical Idealist tradition.  I 
attempt to cash out two of Heidegger’s claims: (1) that his own “fundamental ontology” 
is pre-figured by Kant’s theory of subjectivity, and (2) that the crucial insights in his 
reading of Kant share much with the Idealists but also “move in the opposite direction” 
from them.  I argue that Heidegger’s theory of selfhood gives an account of the sui 
generis features of human existence which unifies our theoretical and practical activities 
while avoiding the stronger Idealist claims regarding the self-sufficiency and self-
legitimacy of reason.  
  











“What is man, that thou art mindful of him?” 
Psalm 8:4 
 
“There are many strange and wonderful things, 
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Kant once said that the main question and ultimate concern of the “whole field of 
philosophy” is “what is the human being?”, and that all of philosophy’s other 
fundamental concerns—theoretical and practical, epistemological, metaphysical and 
moral—must ultimately relate to this central question.   Indeed, from Plato’s attempts to 
understand the Delphic oracular imperative to “know thyself” to contemporary 
discussions about the nature of consciousness, philosophy has often been preoccupied 
with the question of human distinctiveness and the place of humankind within nature.   In 
asking this question, and in locating it at the center of philosophy as he did, Kant initiated 
a certain tradition—what we now call classical German philosophy—which provided a 
certain framework which served as a guide for answering it.  Kant described his critical 
philosophy as an attempt to foment a “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy whose goal 
was a new way of thinking about metaphysical issues which would put metaphysics on 
“the secure path of a science”, and he called this alternate way of doing things 
“transcendental philosophy”.  His immediate sympathetic successors united under this 
banner, and insofar as these transcendental sansculottes took themselves to be guided by 
Kant’s main question, they developed what we can call transcendental theories of 
subjectivity.    
     Now, “subjectivity” might be seen as one of those hopelessly vague and ambiguous 
philosophical terms of art, usually surrounded by an air of gravitas and profundity which 
perhaps can naturally cause suspicion; and indeed the term can and has been used in any 
number of ways to mean a plethora of different things.  I’d like then at the outset to 
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anchor my usage of the term in the following way: by “subjectivity” I mean to point to or 
pick out in a preliminary way that characteristic or set of characteristics by which we can 
initially recognize both ourselves and others as human beings.1  To be a human being, or 
to choose a more Heideggerian locution here, to be the “being each of us is”, is to “have” 
or “possess” subjectivity, to see this feature as characteristic of the type of existing beings 
we are.   
     We can likewise describe this feature, again preliminarily, as the feature in virtue of 
which we “have a view on things”, or in which “things are there for us”, or in which 
things are “at issue” for us.  If we see philosophy as, in Wilfrid Sellars’ apt slogan, the 
attempt “to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang 
together in the broadest possible sense of the term”2, then the term subjectivity is meant 
to pick out those beings for whom things can hang together.  “Having a view” now is to 
be taken in a similarly broad sense, not limited to the ocular, but rather in the sense of 
being capable of assuming a stance, all the way from feeling things to be a certain way to 
judging them to be so, from feeling at odds with and confined by the circumstances 
which that view reveals or feeling in control of them.  Nor is “having a view” limited to 
the spectatorial, to being aware or simply watching what is happening “inside” or “out 
there” in the world, but one’s actions are or can be just as, perhaps more so, constitutive 
and revelatory of one’s view on things, of one’s stance.  To see one of philosophy’s main 
goals as the attempt to understand what the human being is, and thus to understand what 
                                                 
1 I want to be clear here that I do not mean to identify “beings with subjectivity” with “human beings”, but 
rather to anchor the former term at least initially in the latter.  This will be more explicit in a moment.  And 
when I say “human being” here I mean to use the term in a quite ordinary sense, referring to you and me 
and others like us, rather than in any particular technical-philosophical—for example Kantian—sense.   
2 “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, included in the collection In the Space of Reasons: 
Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Sharp and Brandom.  Harvard, 2007.  p. 369. 
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subjectivity consists in, is to say that if we conceive of philosophy as Sellars does, 
philosophy then is interested not just in understanding how things—in a narrower sense, 
as those things which are not us, but nevertheless there, in view—do in fact hang together 
for us, but at the most general level, philosophy is fundamentally interested in 
understanding what we must be like, or how we must conceive of ourselves, such that 
things can come to hang together for us in the ways that they do.  “Subjectivity” then 
must be one of those “things” in the broadest sense of the term which must be hanging 
together with everything else.  But then beings with subjectivity immediately assume a 
peculiar kind of position, being both there hanging together with things and, seemingly 
uniquely, the beings for whom things are hanging together in the first place.   
     To insist that philosophy must include, indeed be in some sense fundamentally 
concerned with, a theory of subjectivity, is to insist that we, that is, the beings picturing 
things hanging together, must be “in the picture” that philosophy gives us too, hanging 
together with things such that it is not lost on us that at the same time “the hanging 
together” is something that we are noticing or attending to or concerned with.  We—
philosophers, human beings—are the ones asking about how things hang together; and 
the picturing of things hanging together in a certain way must be part of the picture that 
philosophy gives us.  These two tasks—understanding how things in fact hang together 
and understanding what subjectivity is such that the hanging together of things is a 
fundamental concern here—should be seen as inseparable and inextricable from one 
another.  A theory of subjectivity needs a theory, or at least an account, of what is not 
subjectivity and how those other things relate to subjectivity and vice versa.  This is to 
say that a theory of subjectivity can’t be formed in a vacuum, and that to answer the 
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question about what the human being is to ask at the same time what humankind’s place 
is in our conception of things as a whole.  But, again, to insist on this question as 
fundamental is to say that if the picture does not somehow include the picturing, then we 
don’t yet have the whole picture.   
     The contrast term to subjectivity will not really then be “objectivity”.  As I am 
conceiving of subjectivity, objectivity can be seen as a special feature of subjectivity; it is 
a term—indeed an honorific one—we can apply to the views on things which themselves 
essentially belong to beings to whom we ascribe subjectivity.  It is an aspirational notion, 
something to which the essential doings of beings with subjectivity can, and perhaps 
often should, be aiming.  The views on things beings with subjectivity have, including 
their pictures of the hanging together of things in general, can—and often, but not always, 
should—be measured and evaluated by how far they manage to remove what is purely 
idiosyncratic or parochial in those views, that is, how far they manage to not be 
dependent on what is “merely subjective”.   In many, but again not all, of its doings, 
beings with subjectivity can and should strive for objectivity, and, I think, and want to 
say unproblematically so, actually sometimes achieve it.  Objectivity is a potential feature 
of the views on things in which subjectivity essentially consists; it is a question of the 
accuracy of the picture of the hanging together of things it arrives at, of how far the 
picture “gets it right” about how things fit into the picture and in fact hang together.   
     The proper contrast term, if we have to name it, would rather be something like 
“objecthood”.  The theories of subjectivity which are definitive of the classical German 
philosophical tradition with which we will be concerned here—and, as we will see, 
similarly with Heidegger—start from the notion that “beings with subjectivity” are not 
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then, and should never be conceived of, as “things”, now in the narrower sense of that 
term, call them “objects”.  There is a fundamental doctrine of “categorical difference” or 
“ontological asymmetry” here.  In picking out a class of existing beings “with 
subjectivity”, beings “without subjectivity”—things, mere objects—are being excluded.3  
These two classes of beings—things in the broader sense—then require different 
conceptions, demand that we picture them differently.  The distinction itself might seem 
tautological at best or inappropriately circular and question-begging at worst, but, again 
preliminarily, it is meant to have a commonsensical and prima facie plausibility.  Stones, 
tables, and cars aren’t capable of themselves—or at least don’t often show up in our 
picture of things when we are trying to be objective, or get it right about stones, tables 
and cars, as capable of themselves—having a view on things, on the world being there for 
them.  And it is just these latter features which a theory of subjectivity as I’ve described it 
has decided at the outset to attend to.  This idea can be seen as the central plank in the 
platform that transcendental philosophy, inspired by the Copernican Revolution, insists 
on: that the bearers of subjectivity, the beings to whom subjectivity can be ascribed as a 
characteristic feature, however we want to call them—human beings, persons, “absolute 
I’s”, or Dasein—cannot be construed along the same lines as we construe all, or most, 
other “things”.  We can never, or at least shouldn’t ever, come to see ourselves as just 
objects among other objects, like the ones that mostly populate our picture of things.    
     This way of conceiving of transcendental philosophy immediately seems to put it at 
odds with what most people call “naturalism”, under most definitions of that term.  If 
                                                 
3 The crucial claim is that “beings with subjectivity” and “objects” refer to two different ontological 
categories; beings with subjectivity (e.g. human beings, persons) are not things (objects) and vice versa.  
The reason for calling this ontological asymmetry will become clearer in due course, and most clear in the 
case of Heidegger.  The idea is that there are asymmetries in the relations of dependence between 
subjectivity and things.   
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naturalism means roughly the conviction that only natural science and its distinctive 
methodologies can properly tell us what exists and how all things hang together, then the 
type of transcendental philosophy whose fundamental concern is the theory of 
subjectivity—let’s call it for symmetry’s sake “transcendentalism”—would insist that 
“beings with subjectivity” themselves seem to be simply outside the natural sciences’ 
special area of expertise.  Natural science’s special expertise is after all precisely getting 
it right about how things are with “objects”—all those things that are there for beings 
with subjectivity.   The “investigation” into beings with subjectivity would seem to 
naturally fall under the expertise rather of the “humanities”—philosophy included—and 
the arts, and perhaps some of the social sciences.  Under this conception, art and literature 
can prima facie tell us lots of things about subjectivity, or what it’s like to be, or what’s 
involved in being, a being with subjectivity, and it would be the special task of 
philosophy to articulate the fundamental structures of this “phenomenon”.   This means 
that transcendentalism insists on the “autonomy” of philosophy (and art and literature), 
meaning that philosophy is not exactly “continuous” with, though also not for all that in 
“competition” with, the natural sciences.    
     None of which however needs to be construed as the last word on the matter.  The 
claim is initially just that the natural sciences look unequipped such as they are to explain 
to us according to their manner of explanation what subjectivity is or essentially consists 
in, which we have taken to be the central concern.  But it might turn out that we—
including natural scientists—have underestimated the tools that the natural sciences 
primarily utilize, or that the natural sciences themselves will evolve or develop new tools 
which better equip them for the job; but that is a different matter, and then they might 
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become so different as to be barely recognizable according to the standards that we use to 
recognize them now.  The point however is that transcendentalism, with its central 
concern for developing a theory of subjectivity, simply takes itself to be offering a 
different starting point and insisting on different fundamental concerns than does 
“naturalism”.   
     One might wonder immediately about animals here.  From the transcendentalist view 
as I am presenting it, the question becomes about how much animals do in fact share with 
us, which is in principle left as an open question, and one whose answer would itself 
require special attention to what the biological sciences reveal about them.  The initial 
association of “beings with subjectivity” with human beings is meant, as I said, as a 
preliminary orientation and anchor for use of the term.  It is a feature of this way of going 
about things that however we come to understand it, subjectivity will be a defining 
characteristic of, at least, we human beings.  How far we then come to extend this 
concept, and thus how inclusive the scope of the theory of subjectivity turns out to be, 
will depend on other factors, not least the details of the theory itself.  Perhaps it will turn 
out to be the case that certain animals, or all, but not—at least prima facie not—stones, 
tables and cars, must be described according to the theory as “beings with subjectivity”.  
Or perhaps, as seems plausible, it will turn out to be a matter of degree, a matter of 
deciding, or finding out, which features are preserved along the spectrum and how far 
out.   
     But, in line with Kant’s question, the theories of subjectivity with which we will be 
concerned here must at least methodologically begin with a focus on human beings.  Such 
a focus requires an emphasis on the special distinctiveness of human subjectivity.  And 
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the focus itself gives an initial shape to the theories themselves.  Rousseau—who is often 
conceded to be an important precursor to Kant and his successors— had described the 
special distinctiveness which belongs to human beings, intimately tied to the fact that 
they are beings with subjectivity, as attaching to their “faculty of self-perfection”, to their 
“perfectibility”.4  This means that our conception of what it is to be human can never be 
exhausted by our understanding simply of what “nature has made of man”, but rather 
needs to be supplemented by our understanding of what “man has made of himself”.   
One, and perhaps the most important, motivation behind these theories of subjectivity, 
and the reason why, from the transcendentalist perspective, the question about “what the 
human being is” amounts to an anchor to which all other questions of philosophical 
concern are somehow tethered, will be the desire to come to understand what human 
beings have made of themselves and what they may still make of themselves, which 
means a desire to understand what human beings are capable of thinking and doing, what 
they can, should, and may think and do. 
     In what follows, I will be concerned with sketching out what is essentially involved in 
this “transcendentalist” tradition through three representative figures: Kant, Fichte and 
Heidegger.  I will be concerned with what their theories of subjectivity actually are—
which is to say how they answer the question about what the human being is—as well as 
how the tradition to which they each contributed functions as a tradition, that is, how it 
becomes inherited and modified.  As we will see, it is not a straightforward matter to say 
what Kant himself, who initiated the tradition, had to say on the matter.  This is because it 
can look at times as if his own “main question” is not in fact very often his own most 
                                                 
4 “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men”.  The Discourses and Other Early 
Political Writings, ed. and transl. by Gourevitch.  Cambridge, 1997.  p. 141.   
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direct fundamental concern.  He sounded the clarion call of the Copernican Revolution 
rather because he wanted to put metaphysics on the secure path of a science.  He wanted 
to show, contra Hume, that our conception of nature has an objective validity whose 
source lies in pure reason, and that the necessary and binding obligations that the moral 
law places on our wills get their objective validity through the same source.  He wanted 
to show the limits of this pure reason in order to make room for rational faith and rational 
hope.   
     Fulfilling these desires in the manner he did required Kant along the way to say lots of 
things about the nature of subjectivity, that is, for him, about the nature of the 
“determining”—in contrast to the “determinable”—moments in our own “modes of 
cognition”, as his own description of the Revolution would have it.  One way of 
beginning to describe how those who inherit Kant’s new tradition—all of whom initially 
describe themselves as “Kantians”—in fact come to inherit that tradition is to say that 
they are particularly sensitive to the “metaphysical import” of the clarion call of the 
revolution vis-à-vis subjectivity itself which Kant himself was not particularly sensitive 
to.  Kant himself was always occupied with what he took to be more pressing concerns 
than an explicit “theory of subjectivity”.  If such a theory is in fact there, it is formed 
piecemeal and “along the way” and always in the service of other immediate concerns, 
describable as a “metaphysics of nature” and a “metaphysics of morals”.     
     But it is just this piecemeal quality that so disconcerted his successors.  They believed 
Kant’s theory of subjectivity did not quite “hang together” in the right way, but were 
equally convinced that, with a little re-alignment of our sensitivities and consequently of 
what we took to be our fundamental concerns, all the problems could be easily solved.   
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Those putative problems for the most part revolve around a perceived lack of “unity” in 
Kant’s theory of subjectivity, and they were to be solved precisely with a “metaphysics of 
subjectivity”—a unified theory of subjectivity as such—which directly concerned itself 
with the metaphysical import of the Copernican Revolution vis-à-vis subjectivity.  The 
charge that Kant’s theory lacked a necessary unity attaches itself to the perception that it 
is inappropriately dualistic along at least two axes.  Firstly, regarding theoretical 
subjectivity, the theory relies on a distinction, itself unexplained or taken for granted, 
between two faculties of cognition, sensibility and understanding, which respectively 
represent the ways in which we are passive and active in cognition, in coming to know 
what and how the world is and must be like.  Secondly, Kant seems to give two accounts 
of reason—a fundamental attribute of how subjectivity essentially functions and goes 
about its business—which on the surface give us quite different results.  This means that 
it is not obvious how theoretical and practical subjectivity can hang together in a unified 
way.5  In particular, since theoretical reason and practical reason respectively give us 
conceptions of nature and of freedom, if we apply those conceptions of reason to our 
picture of subjectivity itself, it is not clear how beings with subjectivity can be both 
natural and moral beings at the same time, how our understanding of how we come to 
know things about the natural world and our place within it can coexist and square with 
our understanding of how we are supposed to be acting within that world.   Kant after all 
himself held out the carrots-on-sticks for those who came after him and were willing to 
inherit the way of doing things which he initiated.  He says those two faculties of 
                                                 
5 I am talking now about how the Idealists saw things, not how Kant himself or more strict “Kantians” 
would describe the matter.  As we will see, Kant is well aware of the tension here and he offers solutions to 
resolve it, indeed in some ways “transcendental idealism” is the solution, or is intended to be.  But, as I will 
argue in part one, independently but in sympathy with the Idealists, those answers aren’t particularly 
satisfying.    
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cognition might after all have a “common root”, unknown to us (now, or ever?), and that 
there can after all be only “one and the same reason” which is employed for both 
theoretical and practical purposes.  This “problem of the common root” and this “problem 
of the unity of reason”, then, will be the central concerns of the discussion of Kant in part 
one.   
     Of course, those who initially inherited Kant’s transcendentalist strategy—
paradigmatically Fichte, Schelling and Hegel—came to call themselves “Idealists” of one 
stripe or another.  Fichte, particularly as the author of the early versions of the 
Wissenschaftslehre prior to say 1800, will stand in here as a representative example of 
“early Idealism”, representative in the sense that much of what I will say about him and 
the most apposite claims that I will attribute to him will also be applicable to the others, 
especially in the early stages of their own development, and largely to the later and more 
“mature” stages as well, and to Hegel in particular.  A fuller treatment of the tradition 
with which I am concerned would require a direct discussion of him.   Nevertheless, I try 
to make the case in part two that Fichte makes all the claims that are essential to an 
“idealist” theory of subjectivity which all of the German Idealists share, at least for large 
swaths of their careers.6  I argue that the idealist theories of subjectivity actually make 
two fundamental claims, which they believe are intimately connected, but which are in 
principle and in fact separable.  The first is a direct consequence of the transcendentalist 
orientation toward subjectivity itself.  The metaphysics of subjectivity which they 
develop insist that we consider beings with subjectivity to be sui generis, whose 
                                                 
6 I am making a distinction here between the set of terms ‘Idealism’ and ‘Idealist’ on the one hand and 
‘idealism’ and ‘idealist’ on the other.  The first set of terms will be used to refer to the philosophers 
themselves, and the second set to the broader philosophical positions to which they are committed, which 
can have a broader applicability than to these historical figures, though still distinctive, that is, different 
from, for example, Berkeleyan “idealism”.    
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distinguishing, ontologically unique feature is characterized by a special kind of 
activity—the spontaneous self-activity of “original synthesis” in Kant’s sense.  The 
crucial claim is that this characterization as a unique type of activity means that 
subjectivity is self-constituting.   The being of beings with subjectivity is constituted by 
that self-activity, and is then nothing, or at least not itself, without it.   The first idealist 
claim is that we are to understand subjectivity then as that very activity, which is 
spontaneous and thus arises “from out of itself”.   
     The second claim, or set of claims, relate to the putative, more robust, “idealist” 
consequences of such a conception of subjectivity, that is, the sense in which and the 
extent to which the first claim is supposed to imply that things which are there for beings 
with subjectivity are then dependent on subjectivity for their own being.  Fichte argues, 
though as we will see, somewhat ambiguously in the details, that the inherited Kantian 
problems of the unity of theoretical subjectivity and the unity of subjectivity as a whole—
both in the theoretical and practical spheres—can be solved all at once as it were once we 
understand that subjectivity is characterized by spontaneous self-constituting activity.  
This means that the self-constituting character of subjectivity alone suffices to show us 
that rational subjectivity is not only unified, i.e. that its respective employments have the 
same essential structure, but that reason itself, and thus rational subjectivity, is thereby 
wholly self-sufficient, meaning that it is dependent on nothing outside itself in order to be 
what it is and to satisfy all of its rational demands.  
     The philosophical standpoint of German Idealism has recently enjoyed a renewed 
interest within Anglophone philosophy, and has garnered a certain respect it has not 
always received.  The focus, however, of this renewed interest is most often centered on 
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the latter types of claims.  Robert Pippin, for instance, attributes the continued 
significance of Fichte’s idealism to its insistence on the “self-sufficiency or autonomy 
of…the normative domain itself, what Sellars [called] ‘the space of reasons’.”   He argues 
that Fichte’s idealism is essentially a “normative monism” that asserts the “unconditioned 
status of the space of reasons”, but without, crucially, arguing for “the metaphysical 
distinctness of a spontaneous mind”.7   As Pippin’s choice of terminology suggests, this 
assertion is definitive of the fundamental concerns of the neo-Hegelianism of McDowell 
and Brandom.  While I claim that Fichte clearly does argue for such “metaphysical 
distinctness”—indeed he bases his claims regarding self-sufficiency straightforwardly on 
the distinctiveness of self-constituting subjectivity—the point moreover in the discussion 
of Fichte’s idealism is that the first claim regarding distinctiveness is more compelling 
than the second claim regarding self-sufficiency, not least in the sense that the second 
claim doesn’t follow from the first claim in the way Fichte seems to think it does, unless 
we accept a rather strong version of the mind-dependence of things which is neither 
necessitated by the first claim nor particularly appealing.  The compellingness of the first 
claim by contrast accrues to the way Fichte addresses the putative problems within Kant’s 
transcendentalist position as I will describe them.            
     Now, if a large portion of current scholarship in German Idealism is not particularly 
motivated by an interest in its theories of subjectivity as such, then this lack of interest 
applies perhaps to a greater degree to current Anglophone Heidegger scholarship, and 
perhaps to an even greater degree to so-called “Continental” approaches.  The former, to 
risk unfair generalizations to which there will of course be exceptions, has tended to 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, his “Fichte’s Alleged Subjective, Psychological, One-Sided Idealism”; included in 
Sedgwick, ed., The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Cambridge, 2000; and the sections on Fichte 
in Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989.   
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focus on Heidegger’s vehement anti-Cartesianism and affinities to later Wittgenstein, and 
the latter has tended to see Heidegger, with some justification, particularly with regard to 
his later works, as the progenitor of the “post-modern” idea of the “death of the subject”.  
For both, the affinities with the classical tradition and its focus on subjectivity tend to be 
neglected or ignored.  Indeed, it will seem surprising to some, and even ludicrous to 
others, to find Heidegger in the list of authors I have chosen to represent this tradition.  It 
is true, for reasons we will discuss, that even in his early works, which are explicitly 
concerned with an analysis of Dasein, or human beings, Heidegger for the most part 
eschews the term “subjectivity” and indeed describes it as “ontologically inappropriate”.  
His favored term in those works, including Being and Time, is rather “selfhood”.  But it 
will be one of my fundamental contentions that “selfhood” and “subjectivity” refer to the 
same phenomena, as I outlined it at the outset.   
     In fact, it will be the dominant contention of my discussion in part three that the “early 
Heidegger” is most fruitfully interpreted as precisely giving a theory of subjectivity in my 
sense, and that his existential analytic of Dasein fits squarely in the transcendental 
tradition as I will be laying it out; indeed, it figures in my account as the most plausible 
and philosophically compelling representative of that tradition.  It will hopefully become 
clear that Heidegger is not so much interested in overthrowing or eliminating the concept 
of subjectivity as he is in giving, in his own words, “a more radical formulation of the 
concept of the subject”.  He writes that “the principle problem…is, after all, to determine 
exactly what and how the subject is—what belongs to the subjectivity of the subject”.8   
                                                 
8 GP 238. 
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     This interpretation becomes most compelling when seen through the lens of 
Heidegger’s lectures and writings immediately following Being and Time, characterized 
by a renewed involvement with both Kant and the German Idealists—principally Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics, but also shorter essays such as “What is Metaphysics?” 
and “On the Essence of Ground”.  Heidegger says at the end of his 1927-28 lectures on 
Kant that when he “some years ago studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew…it caused 
the scales to fall from my eyes, and Kant became for me a crucial confirmation of the 
rightness of the path which I took [in Being and Time].”9   
     My discussion of Heidegger in part three will focus on the sense and the ways in 
which Heidegger’s fundamental ontology remains rooted in the tradition of 
transcendental theories of subjectivity.  Taking as a guiding clue Heidegger’s own 
elliptical remark in the Kantbook that his interpretation of Kant, and a fortiori the 
alignment of his own philosophy with Kant and the transcendental tradition, shares an 
affinity with the insights offered by Kant’s Idealist successors, but that his work “moves 
in the opposite direction of German Idealism”, I attempt to show what Heidegger’s own 
theory of selfhood is taking from and what he is resisting in that tradition.  Briefly put, 
Heidegger offers a theory of selfhood which insists on Dasein’s sui generis metaphysical 
character as self-constituting, in such a way that Dasein’s subjectivity is unified in its 
theoretical and practical possibilities according to its essential structure, but also in such a 
way which avoids the stronger, more robust idealist claims regarding self-sufficiency and 
mind-dependence.   
                                                 
9 PIK 431.   
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     Since what follows can fairly be largely characterized as an exercise in the “history of 
philosophy”, before I begin I feel it necessary to say a word about my guiding attitude 
towards the issue of the faithfulness of both the Idealist and the Heideggerian 
interpretations of Kant’s philosophy, understood on its own terms.  This issue—namely 
how faithful the Idealists or Heidegger are to the spirit and/or the letter of Kant’s 
writings, in particular the extent to which German Idealism marks a progression or an 
illegitimate digression from Kant’s “true” doctrines and aims, or how to understand the 
self-avowed “violence” of Heidegger’s interpretation—is a sticky and contentious one, to 
say the least.  One of my ultimate goals is to show the ways in which Heidegger’s theory 
of selfhood can be best understood as a counter-move or counter-proposal—indeed a 
philosophically plausible and compelling one—to the Idealist resolution to the Kantian 
“problem” of the unity of theoretical subjectivity and of reason as a whole which their 
theories of subjectivity represent, while remaining significantly rooted in that tradition.  
So the primary desideratum in discussing Kant will not ultimately be to demonstrate the 
ways in which the Idealists—again taking Fichte as representative—or Heidegger did or 
did not “get it right” regarding Kant considered on Kant’s own terms.   The goal in part 
one will be, rather, to understand the Kantian problem of the unity of subjectivity 
independently of the Idealists but with the Idealist point of view in mind, and to elucidate 
the motivations that guided their subsequent corrections or amendments to the Kantian 
system but which can be seen independently of those subsequent amendments. And this 
because one of my claims is that Heidegger will share many of these motivations.    
     The problems which the Idealists will identify represent, I think, genuine difficulties in 
Kant, but difficulties which to be sure could or might be possibly resolved from 
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considerations taken purely from a standpoint internal to the Kantian system itself.  But 
that is not the project here.  The project rather involves taking Kant’s fourth question 
“What is the human being?” seriously—as the ultimate question of philosophy—and 
uncovering the characteristic features of the tradition it initiated.  But to “take it 
seriously” means that the task of providing a theory of subjectivity that answers to it 
becomes in principle divorced from the particular demands of the Kantian framework.  
That task is to provide a unified account of human being, what it can, must, and may 
think and do, in order to understand what it can and should make of itself.  My goal is to 
illuminate the philosophical development of the tradition of answering that question 
beginning with Kant and continuing through the German Idealists and to Heidegger.  So 
the ultimate evaluative perspective I am interested in is how far we can still acknowledge 
the sense in which these thinkers did or did not “get it right” in answering this question, 
more so than how they did or did not “get it right” regarding each other.  That said, the 
best way, I believe, to understand how each of them answered the question is to 
understand the ways in which they responded to the answers given by their predecessors.   
     The benefit of approaching this question historically then lies in the possibility that in 
emphasizing certain threads in the fabric of the traditional transcendentalist picture of 
subjectivity, woven in large part by these particular thinkers, a new pattern in the tapestry 
can become visible and predominant.  Its coming to predominance will of course depend 
on the extent to which I succeed in making the image philosophically compelling, but my 
hope is that the new image can then serve as a guide to transcendentalist accounts of 
subjectivity which can offer counter-proposals to the now-predominant naturalizing 
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Part I:  Kantian Dualism and the “Problem” of the Unity of Subjectivity 
 
1)  Kant and the Unity of Subjectivity 
 
What is Kant’s account of subjectivity?  As I explained in the introduction, Kant is 
supposed to have put subjectivity at the center of philosophy, to have enacted a 
“Copernican Revolution” and initiated a tradition of “transcendental philosophy”.  But 
how and where does he thematize subjectivity as such?  And what role does it play in his 
philosophical system?   
     In the lectures on logic, Kant says that the whole field of philosophy “in a 
cosmopolitan sense” can be subsumed under four main questions.   
 1) What can I know? 
 2) What should I do? 
 3) What may I hope? 
 4) What is the human being?10 
 
So Kant adds a fourth question to the famous three from the Canon of the first Critique.11  
He identifies the four questions with metaphysics, morality, religion, and anthropology, 
respectively, and goes on to say that “in principle, one can reckon all of these to 
anthropology, because the first three are related to the last”.12  
     One knows where to look, at least, to find Kant’s answers to the first three questions: 
in the first two Critiques, at least, and in the Religion.  But it is unclear if we are to find 
the answer to Kant’s fourth question, if indeed he has one, in the lectures and published 
                                                 
10 GS IX, 25.   
11 KRV A805/B833 
12 GS IX, 25.  “Im Grunde könnte man aber alles dieses zur Anthropologie rechnen, weil sich die drei 
ersten Fragen auf die letzte beziehen”. 
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texts which bear the actual title “Anthropology”.   How are we to understand the claim 
that the “whole field of philosophy” is “related” to the anthropological question “what is 
the human being”? 
     Kant describes “pragmatic anthropology”, with which his anthropological writings are 
largely concerned, as an “investigation of what he [the human being] as a free-acting 
being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.”13  And this is opposed to an 
investigation of what nature makes of the human being, or what Kant calls a 
“physiological anthropology”.  The distinction made here is between the human being 
considered as a purely natural being, molded and determined entirely by nature, and the 
human being considered as a “free-acting” being capable of a certain degree of self-
determination.  What we get in the texts on pragmatic anthropology themselves is best 
described as an amalgamation of ruminations on empirical faculty psychology, moral 
psychology, physiognomy, moral education and the like, at any rate something quite far 
removed from the purely a priori investigations contained in the Critiques.   
     I think there are two ways of understanding the “relatedness” Kant claims to exist 
between the first three questions and the last.  On the first reading, the anthropological 
works function as a kind of empirical, pragmatic application of the a priori 
epistemological, moral, aesthetic and theological doctrines of the Critiques.  They 
provide a descriptive typology of the sorts of temperaments, characters, and typical 
conducts among concrete, living human beings and their specific kinds of collective 
arrangements—races, nations, and so forth—sometimes with an implicit prescriptive 
evaluation of them.  This reading, which is a natural and, I think, the standard one, has 
                                                 
13 GS VII, 119.  
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the following, by no means slight, advantage, i.e. that the answers to the last question, 
which Kant calls anthropological, are to be found in the writings which Kant actually 
calls anthropology—“found” perhaps in an incomplete, sketchy, or merely promissory 
state, but found nonetheless.   
     The other way of reading takes the “is” in the last question more seriously, and 
additionally, understands the “relatedness” in a foundational sense, that is, it ascribes to 
the last question a kind of logical priority.  Under this reading, the answer to the question, 
“what is the human being?” is meant itself to inform the answers to the other questions 
concerning what the human being can, should, and is permitted to think and do.  “Related 
to” is not taken here to mean “can be applied to” or “is useful for”, but rather something 
more like “is reducible to” or “amounts to”.   If we want to know what the human being 
can know, should do, is permitted to hope, we have to ask what the human being itself is; 
only asking the latter directly will give us complete and satisfying answers to the former 
three.    
     Under this reading, the answer to the last question is not to be found in the 
anthropological writings themselves, which remain too empirical to fulfill the kind of role 
attached to it.  So it is either to be found scattered about the other writings, in need of 
some kind of explicit reconstruction, or it is ultimately not answered by Kant at all.  But 
although it distorts what Kant says about the final question in this way, the second 
reading is more faithful to the actual letter of the final question, which is not, after all, a 
question about how best to apply our philosophical knowledge in understanding 
particular empirical differences in temperaments, characters, etc. and in determining the 
specific conduct of our actual lives—as necessary and admirable as such a task might 
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be—but rather a question about what the human being is.  And it is additionally more in 
the spirit of the programmatic remarks Kant makes about anthropology, namely, an 
investigation into the human being considered “as a free-acting being”.  The very first 
paragraph of the Anthropology itself asserts that 
The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him 
infinitely above all other living things on earth.  Because of this he is a person, 
and…through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things.14 
 
On the second reading, to ask what the human being is is to ask about this unique 
ontological status, to ask how it is that this being is “an entirely different being from 
things” (ostensibly even from other living things).   
     Now what I am calling “the second reading” is, I want to maintain, very close to the 
attitude that the post-Kantian Idealists (and, ultimately, Heidegger) take toward the 
questions which Kant lays out in the Logic as exhausting the concerns of the “whole field 
of philosophy”.  It should be said that the two different readings are not mutually 
exclusive, and, as I have said, the task of figuring out how to apply philosophy’s a priori 
findings in the conduct of our lives as concrete humans beings, or what I am calling the 
“first reading”, is not something the Idealists would want to shun or abandon.  But the 
question remains about whether the task assumed by the second reading, namely, of 
developing an ontological account of the human being qua free-acting being—and  
taking up that task as the primary concern of philosophy—is a truly Kantian one.   
     There are, as we will see, perhaps good reasons to believe that the latter task is not, 
and indeed cannot be, Kant’s task.  There are perhaps principled reasons within Kant’s 
system which necessarily exclude an account of the ontological uniqueness of the human 
                                                 
14 GS VII, 127, emphasis mine, though “person” and “things” are emphasized in the original as well. 
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being—and this is what I am calling a “theory of subjectivity”—from within the realm of 
philosophy’s tasks.  And yet I will try to show that providing such a theory is in fact a 
primary desideratum of the Idealists and later, of the “early Heidegger”.   
     There are perhaps many ways to tell the story of how the Idealists “moved on” from 
Kant, and many ways in which it has in fact been told.  Many, indeed most, involve 
identifying some kind of a lacuna in the Kantian system, a necessary question 
unanswered, or a necessary task unfulfilled.  But whether or not the lacunae appear as 
such within Kant’s philosophy depends on how that philosophy is presented.   
     We can identify two main themes guiding the thought of those who begin writing in 
the immediate aftermath of Kant’s main works and who remain broadly sympathetic to 
the Kantian program—Reinhold, Fichte, the early Schelling, and the early Hegel.  Each 
revolves around the alleged need to fill some kind of perceived lacuna in Kant’s 
philosophy.  The first, perhaps most obvious, characteristic theme is the focus on 
systematicity and in particular the need to ground the systematic whole of philosophy on 
a single principle.  This theme is played out beginning with Reinhold’s “Principle of 
Consciousness”, through to Fichte’s self-positing I and Schelling’s I as the 
“unconditioned in human knowledge”.  The other theme is the focus on the “I” itself, that 
is, the need to develop a theory of subjectivity, and in particular of the unity of 
subjectivity, as the most important of philosophy’s genuine tasks. 
     These two themes become de facto intertwined in the thought of the Idealists; indeed, 
the second is seen as a way of fulfilling the requirements of the first, as evidenced by the 
fact that the proposed “first principle” usually involves some alleged fact about the I and 
its activity.  But they are logically distinct, and in what follows I do not want to focus on 
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the question of systematicity as such, that is, the question why the Idealists feel the need 
to ground the systematic whole of philosophy on a single principle.15  Nor do I want to 
attempt to directly evaluate the legitimacy of such a move, i.e. consider whether there is 
really a lacuna here on Kant’s own terms.  Though the theme of systematicity will of 
course be addressed as well indirectly and along the way, I want rather to focus directly 
on the second theme, namely, to present the elements of Kant’s philosophy in an attempt 
to illuminate the Idealist insistence on the need for a theory of subjectivity putatively 
lacking, or insufficiently developed, in Kant, and in particular to elucidate why this 
theory should take the form of a theory of the unity of subjectivity. 
     Kant’s guiding question, in the problematic sense I have described, is “What is the 
human being?”  The answer to this question can be embodied in a theory of subjectivity, 
because “subjectivity”, as I am using the term, is meant to capture the kind of being that 
human beings possess, as opposed to the kind of being of things, or, more 
problematically, other living beings.  And to ask about the unity of subjectivity is to ask 
about the human being in its wholeness, totality, and integrity, everything that he can, 
should, and may do.  But for Kant, and for the Idealists as well, the uniqueness of the 
human being consists in the fact that she, among mortal creatures at least, alone possesses 
reason.  So that the latter set of concerns becomes the question of the unity of reason. 
     But to see how the unity of reason becomes a problem for Kant—certainly, at least, 
from the point of view of the Idealists—we need to consider the dualisms in Kant in the 
face of which the question of unity arises.  Now Kant’s philosophy is famously rife with 
dualisms, between the analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori, transcendental and 
                                                 
15 See Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in 
German Idealism.  Harvard, 2005. 
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empirical, phenomenal and noumenal, etc.  But more important for our purposes are the 
dualisms Kant identifies, firstly, among our cognitive faculties and capabilities, i.e. 
between sensibility and understanding, and secondly, among the uses of reason in our 
lives, i.e. between theoretical and practical reason. 
     Accordingly, there are two separate issues which must be addressed concerning the 
question of the unity of subjectivity and of reason in Kant, corresponding to these two 
fundamental dualisms.  The first issue is the unity of the theoretical subject, or the human 
being considered as a cognizer or knower.  This will be the topic of the following section 
(§2).  The other fundamental dualism is that between theoretical reason on the one 
hand—or the use of reason by the theoretical subject in its cognitive, scientific 
endeavors—and practical reason on the other—or the use of reason by the practical 
subject or agent in the endeavor to be moral.   This issue will be discussed in section three 
(§3).  Now, the theme of the unity of theoretical subjectivity can itself be seen as 
containing two different levels of unity.  The first level will be our main object of concern 
in the discussion of theoretical subjectivity.  This is the unity which gives rise to 
experience, or of consciousness of an objective rule-governed world, and is produced by 
the transcendental unity of apperception under the categories.  We can call it the unity of 
consciousness or the unity of experience.  At issue here is the functioning of the faculties 
of sensibility, understanding, and, more problematically, the transcendental imagination 
in the production of objective representation and objectively valid judgment.   
     Additionally, there is a second possible level of unity within theoretical subjectivity, 
i.e. one which refers to the necessary role of theoretical reason itself in cognition—as 
distinct from the role of the understanding (and of course, from sensibility)—namely in 
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its regulative use, that is, its role in giving the objective world the type of unity 
presupposed by genuine scientific endeavor, i.e., in giving experience the form of nature, 
understood as a totality governed by a reasonably finite set of fully general and 
determinate empirical laws.  I mention this level because this issue seems to be what Kant 
has in mind when he discusses the issue of the “unity of reason” in the first Critique—as 
opposed to what is usually understood under that rubric—though it will not be an explicit 
topic of discussion here.16 
     The much more common sense of the “unity of reason” in the literature on Kant refers 
rather to the task of producing a unified conception of reason within both the scientific 
and moral domains—which is our second theme, discussed in section three.  At issue here 
is the apparent contradiction between theoretical reason’s conception of nature and 
practical reason’s conception of the necessity of freedom for the possibility of morality.  
Reason at once demands that everything, including human actions, conform to the 
determinism of natural causation, and that causation through freedom must be possible 
for the reality of truly moral action.  How to reconcile these seemingly incompatible 
demands?  But also at issue in both fundamental dualisms is the compatibility of the 
conceptions of the subject and subjectivity which theoretical and practical reason 
respectively yield.  Kant repeatedly refers to the “paradox” that the subject’s self-
knowledge or self-conception is limited to its empirical manifestation as appearance in 
                                                 
16 That there is such a level of unity, that is, whether reason’s regulative principles are really required in 
order to arrive at science, over and above experience, is not uncontroversial.  But as this particular question 
does not directly concern the Idealists and the Idealist critique of Kantian dualism, I will not discuss it here 
in much depth.  What is important is that the account of the unity of the theoretical subject somehow 
(through the co-operation of sensibility, understanding, and reason) result in a conception of nature.  The 
fact that Kant actually uses the phrase “unity of reason” only within the context of discussing reason’s 
regulative role in producing the concept of nature suggests that the issue refers primarily to the context of 
theoretical reason.     
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inner sense.  How does this square with both the spontaneity required within the 
theoretical sphere itself, and the type of freedom required for morality?  What is this 
spontaneity belonging to transcendental apperception, and how does it relate to practical 
freedom? 
     In section two, then, I will address Kant’s bifurcation of the “stems of cognition”—
sensibility and understanding—and the ambiguous place of the imagination within the 
system of faculties of Kant’s transcendental psychology.   I will discuss the role of these 
faculties in producing the unity of experience in the Transcendental Deduction of the first 
Critique, with an eye toward illuminating the types of issues regarding the ontological 
status of this originary synthesis and the role of the imagination which the Idealists and, 
later, Heidegger will focus on.  My goal in this section will be to elucidate the 
motivations of the Idealists and Heidegger in developing a metaphysics of subjectivity, 
which they see as implicit in Kant’s account, over against the claim made by interpreters 
such as Dieter Henrich that Kant’s account of theoretical subjectivity is both non-
metaphysical and involves an irreducible and legitimate “multi-dimensionality” or 
pluralism. 
     In the third section, I will consider the ways in which Kant attempts to reconcile the 
seeming incompatibility or tension in his accounts of theoretical and practical reason, in 
particular his teleological account of reason’s regulative principles as producing a 
possible “transition” between nature and freedom, between the respective “demands” of 
theoretical and practical reason.  I will consider the ways in which, anticipating the 
Idealist critique, one can remain dissatisfied with this attempt to produce a unified 
account of reason and of rational subjectivity which satisfies all of reason’s demands.  I 
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want here to demonstrate the motivation for the later Idealist call for a demonstration of 




2)  The Unity of Theoretical Subjectivity 
 
Kant’s problem in the first Critique is the “problem of metaphysics”.  He says he wants to 
put metaphysics on the “secure path of a science”—by which he means a system of a 
priori cognition such as he thinks is to be found in mathematics and natural science—
which he finds lacking in the tradition of rationalist metaphysics, and which he finds 
threatened by Humean skepticism.  In the preface to the second edition he proposes a 
“change in our way of thinking” about metaphysics which has come to be called the 
“Copernican Revolution”.   
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; 
but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that 
would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing.  Hence 
let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by 
assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree 
better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to 
establish something about objects before they are given to us.17   
 
     Kant’s attempt to “transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics”18 involves an 
“altered method of our way of thinking” whose guiding presupposition is that “we can 
cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.”19  Kant proposes 
that the only way to proceed in metaphysics is to affect a change of perspective in which 
we stop trying to consider how knowledge can result from the theoretical subject’s 
conforming to objects, but rather by considering how knowledge is the result of objects 
conforming to the a priori cognitive procedures of the theoretical subject.  Now for Kant 
these “cognitive procedures” are the a priori synthetic activity of the theoretical subject, 
                                                 
17 KRV, Bxvi. 
18 KRV, Bxxii. 
19 KRV, Bxvii. 
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or better, the transcendental subject.  The point of the Transcendental Analytic is to show 
how the unifying synthetic activity of the theoretical subject provides the basis for the 
possibility of experience and thus of objective knowledge.    
     In the Transcendental Deduction section of the Analytic, Kant maintains that the 
fundamental principle of this synthetic activity is self-consciousness, that is, he claims 
that the ability to relate all of one’s representations to oneself in a unified experience 
according to the rules provided by the understanding itself provides the basis of the 
possibility of objective knowledge.  Kant calls this originary synthetic unity the 
transcendental unity of apperception.  The unity of apperception, or the unifying activity 
of the theoretical subject on its own representations, then, is the enactment of the change 
in thinking in metaphysics that characterizes the Copernican Revolution.  Representations 
of objects constitute objective experience and judgments about them are universally valid 
insofar as they conform to the rules guiding the unifying activity of the understanding 
which is identical to the synthetic activity of self-relation enacted in the unity of 
apperception.   
     The remainder of this section will be divided into three parts.  After briefing 
discussing the role of apperception in the unity of the theoretical subject (a), I want to 
consider two types of dualisms that remain in place despite this unity.  The first is 
between what Kant calls the “stems of cognition”, sensibility and understanding, or the 
two fundamental sources of representation within the subject which cooperate in the 
achievement of theoretical and objective knowledge of the world.  This will serve to 
introduce the problem of the “common root” of these stems and the problematic role of 
the transcendental imagination within the originary synthesis which is the basis of this 
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knowledge, and which will become a dominant theme within both the German Idealist 
and Heideggerian receptions of Kant’s philosophy (b).   The second dualism involves the 
status of the transcendental subject as an object of knowledge for itself.  Kant maintains 
that the subject can only come to know itself as it is “in appearance”, and can know 
nothing of itself “as it is in itself”.  This “paradox of subjectivity” will be an important 
theme in both the Idealists’ and Heidegger’s respective attempts at a metaphysics of 
subjectivity (c). 
 
a)  The “Subject” of the Unity of Apperception 
 
In line with his proposed Copernican Revolution, Kant in the Transcendental Deduction 
asserts that all combination of representations within the manifold of intuition must be the 
action of the understanding; all synthesis is the result of the spontaneity of the 
understanding.  “[W]e can represent nothing as combined in the object without having 
previously combined it ourselves, and…among all representations combination is the 
only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, 
since it is an act of its self-activity [ein Actus seiner Selbsttätigkeit].”20  Now, the 
fundamental activity of combination or synthesis—which is the basis of the unity of 
experience—Kant calls pure, or original, apperception, and the synthetic unity it 
engenders is called the unity of apperception.  The mark of this synthesis is “a necessary 
                                                 
20 KRV, B130. 
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relation to the I think”21, and for this reason it is also referred to as the unity of self-
consciousness.    
     Kant says that the “I think must be able to accompany all of my representations”22; 
and thus it is only because experience has the unity provided by each representation being 
combined in a single consciousness, i.e. only because I can recognize all representations 
as my representations and all combination of representations as the result of my 
combining them, that that experience can constitute objective cognition.  Of course, this 
is only the case if it can be shown that the unity of apperception must be identical to the 
unity of representation under the form of objective judgment, or that the original 
combination effected by apperception must proceed in accordance with categorical rules 
which provide the basis of something’s being an object for us in general.   This is of 
course precisely what Kant goes on to do in the remainder of the Deduction, but its 
specifics are not of immediate interest to us here.  Instead, I’d like to focus on a few 
related aspects of the doctrine of apperception, which become evident if we ask the 
question, “who or what is the subject of this original synthesis, and what kind of 
knowledge (self-knowledge) can we thereby possess about it?”   
     Kant says that the “I think expresses the act of determining my existence [Das, Ich 
denke, drückt den Actus aus, mein Dasein zu bestimmen]”23, and that “in the synthetic 
original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as 
I am in myself, but only that I am.”24  So we have to be careful about the type of self-
                                                 
21 KRV, B132. 
22 KRV, B131. 
23 KRV, B157fn. 
24 KRV, B157. 
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consciousness and self-knowledge that is associated with original apperception.  Kant is 
careful, for the most part, to stress that it is only the formal ability to attach the “I think” 
to each representation, as my representation, that characterizes pure apperception, not that 
I actually do or must so attach it to each representation.   Actually being aware of a 
representation as mine, i.e. representing to myself “I think x”, is rather an instance of 
empirical apperception, which requires some specific determination of the manifold of 
intuition within inner sense (x).   Original apperception is itself the ground of empirical 
self-consciousness, that is, awareness of the contents of one’s thoughts.  It produces the 
simple representation “I think”25, which itself is merely an expression of the original act 
of synthesis.   
     But just as the subject of pure apperception is to be distinguished from the empirical 
subject of self-consciousness, it is also to be distinguished from the I “as it is in itself”, 
that is, the noumenal self.  And this for essentially the same reasons that we cannot know 
anything about things as they are in themselves, i.e. abstracted from the “limiting 
condition” of the form of our sensibility, in this case the form of inner sense, or time.  We 
can only cognize ourselves under the form of time, that is, the secession of 
representations or thoughts we actually have.  We can have, for example, no knowledge 
of our “souls” as they exist in themselves, whether they survive our deaths, etc26.  In the 
act of original synthesis, my own existence is given (“that I am”), but since the manifold 
of intuition is not also thereby given, but rather is determined by our receptivity, self-
knowledge (“what I am” to myself) only extends to my empirical self within inner sense.  
Kant is explicit throughout the Deduction in insisting that we do not possess the kind of 
                                                 
25 KRV, B132. 
26 I will return to this claim later on in this section. 
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“self-intuition” that would determine the content of my subjectivity as well as 
determining the existence of my subjectivity through pure apperception.   This is 
important because, as we will see, the Idealists will insist on ascribing some kind of 
intellectual intuition to the subject of apperception, or the pure or unconditional I. 
     So what can be said about the subject of original apperception?  Apperception, as we 
have seen, is essentially an activity of combining of representations; it is an act of 
spontaneous synthesis resulting in objective experience, in both awareness of the world of 
“external” objects and awareness of “an inner life” of thoughts, imaginations, etc. in time, 
that is, it is the basis of both empirical knowledge and self-knowledge.  But can we then 
ask what or who is acting here, that is, doing the combining, and what kind of knowledge 
the subject of this pure activity can have of itself qua activity?         
     We have seen that the “I” of which we are, each of us, aware in empirical self-
consciousness is only an appearance.  Self-consciousness in this sense is derivative upon 
or conditioned by the original self-relating of pure apperception, and being explicitly 
aware of this self-relating is not a necessary condition of its existence.  Kant also claims, 
as I have here stated but will explore in a bit more detail shortly, that we have no 
knowledge of the self as it exists “in itself”, or what rational psychology would call the 
“soul”.  We know of original apperception only that it is a spontaneous activity, and that 
this activity is a condition of objectivity and self-awareness.   
     But to say this is already to say a lot.  Despite Kant’s seeming reticence to give a 
metaphysical characterization of the transcendental subject, and despite his insistence that 
it must remain in darkness, we already have both negative and positive characterizations 
of it which are neither empty nor insignificant.  Positively speaking we know that it is an 
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activity, and a spontaneous self-activity that is not only the enabling condition of 
experience and empirical self-awareness, but an activity that brings itself into existence.  
This is the meaning of calling the activity spontaneous, and, Kant says, “this spontaneity 
is the reason I call myself an intelligence.”27  Additionally, as mentioned at the outset, 
Kant asserts in the Anthropology that this feature of spontaneity fundamentally marks the 
transcendental subject as having “an entirely different being from things”.  It is a mark of 
subjectivity that it can never be considered a thing, a mere object.28 
     Kant also maintains that this feature of spontaneity “raises [the human being] 
infinitely above all other livings things on earth”.29  But he is also repeatedly insistent in 
these sections of the Critique that the type of intelligence at issue here in the case of the 
transcendental subject is to be carefully distinguished from other possible types of 
intelligence—say, a divine intelligence—by virtue of its dependence on a faculty of 
receptivity in supplying the determinable content of experience.30   
Now I do not have yet another self-intuition, which would give the determining in 
me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before the act of 
determination, in the same way as time gives that which is to be determined, thus I 
cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent 
the spontaneity of my thought, i.e. of the determining...31 
 
                                                 
27 KRV B158fn. 
28 GS VII, 127.  It is these latter two features of transcendental subjectivity, as I will discuss in the next 
part, that will so profoundly impress Fichte and inspire his conception of the self-positing I.   
29 GS VII, 127.  This claim is of course controversial, and there are those who would insist on a categorical 
continuity with, at least, higher animals, by insisting that the latter in fact possess some relevant kind of 
self-consciousness, or by denying that self-consciousness is itself a necessary condition of the relevant kind 
of intentionality roughly in line with Kant’s sense of intentionality, but I needn’t discuss those issues here.  
30 The spontaneity which marks human intelligence is presumably to be distinguished by that possessed by 
angels as well but the fundamental difference between these two becomes much more obvious in the 
context of Kant’s practical philosophy.   
31 KRV B158fn.   
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Kant glosses this type of “self-intuiting spontaneity” or of an “understanding that itself 
intuits”, which he explicitly identifies with divine understanding, as one “which would 
not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would 
themselves at the same time be given, or produced”.32  This type of creative intelligence, 
which produces the existence of the objects in the act of representing them, would 
possess rather an intellectual intuition.   
     So the transcendental subject is what we can call a finite subjectivity, a spontaneous 
synthesizing activity which depends on a faculty of receptivity, or sensibility, to provide 
its matter, the manifold of intuition.  But is this a metaphysical claim?  If we consider 
metaphysics under some broad definition, in which its tasks include providing an 
inventory of beings and their types, and furthermore spelling out the nature or essences 
ascribed to these types respectively, it’s hard, I think, to avoid considering Kant’s 
remarks on the transcendental subject to be metaphysical.  Kant can be seen here as 
situating human subjectivity, and a fortiori human beings tout court, within the inventory 
of beings.  Human beings by nature possess the type of spontaneity which defines what 
we would today call intentionality, but also by nature remain tied to the limiting condition 
of sensibility.33  This can be seen as an account of the essence of human existence and 
intentionality, and it serves to give human subjectivity a sui generis ontological status.34    
                                                 
32 KRV B145. 
33 Again, I am bracketing here the question of whether higher animals, or it should be said now, artificial 
intelligences, also possess this type of (self-conscious) intentionality. 
34 For an ever-handed and penetrating discussion of how to interpret Kant’s claim that the cognitive subject 
is spontaneous, see Pippin’s “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind”, included in his Idealism as Modernism: 
Hegelian Variations. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.  The claim that Kant’s ascription of 
spontaneity to theoretical subjectivity should be given a metaphysical meaning has been resisted by many, 
most notably Patricia Kitcher.  See, for instance, her “Kant’s Real Self “ in Kant on Self and Nature, ed. by 
Allen Wood. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1985; and her Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1990.  More recent attempts to justify a metaphysical interpretation are given, e.g., by 
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     But is it a metaphysical claim by Kant’s own lights?  For Kant, of course, metaphysics 
considered as a science, amounts to the sum total of synthetic a priori propositions.  Are 
we dealing here with a synthetic a priori proposition?   Certainly it is meant to be a priori, 
as it does not seem correct to say that we know it through some kind of empirical 
observation.  To know something empirically is a matter of providing some concept with 
an empirical content, through receptivity.  In fact, part of the point here seems to be that 
the concept of subjectivity itself can never have empirical content, i.e. be an object, a 
thing.   As Kant says, it has “an entirely different being from things”.35   Is it synthetic?  
This is perhaps unclear.  Could it be analytic, i.e. part of the very concept of subjectivity 
that it is a finite self-activity?  Probably not, but it seems to me hard to avoid the sense 
that this particular claim, that transcendental subjectivity is finite self-activity that is 
responsible for the original synthetic activity that grounds all objectivity and empirical 
self-awareness, and that this subjectivity therefore is ontologically unique, has a different 
status than the other propositions that make up a critical metaphysics.   
     Even if a case could be made for considering this claim as a synthetic a priori 
proposition, Kant doesn’t seem to attempt to justify it in the manner he does other such 
propositions.  Such metaphysical claims, under this framework, require transcendental 
arguments.  And other classical synthetic a priori propositions, such as ‘all events have a 
cause’ or even, arguably, that the ‘“I think” must be able to accompany all of my 
representations’, that is, the central claims of the Critique, seem to have such arguments 
associated with them.  Nevertheless, the claim that transcendental subjectivity is an 
ontologically unique finite self-activity seems to be an absolutely central claim of, even 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arthur Melnick in his Kant’s Theory of the Self.  New York: Routledge, 2009; and Colin Marshall in his 
“Kant's Metaphysics of the Self”. Philosophers' Imprint 10:8 (2010), 1-21. 
35 GS VII, 127. 
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the very ground of, transcendental philosophy itself in Kant’s sense.  And if we consider 
metaphysics to provide an inventory of types of beings and their essences, it seems that 
that transcendental philosophy is resting on a crucial metaphysical claim.  Kant does not 
seem to be aware of, or at least interested in, spelling out the import of this striking 
metaphysical claim.  But as I will try to show in the following chapters, it is precisely this 
import which so impresses the early Idealists, and subsequently Heidegger. 
     
b)  The “Common Root” and the Homelessness of Transcendental Imagination 
 
Kant says that all theoretical cognition arises from “two fundamental sources in the mind 
[zwei Grundquellen des Gemüts]”36, namely receptivity and spontaneity.  Our capacity 
[Fähigkeit] for receptivity, that is, the ability to “acquire representations through the way 
in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility.”37  The faculty [Vermögen] for 
“bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the 
understanding.”38  So there are two separate capacities or faculties which are distinct but 
mutually necessary for cognition, namely sensibility and understanding.  This distinction 
is of course crucial for Kant and the whole project of the first Critique, and forms the 
basis of the architectonic separation of the text into the Transcendental Aesthetic and the 
Transcendental Analytic, but Kant says very little about the origin of this distinction or its 
justification.  In the Introduction, he writes, 
All that seems necessary for an introduction or preliminary is that there are two 
stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us 
                                                 
36 KRV A50/B74. 
37 KRV A19/B33. 
38 KRV A50/B74. 
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unknown root [die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen, aber uns unbekannten 
Wurzel entspringen], namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of 
which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.39 
 
     On the face of it, there are at least two reasons to think that the distinction between the 
two stems of cognition must be preserved.  Firstly, each represents an indispensable 
feature of the kind of finite subjectivity that Kant ascribes to human beings, and 
subsequently, preserving the integrity of each seems essential to the theory of human 
cognition that Kant is developing in the first Critique.   The self-activity or spontaneity 
that Kant says gives rise to experience must be delimited by the conditions of human 
receptivity or sensibility, that is, the spontaneity necessary for cognition must be 
beholden or responsive to the content of the manifold of intuition, which is provided only 
passively, i.e. affected by something, if the result of that synthetic activity is to represent 
the world objectively.  Secondly, it’s prima facie hard to see what it would mean for two 
faculties, one spontaneous, the other receptive, i.e. active and passive respectively, to be 
reducible to or originate in a third faculty.40  If understanding itself is wholly active, and 
sensibility itself wholly passive, the so-called common root would seem to have to be 
wholly active and wholly passive at the same time.   Indeed in the Anthropology, Kant 
seems to rescind the possibility of the common root hinted at in the previous passage for 
just this reason. 
Despite their dissimilarity, understanding and sensibility by themselves form a 
close union for bringing about our cognition, as if one had its origin in the other, 
or both originated from a common origin; but this cannot be, or at least we cannot 
conceive how dissimilar things could sprout forth from one and the same root.41 
 
                                                 
39 KRV A15/B29. 
40 “Prima facie”, perhaps, but as we will see in part three, I think cases in which we must ascribe both 
activity and passivity “at the same time and in the same respect” are actually quite pervasive.    
41 GS VII, 177. 
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     There are three possibilities here if we give these two passages equal footing.   Either 
(1) Kant denies the possibility of the common root, or (2) he leaves it open as a 
possibility but believes that knowledge of it is in principle inaccessible to us, or (3) he 
believes that we may yet discover what the common root is, even though we cannot 
conceive at the moment what, or even how, it could be.  At the very least, it doesn’t seem 
to be a question Kant is particularly interested in, and indeed it is one for which, unlike 
the question of the unity of theoretical and practical reason, he never himself suggests an 
answer.  In contrast, it is a question in which both the early Idealists and Heidegger in 
their readings of Kant are very much interested.  Each in their own way choose the third 
option and claim that the common root is in fact discoverable, and furthermore that it is 
some form of the faculty of transcendental imagination.  At least among the faculties that 
Kant discusses, this possible candidate immediately suggests itself for reasons that I hope 
to ultimately make clear.  In the remainder of this section however, I want to give a 
preliminary sense of the role of the transcendental imagination within the first Critique, 
particularly in the Transcendental Deduction, and to loosen and begin to dislodge the 
sense that identifying the common root is an impossible or hopeless endeavor.   
     The faculty of imagination holds a troubled place in Kant’s system.  Kant of course 
returns to imagination in the third Critique and assigns it a crucial role in the formation of 
aesthetic judgment.  Even if a proper understanding of the exact way in which it is 
functioning there is difficult to achieve, its specific role and place relative to the other 
faculties at work, notably here the understanding, is relatively clear-cut.  But its role in 
the formation of empirical judgment, i.e. objective cognition, within the argument of the 
Transcendental Deduction is particularly troubled and ambiguous.   In what follows I 
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want to highlight this ambiguity, and discuss its relationship to the original synthetic 
unity whose activity grounds all experience, both objective empirical cognition and 
subjective self-awareness, and which I have been insisting is the essence of finite 
subjectivity on Kant’s account.  I hope in the process to begin to make clear why the 
Idealists, and Heidegger after them, find so much promise in the project of reconfiguring 
Kant’s account of subjectivity by foregrounding the role of imagination.   I also want to 
consider Dieter Henrich’s arguments that this Idealist project of locating the common 
root in the imagination is thoroughly un-Kantian and represents an abandonment of the 
Critical project.  
     In my earlier discussion of the subject of transcendental apperception, I tried to give 
an initial assessment of the metaphysical import of the spontaneity or self-activity 
associated with the original synthesis which gives rise to empirical cognition and self-
awareness.  There, this spontaneity was attached to the synthetic unity of apperception, 
which Kant in the B-edition equates with “the understanding itself”42.  In fact, the 
situation is somewhat more complex than this.  In the Metaphysical Deduction, which is 
common to both editions, Kant defines synthesis in general as the “action of putting 
different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness 
in one cognition”43.  But then he immediately describes synthesis in general as the “mere 
effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul.”44  This 
raises the question whether the element of spontaneity required for cognition actually 
accrues to the faculty of imagination, whether we should consider imagination as 
                                                 
42 KRV B134 fn. 
43 KRV A77/B103.  italics mine.   
44 KRV A78/B103.  again, italics my own. 
  
42 
representing the active element in cognition.  Kant suggests this again when he goes on to 
describe the “three things” that must be given a priori in cognition.  The first is the 
manifold of pure intuition, the second is the synthesis of this manifold “by means of the 
imagination”, and the third is the concepts which give this synthesis unity.  He says that 
the synthesis of the imagination “does not yield cognition” and that it must be brought to 
concepts, which depends on the understanding, in order to arrive at cognition “in the 
proper sense”.  But it is unclear at this stage if this “bringing to concepts”, or instilling the 
synthetic unity with a specific kind of unity, involves an additional activity, over and 
above the spontaneity of the imagination. 
     It should be noted that the term “cognition [Erkenntnis]” does not seem to be univocal 
here.  When Kant defines synthesis as the collecting of various representations in one 
cognition, or says that the “synthesis of a manifold…first brings forth a cognition, which 
to be sure may initially still be raw and confused”, we are to distinguish this from 
cognition in the proper sense [in eigentlicher Bedeutung], which involves concepts and 
thus presumably, if the concepts are pure, possesses objective validity.  But does having a 
cognition “in a proper sense” demand an additional spontaneous activity, require the 
understanding to step in, as it were, and reorganize the synthetic unity according to 
concepts?  Although it’s not entirely clear what the raw and confused cognitions would 
amount to, the passage rather suggests to me that we should consider the faculty of 
imagination to exhaust the active element in synthesis.  The difference then would not be 
whether the understanding is also active or not, but whether the synthesis of the 
imagination is conducted according to concepts, i.e. the rules of the understanding, or 
not.  Kant says that “synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for 
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cognitions and unifies them into a certain content”45.   Notice that in his description of the 
“three things” necessary for cognition, only the synthesis of imagination is described as 
an activity.  The synthesis of imagination “alone” is responsible for producing content, 
and conducting this synthesis in accordance with the rules provided by the concepts of 
the understanding can be seen as a condition on the synthesis producing content of a 
certain kind, namely objective cognitions “in the proper sense”.  Rules in themselves are 
static things, a set of guidelines, and it is following the rule (or not) in “putting the 
representations together with each other” which requires an activity of some kind, and 
this, I am suggesting, can be ascribed to imagination.  Before I elaborate on this possible 
line of interpretation, I need to consider what Kant says about imagination in both 
editions of the Deduction themselves, including where they seem to differ.46   
     In the last paragraph of the preparatory remarks to the Transcendental Deduction in 
the A-edition, which is excised in the B-edition, Kant again asserts that there are three 
“original sources [ursprüngliche Quellen], (capacities or faculties of the soul) 
[(Fähigkeiten oder Vermögen der Seele)] which contain the conditions of the possibility 
of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the 
mind”47.  These are sense, imagination, and apperception.  How are we to square this with 
the earlier assertions that all cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind 
                                                 
45 KRV A77/B103. 
46 The literature on the Transcendental Deduction and the relationship between the A- and B-edition 
presentations is, of course, quite large.  Of particular note is Henrich’s classic “Kant’s Notion of a 
Deduction and the Methological Background of the First Critique”, included in Förster, ed. Kant’s 
Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum.  Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 
1989; Allison’s account in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1983; and 
Guyer’s in Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987 
47 KRV A94.  The passage under discussion is replaced in the B-edition with a historical remark describing 
the intention of the Critique to steer “human reason between the two cliffs” of enthusiasm and skepticism, 
represented by Locke and Hume respectively, and no mention at all is made about imagination or the 
sources of cognition.  
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[Grundquellen des Gemüts], receptivity and spontaneity, and that there are thus two stems 
[Stämme] of human cognition, sensibility and understanding?   
     In the second section of the A-Deduction, Kant discusses the threefold synthesis 
which is found in all objective cognition: apprehension, reproduction, and recognition.  
Each of the syntheses can be seen as a transcendental step in which some element of 
cognition or mental action is shown to be a necessary condition of what comes before if 
cognition in the proper sense is to be achieved, though it should be kept in mind that Kant 
is not intending us to consider them as three separate syntheses.  In apprehension, Kant 
asserts that having a manifold of intuition at all requires some synthetic activity in which 
representations, as mere modifications of the mind, are “run through” and “taken 
together” as a manifold.  Now, the origin of this activity, i.e. the synthesis which results 
in a manifold of intuition, is not entirely clear here and I won’t discuss it now48.  More 
interesting for present purposes is the other two syntheses.  
     By “synthesis of reproduction” Kant means the activity in which representations 
become associated with each other, in which “one of the representations brings about a 
transition of the mind to the other in accordance with a constant rule.”49  Kant argues that 
the empirical rules of association governing these transitions in the mind (which he calls 
empirical imagination)—say, using his famous example, thinking of cinnabar upon 
perceiving a certain shade of red—would not be possible if the representations 
themselves were not actually subject to such a rule.  So, he goes on, we must assume a 
                                                 
48 Though it should be said that there is reason to believe that this synthesis can be straightforwardly 
attributed to the imagination, insofar as the synthesis presupposes an activity.  “There is thus an active 
faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised 
immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension.” (A121)  This suggests that the synthesis of 
apprehension is itself conducted by the imagination, which would not be strange considering Kant’s claim 
that all synthesis is an effect of imagination.  
49 KRV A100. 
  
45
transcendental faculty of the imagination a priori, which provides “the sort of 
combination of the manifold that makes possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of 
reproduction”50, namely a faculty whose synthesis is guided by a priori rules which 
themselves ground the possibility of the empirical laws of reproduction and association.    
     So, the type of synthetic unity which constitutes cognition of an object—as opposed 
to, as Kant says, “a blind play of representations, i.e. less than a dream”, which would 
reduce our empirical imagination to a “dead and to us unknown faculty”—is that unity 
which is guided by certain necessary rules of reproduction, and the necessity of certain 
associations or reproductions is grounded in the concept of the object.51  Now Kant 
asserts that this synthesis of recognition in the concept itself requires a transcendental 
ground, and this is transcendental apperception, or the consciousness of one’s 
unchanging, stable, numerical identity through all synthesis, or consciousness of the unity 
of one’s synthetic activity in one consciousness.   
Thus the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the 
same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all 
appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e. in accordance with rules that not 
only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object 
for their intuition, i.e. the concept of something in which they are necessarily 
connected.52  
 
Now, in the third section of the A-deduction, Kant goes on to represent the threefold 
synthesis as “unified and in connection”—again, there is after all only one synthesis 
taking place—and to discover what he calls the “inner ground” of this connectedness.  In 
this regard, he says that we have to begin with pure apperception, which yields the 
                                                 
50 KRV A101. 
51 Of course, the argument of the transcendental deduction goes on to maintain that this necessary unity in 
one consciousness must itself be guided by rules which provide the concept of an object in general (=x), 
and these a priori rules are the categories.   
52 KRV A108,  all italics mine. 
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“absolutely first” principle of thinking in general, the a priori principle of all synthetic 
unity.   
This synthetic unity, however, presupposes a synthesis, or includes it, and if the 
former is to be necessary a priori then the latter must also be a synthesis a priori.  
Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of 
the imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all composition of 
the manifold in a cognition.  But only the productive synthesis of the imagination 
can take place a priori…the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of 
the imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all 
cognition, especially that of experience.53 
 
What is remarkable about the A-deduction is this priority given to the pure, productive 
imagination; it is portrayed as the active faculty, itself responsible for all pure synthesis, 
and thus the ground of all cognition.   
We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human 
soul, that grounds all cognition a priori.  By its means we bring into combination 
the manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity 
of apperception on the other.  Both extremes, namely sensibility and 
understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental 
function of the imagination.54 
 
In passages like this it becomes clear why it is sometimes suggested that Kant in fact 
already possessed the resources to locate the “common but to us unknown root” in the 
faculty of productive imagination.  But, recalling the earlier discussion of the subject of 
original synthesis, and my suggestions of the potential metaphysical import of this type of 
spontaneity or self-activity, it also becomes clearer why the early Idealist attempts to 
“complete” the Kantian project with a metaphysics of subjectivity involve focusing on 
the faculty of imagination.  
     We are now in a position to continue the line of interpretation I began earlier, 
according to which it is the faculty of imagination that manifests the type of self-activity 
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that bequeaths human subjectivity its unique ontological status.  It is the locus of mental 
activity as such, the name given to the power of the mind to act from and upon itself; it is 
what makes subjectivity subjectivity, viz. something essentially distinguished from 
things.  Now, Kant himself recognizes that assigning imagination such a role in 
grounding cognition seems “certainly strange”.  And indeed, several problems 
immediately present themselves.   
     Firstly, Kant describes imagination as a “blind” function of the soul, and it seems 
unlikely that a blind, unruly mental activity could be assigned the role of the fundamental 
ground of cognition, and the source of spontaneity.  Secondly, there are a plethora of 
places, including the B-deduction which I will discuss shortly, where spontaneity is 
associated rather with the faculty of understanding.   Both of these concerns can be 
addressed together.   To begin with, it’s not clear that “blind” here is meant to indicate 
that it is not rule-governed.  It might seem, given Kant’s repeated description of the 
understanding as the “faculty of rules”, that the way to distinguish between the 
spontaneous activity of the imagination on the one hand and that of the understanding on 
the other is that the latter is rule-governed while the former is not.  But in fact it must be 
the case that the synthetic activity of the imagination, both in its empirical-reproductive 
activity and in its original-productive activity, proceeds in accordance with some rule or 
other, if the content which results is to be determinate to any degree whatsoever.  We 
should keep in mind here a distinction which Kant hints at throughout the A-deduction—
though he doesn’t I believe always carefully apply it—namely the distinction between 
rules and laws.    
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     All combination or association of representations proceeds according to rules, 
otherwise, Kant says, we would only have “unruly heaps” of unconnected representations 
and imagination would be for us a “dead” faculty.  Laws are rules of combination which 
have an objective ground.  “Rules, insofar as they are objective, are called laws.”55  And 
laws are thus distinguished by their necessity.  “[T]he representation of a universal 
condition in accordance with which a certain manifold (of whatever kind) can be posited 
is called a rule, and, if it must be so posited, a law.”56  The principle of a law—which, 
when applied to a manifold, yields objective content—is based in the “affinity” of the 
combined representations.  Certain representations just belong together if the synthetic 
manifold is to have an objective determinate content.  The pure understanding, i.e. the 
categories, is, of course, the source of the sort of affinity of representations which yields 
the form of an object in general.   
     We can conceive of the understanding, then, as a set of constraints on the spontaneous 
synthetic activity of the imagination, as a set of rules (concepts) and laws (pure concepts 
or categories) which give the resultant content a certain form.  Concepts make the 
determinate content discursive, and the categories make the content objectively valid, i.e. 
a cognition in the proper sense.  But within this picture we are free to consider the 
imagination as the name of our capacity for spontaneity as such; understanding then is the 
name of the set of principles, rules and laws which the imagination follows in yielding 
various types of determinate content.  We can say that the understanding is itself 
spontaneous, but only because it is the form (both empirical and pure) of the synthetic 
activity of the imagination, which represents spontaneous self-activity as such.  In itself 
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then the understanding is purely formal, and depends on the activity of the imagination.  
“It is apperception that must be added to the pure imagination in order to make its 
function intellectual.” 57  This can also make sense of the passages in which Kant seems 
to define understanding in terms of imagination. “The unity of apperception in relation 
to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in 
relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure 
understanding.”58  So if we want to identify the understanding itself as a spontaneous 
faculty, this is only and simply because it is “imaginative activity” with a certain form.  
     Of course, the point of the Transcendental Deduction is to prove the objective validity 
of the categories, i.e. to prove that the application of the categories is a necessary 
condition of experience, that is, cognition in the proper sense.  But if we abstract from 
this immediate purpose and use the resources of the Deduction in considering what a 
Kantian picture of transcendental psychology or mental activity in general would look 
like, the interpretation of the imagination as the true source of spontaneity gains further 
credibility.  The imagination as spontaneity is the source of all mental activity, i.e. all 
transitions in thought from one representation to another.  Its synthetic activity must at a 
bare minimum adhere to the formal condition of the unity of apperception, otherwise I 
couldn’t identify the representations as my own or the transitions as those I was making.  
Furthermore, the transitions or combinations must be in accordance with some rule or 
other, because all thinking is discursive, that is, conceptual.  Now, if the thinking is to 
amount to objective cognition, the imaginative activity must proceed in accordance with 
the objective laws represented both by the empirical and pure concepts of the 
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understanding.  If I am have an objective cognition of cinnabar, for example, the 
representation of this shape must be combined with the representation of this shade of red 
and the representation of this amount of heaviness; and it must conform to the pure 
conditions of objecthood in general, e.g. have certain causal properties, etc.   
     But objective cognition is of course not the only telos of mental activity or thinking; 
there are of course all sorts of mental activity that don’t amount to cognition in the proper 
sense, e.g. memories, dreams, free associations.  In all of these cases, the rules governing 
the transitions or combinations in the mind must be rule-based in some way or other, and 
indeed seem to require some application of the categories, but the rules may be purely 
subjective or idiosyncratic, or some of the categories may be missing.  Cinnabar may 
remind me of my grandmother, or I may imagine green cinnabar, or dream of cinnabar 
which floats in water, or even dream of a piece of cinnabar which is also a pumpkin at the 
same time. 
     If Kant says that the imagination is “blind”, then, he cannot mean that it is not rule-
governed.  We should, I believe, interpret this to mean that the specific ways in which it 
is rule-governed, that is, the rules which it is following in any particular case, are not 
always and needn’t be in principle accessible to us; the original synthesis is a “hidden art 
in the depths of the human soul”.   But the synthesis of imagination, though always rule-
governed in some way or other, needn’t be law-governed.   This only happens in a 
specific variant of mental activity, namely cognition.  In cognition, the synthesis of 
imagination proceeds in accordance with the laws stipulated by the pure understanding.  
     Now, the situation in the B-deduction, at least on the surface, is quite different.  It can 
seem as if the faculty of imagination is being eliminated.  Here, all combination is the 
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action of the understanding.  “[T]he combination of a manifold in general…is an act of 
the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter 
understanding…all combination…is an action of the understanding”; and “among all 
representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but can be 
executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity.”59  So, all the 
things that were attributed in the A-Deduction to the faculty of imagination, namely all 
synthetic self-activity, are attributed rather in the B-Deduction to understanding.  Kant 
here abandons the threefold distinction between apprehension, reproduction, and 
recognition.  The argument of the B-Deduction itself, then, begins immediately with the 
synthetic unity of apperception, as the highest principle of all synthetic unity, which Kant 
identifies with the understanding itself60.  The argument then proceeds in successive steps 
to prove that the unity of apperception must be in accordance with the unity of an object 
in general, namely it must be in accordance with the categories. 
     The faculty of productive imagination is introduced in section 24 of the Deduction, but 
its role seems to be quite different than it was in the A-edition.  In section 22, Kant draws 
a distinction between thinking and cognizing an object.  This seems to be very close to the 
distinction which I have drawn in the discussion of the A-edition between cognition in 
general and cognition in the proper sense.  Thinking of an object requires that the unity 
of representation adhere to the conditions of representing an object in general, that is, the 
categories.  But Kant here calls this mental activity merely intellectual, and notes that 
empirical cognition, or experience, “cognition in the proper sense”, requires application 
of the categories to empirical, or sensible, intuition.  The categories, Kant says, are mere 
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forms of thought and only when the synthetic activity of apperception—by itself merely 
intellectual—is a synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition do the categories acquire 
objective reality and constitute empirical cognition. 
     Now in section 24 Kant identifies this synthesis, which he calls figurative in contrast 
to the intellectual synthesis of understanding alone, with the transcendental synthesis of 
the imagination, which is the work of the productive imagination.  It should be noticed 
then how this effectively reverses the roles of understanding and imagination from those 
they played in the A-deduction, at least under the interpretation I have suggested. 
According to the latter, the imagination is responsible for the work of synthesis, as mental 
self-activity in general, which by itself merely constitutes thought or cognition in general.  
It is only when the synthesis proceeds in a certain kind of cooperation with the 
understanding, or to be more precise, when the synthesis is rule-like in the right way, or 
rather law-like, or has the proper form provided by the understanding, does the synthetic 
unity yield empirical cognition in the proper sense.  According to the B-edition of the 
Deduction, the understanding as the locus of all combinative activity itself conducts the 
synthesis.  Rather than, as in the offered interpretation of the A-deduction, the 
understanding being the name of a certain kind of form which the original synthesis can 
take, the understanding here is to be understood as an active faculty in its own right, 
which taken by itself can only yield mere objects of thought, that is, mental content in 
general, and it is only when the imagination contributes its figurative synthesis do we 
have proper empirical cognition or experience. 
     Of course, as in the A-deduction, the syntheses of understanding and imagination are 
not meant to be understood as numerically distinct.  In fact, at one point Kant seems to 
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explicitly identify them.  “It is one and the same spontaneity that, there under the name of 
imagination and here under the name of understanding, brings combination into the 
manifold of intuition.”61  Indeed, Kant says imagination is merely “an effect of the 
understanding on sensibility and its first application.”62  But there must be at least a 
conceptual distinction between them, and we can find this if we recall the distinction 
between thought and cognition.  Figurative synthesis is synthesis of the sensible 
manifold, and, Kant says, imagination belongs to sensibility.  Intellectual synthesis 
however needn’t involve the action of the imagination, as in mere thinking which falls 
short of objective reality.  Understanding is mental activity abstracted from sensible 
conditions.   
     Ultimately, then, there is not as wide of a gap as it might first appear between the A- 
and B-editions in terms of the pictures of the relationship they respectively yield between 
the faculties, specifically between imagination and understanding.   But there still 
decidedly remains a difference of emphasis or primacy.  The B-edition seems to shift 
away from the talk of the imagination’s fundamental role in original synthesis present in 
the A-edition, in favor of the imagination’s dependence on the synthetic activity of the 
understanding.  “Now that which connects the manifold of sensible intuition is 
imagination, which depends on understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis 
and on sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension.”63  I will not try to speculate 
here about the reasons for this shift; we will return to it later in discussing Heidegger’s 
claim that Kant “shrinks back” from his discovery of the originary role of imagination in 
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the Kantbook.   But it should be mentioned that perhaps not too much emphasis should be 
placed initially on the notion of “dependence” here.  It is clear that there is always a 
mutual interdependence, in the sense of a necessary cooperation, between all of the 
alleged faculties within the various types of mental activity. 
     What I hope to have evoked at least initially is the sense, to use Heidegger’s phrase, of 
the “homelessness” of imagination within the two versions of the Deduction, and by 
extension, within the project of the entire first Critique.  Besides Kant’s provocative and 
puzzling remark concerning the common root, we may be struck by the ambiguity of the 
two remarks concerning the fundamental or original sources of human cognition 
(intentionally leaving this term itself ambiguous); on the one hand: sensibility and 
understanding (identified as the faculties of receptivity and spontaneity respectively); and 
on the other hand: sense, imagination, and apperception.  Given the weight I have placed 
on the question of the metaphysical import of the original synthesis which is the purview 
of the type of spontaneity distinctive of human subjectivity, anticipating the concerns of 
the Idealists and Heidegger, the question legitimately arises about where this spontaneity 
lies, to which faculty or faculties it is to be assigned.   In the A-Deduction, I suggested 
that we can understand the productive imagination as the paradigmatic spontaneous 
faculty, the locus of all original synthesis, and the understanding as spontaneous insofar 
as its formal laws give a certain form to the unity of the activity.  In the B-Deduction, the 
imagination has lost its fundamental role as the faculty of synthesis in general, which 
accrues rather to the understanding, but remains itself a bona fide spontaneous faculty, 
even though, Kants says, it “belongs to sensibility”, that is, a faculty of receptivity.  This 
is in itself not a problem, because it can simply mean that the imagination, as opposed to 
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the understanding which can remain purely intellectual, must necessarily unify a sensible 
manifold.64   But if all that I have said is accurate, it does create a problem for an easy 
identification of the dualism between receptivity and spontaneity, which must remain an 
absolutely fundamental distinction within Kant’s account of finite human subjectivity, 
and the dualism of sensibility and understanding, which seems to give structure to most 
of the architectonic and the form of the arguments of the first Critique.  A precise picture 
of the role of imagination qua spontaneous faculty and thus qua essential faculty of 
human subjectivity distinctive from the understanding remains obscure and elusive.  I 
also hope to have evoked the sense of promise the Idealists and Heidegger attached to the 
faculty of imagination as both the faculty of human spontaneity par excellence, and the 
faculty which may perhaps prove to be the original source or common root of both 
sensibility and understanding. 
     Dieter Henrich addresses the issue of the common root in his article “On the Unity of 
Subjectivity”65.  The article is explicitly framed as a critique of the attempt on behalf of 
both the Idealists and Heidegger to identify the common root with the faculty of 
imagination.  Henrich maintains that Kant in fact must deny in principle that any 
knowledge of the common root is possible, and additionally tries to show that Kant 
adheres to a necessary irreducible pluralism of faculties, and that the structure of 
subjectivity on Kant’s account is defined by an “intrasubjective teleology” among 
faculties which is essentially “multidimensional”.  He argues for this firstly by placing 
                                                 
64 Though it does seem odd in this context that in the B-edition Kant defines imagination as “the faculty for 
representing an object even without its presence in intuition” (KRV B151) in light of its role in the B-
Deduction as the faculty which ensures the objective reality of its synthetic unity.  This definition rather 
seems to better encapsulate the role of imagination in the A-Deduction, where I have suggested it is the 
faculty of spontaneous mental activity in general.    
65 Hereafter abbreviated as OUS.  Included in the collection of essays by Henrich edited by Richard L. 
Velkley, The Unity of Reason.  Harvard, 1994.  References to page numbers are to this edition.   
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the passage of the common root within the context of Kant’s rejection of 18th century 
faculty psychology, and secondly by trying to demonstrate how Kant’s general position in 
the first Critique necessitates seeing the common root as in principle inaccessible, 
something outside or beyond the scope of human knowledge, which must remain forever 
obscure to us.   
     First the historical claim.  Henrich says that the “passage on the common root does not 
point forward but refers back to the controversies of the eighteenth century concerning 
the system of psychology and its ontological presuppositions.”66   He has in mind Kant’s 
rejection of Wolffian psychology which tries to discover a “basic power” within the soul 
which grounds all other powers or psychological faculties.  This project is a consequence 
of Wolff’s appropriation of Leibnizian ontology.  As Henrich says, Wolff’s “reduction of 
the powers of the faculty of knowledge to one basic power was not motivated by reasons 
that lie in the structure of the subject itself.  Rather, those reasons stem from his attempt 
to turn the Leibnizian concept of substance into the foundation of a systematic 
psychology.”67  Henrich shows that Kant took over Crusius’ criticisms of this idea of a 
basic power.  Firstly, according to Crusius and thus Kant, the idea rests on an incorrect 
definition of power.  To identify a substance as possessing a “power” is merely to 
describe the relation of an accident to the substance in which it inheres, the “power” 
merely identifies the “possibility of an effect” of the substance.  Secondly, to identify the 
soul’s basic power, as Wolff does, as the vis repraesentativa universi, the ability of the 
soul to represent the world to itself, is merely to give a “common title” to the soul’s 
various representative powers, to abstract their common factor.  This procedure is 
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essentially empty and semantic, as it would be if one were to try to account for the 
various kinetic properties of matter by identifying the basic power of matter as “the 
moving power”.  To reduce the soul’s powers of perception, imagination, memory, 
judgment etc. to the vis repraesentativa universi is not to ground them in the soul’s basic 
power but merely to give these various representative powers a common name.  The real 
criterion of a basic power, in Henrich’s words, “is that it renders intelligible the powers it 
grounds, such that the powers can be deduced from the basic power.”68  “By contrast to 
the merely abstracted general power, the basic power is that which constitutes something 
peculiar and different from other things ‘in a manner not due to our way of considering 
things’”.69  
     It must be admitted that this historical background information is unassailable.  What 
is less clear is that we must admit, as Henrich insists, that this is what Kant has in mind in 
the passage on the common root, that Kant in that passage is “referring back” to this 
position vis-à-vis Wolffian psychology which he considers refuted by Crusius.  It remains 
uncertain if Kant’s reference to the common root which is “to us unknown” is a reference 
to the type of “basic power” sought by that project with its illegitimate ontological 
presuppositions and ambitions.  In particular, this interpretation can make the “perhaps” 
of the common root passage seem odd in this context.  If the description of the common 
root as “to us unknown” here is taken to refer to the fact that it is in principle inaccessible 
to us, rather than something as yet undiscovered, and this assertion is based on a 
principled rejection of the project of finding a “basic power”, why then does Kant suggest 
that the stems of cognition may “perhaps” arise from such a root after all?   
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     Henrich explains this “perhaps” by the fact that for Kant the idea of a basic power of 
the soul, a unifying principle that reduces and explains the soul’s other various powers 
and faculties, can and must remain a purely regulative ideal.   Kant believes that it is a 
“maxim of reason” to always seek unity among the plurality of phenomena, to seek the 
unitary principle that explains the phenomena, in this case the soul’s various powers, but 
that this fact about the nature of reason does not guarantee that it can in fact be found; it 
remains, he says, “purely hypothetical”.   This is what causes Henrich to describe Kant’s 
counter-proposal as an “intrasubjective teleology” of the subject’s faculties which is 
“constituted of several mutually independent factors, contingent in their reciprocal 
relations.”70  “[T]he joining of the cognitive powers can only be explained from some 
purposive arrangement; and yet the teleology is intrasubjective in that the purposiveness 
in question does not refer to given objects.”71   Even in denying the possibility of a 
positive knowledge of a fundamental and original ground of the subject’s cognitive 
capacities, and thus a unitary principle of theoretical reason, we can still conceive of the 
interplay of faculties as teleologically directed at the ideal of a perfect unity and 
simplicity.  The unity of theoretical subjectivity can remain a regulative ideal, even 
though it can never be reached.   
     This idea is at play, as Henrich points out, in the argument of the Paralogisms, and its 
critique of rational psychology in the ontological tradition of Leibniz and Wolff.  There 
Kant argues against the doctrines of rational psychology which maintain that we can 
know the soul as a simple, indestructible, persisting substance; the soul, that is, as it 
would be conceived as a basic power and ground of all theoretical powers.  As I will 
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discuss the Paralogisms in the next section, I will postpone for a moment remarking on 
the relevance of the arguments there for the matter at hand.  But Henrich’s appeal to them 
is connected with another Kantian theme which he uses to bolster his argument that the 
common root is in principle inaccessible.  Henrich is keen to emphasize the dimension of 
Kant’s thought which insists on certain regions of unavoidable obscurity or Dunkelheiten, 
in which reason’s light, though it be part of reason’s nature to try, can never penetrate.72  
According to Henrich, the project of discovering the ground of subjectivity itself, and 
thus the unitary principle of theoretical reason, a project to which, allegedly, the very idea 
of identifying the common root purportedly belongs, is one such region.  For Henrich’s 
Kant, the unity of the subject is something to be amazed at, but something for which no 
explanation is possible, something which must always remain mysterious.  The project of 
the Critique is after all about surveying the limits of human reason, and the ground of the 
unity of subjectivity lies beyond these limits.  Henrich says that the “‘I’, around which we 
‘can only revolve in a perpetual circle’ (A346/B404), cannot get outside itself and reach 
the ground of its own possibility.”73   In connection with this, Henrich also mentions 
Kant’s remark in the Anthropology, already quoted above, about the problem of the 
heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding.74  It is prima facie extremely difficult to 
see what it would mean for the common root to be the source of both sensibility and 
                                                 
72 This theme is present in the very first lines of the Critique.  “Human reason has the peculiar fate in one 
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understanding, given that the former is a faculty of receptivity and the latter one of 
spontaneity.  Henrich, in regards to both these points, asserts then that the common root, 
the ground of theoretical reason, can only be thought of, in anticipation of the direction 
Fichte and Hegel will take, as an object of intellectual intuition, which Kant explicitly 
denies of human subjectivity.  Thus, Henrich claims, considering both his story of the 
historical background of the common root passage, and his situation of the common root 
within the region of Kantian Dunkelheiten, that the “speculative Idealists no longer saw 
the background of what to them seemed inadequate in Kant’s work…they no longer 
considered it meaningful to be amazed at the origin and unity of consciousness.”75 
     So for Henrich the common root passage is far from a hopeful announcement of a 
further task for Critical philosophy, but rather a retrospective renunciation of a project of 
18th century psychology, and a pre-emptive warning about the limits of human reason’s 
capacity to determine the grounds of its own possibility.  I’ve suggested that we can 
remain skeptical about the former point.  Kant no doubt rejects the idea of a “basic 
power” in the Wolffian sense—Kant’s rejection of the Leibnizian ontology underlying 
and motivating it makes this clear—but it’s not thereby definitively been decided that the 
idea of a common root of understanding and sensibility must take this form.  What can, I 
think, be ascertained in a positive sense from Kant’s appropriation of the Crusius 
objection to the idea of a basic power is the actual criterion for determining the common 
root, namely, that it “must render intelligible the powers [or faculties] it grounds”.  It 
must be shown how the derivative faculties can be derived from the common root as their 
source.  This puts a pressure on any account of the common root, and gives a condition 
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for its success, but this project itself has not been shown to be impossible.76  At best what 
has been shown is that the common root cannot be understood as the “basic power” in the 
Wolffian sense.  
     As regards the second point, it must of course be admitted that maintaining the 
boundary of human reason, and upholding the sense of amazement at the Dunkelheiten 
that lie beyond it is a definite Kantian theme, and Henrich is right to emphasize it.  But 
again it is not clear that the common root must necessarily belong to it.   Henrich says 
that the “question of the basic power of sensibility and understanding concerns not the 
structure of subjectivity but the conditions of the possibility of such a structure.”77   But 
why is this?  If we read “basic power” here not in the objectionable Wolffian sense, but 
rather in the sense of a common root which fulfills the criterion mentioned above, then it 
seems that all that is going on is an expansion and simplification of our conception of the 
structure of subjectivity, not an attempt to give the conditions of the possibility of the 
structure itself.  The project would leave the limit intact, just pushing it one step back, as 
it were.  Even if it could be shown how sensibility and understanding originate in some 
way in a common root—imagination, say—it still could remain an intractable mystery 
how this imagination is itself possible.  The question of why human subjectivity must be 
grounded in the self-activity of imagination would not thereby be answered.  Rather, the 
idea of the common root seems precisely, or at least can seem so depending on how it is 
conceived, like an issue about the structure of subjectivity itself, and not necessarily 
anything beyond that.  Henrich perhaps identifies the project of a common root with an 
attempt to go beyond the limits of reason, to go beyond the necessary transcendental 
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structure of subjectivity toward the conditions of the possibility of the structure, because 
he sees the common root as necessarily an object of intellectual intuition, as indeed the 
Idealists did or tended to.78  But it has not been shown that the common root can only be 
known by, or indeed identical with, a faculty of intellectual intuition, especially in Kant’s 
sense of the term.  The project of locating the common root outside of a faculty of 
“intellectual intuition” in Kant’s sense, as, for instance, both the Idealists and Heidegger 
do, is kept open as a possibility.   Henrich himself seems to acknowledge these points 
when he admits that Heidegger “explicitly distinguishes his attempt from the construction 
of a basic faculty that was at issue in the historical interpretation.  The interpretation of 
imagination as the common root [offered by him] is not about the reduction of the given 
structure of cognition to some simple basic underlying powers but solely the development 
of that structure itself.”79  
 
c)  The Metaphysics of Subjectivity 
 
Henrich mentions the section on the Paralogisms in the context of his argument that any 
attempt to investigate the common root or the ground of the unity of subjectivity must 
remain futile, or at least involves retreating from the territory of critical philosophy 
toward a pre-critical metaphysics.  Kant does not just remain agnostic about the 
possibility of identifying the common root, he “renounces” the possibility.  The common 
root remains relegated to the region of Dunkelheiten, outside the limits of human reason’s 
capabilities.  Indeed Henrich says this section is essential for grasping this position: “The 
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critique of the paralogisms thus first provides the possibility of understanding Kant’s 
arguments for the unknowability of the common root of sensibility and understanding.”80   
I want to pause here a moment to evaluate the relevance of the Paralogisms for our 
discussion regarding the ground of the unity of subjectivity, and in particular the issue of 
the common root.81   
     It should be kept in mind, as Henrich himself highlights, that the Paralogisms are first 
and foremost a critique of the claims of traditional metaphysics of the Leibniz-Wolff 
variety, specifically with that part of it which Kant identifies as the “rational doctrine of 
the soul” or “rational psychology”.  Essentially, the section on the Paralogisms asks the 
question, “what use can the principle of apperception, the ‘I think’, have for extending 
our cognition or our knowledge regarding the subject, or the ground of the unity of the 
subject?”   In a word, the answer is “none”.   All the claims of rational psychology—that 
we can know that the soul is a substance, simple, identical through time, and distinct from 
body—are based on dialectical, illusory, and thus false, inferences. 
     Now, based on what has been said so far, we have cause already to be suspicious of 
the status of the Paralogisms as a definitive dismissal of the notion of the common root.  
If my attempt to show that the common root can still have a meaning outside of the 
traditional notion of a basic power inhering in the soul as substance has succeeded, then 
the critique of the paralogisms may be beside the point.  In this context, they can prove at 
best that the common root cannot be understood as such a basic power.  But putting aside 
this initial cause for skepticism, I want to press on a bit because I think the Paralogisms 
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of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. New Edition. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000.     
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can also be useful in sharpening my interpretation of the type of project the Idealists and 
Heidegger are engaging in after Kant.  
      Rational psychology, Kant says, is an attempt to derive knowledge of the nature of 
the soul from the “sole text” of the principle of apperception, the ‘I think’.82    The ‘I 
think’ according to Kant does serve to “distinguish two kinds of objects through the 
nature of our power of representation.”83   The ‘I’ as an object of inner sense is called the 
soul, and as an object of outer sense is called body.   The soul is the object of inner sense, 
the empirical I, that is, the soul as it is in appearance.   Now, the rational doctrine of the 
soul makes the further claims that we can determine that the soul is a substance, in which 
all thinking inheres, that it is simple, numerically identical and enduring through time, 
etc.  We need not rehearse here the specific arguments that rational psychology marshals 
for these conclusions, but in each case, the soul is purportedly being determined as a 
supersensible object.  The critique of the paralogisms essentially reminds us that all 
cognition for Kant, that is, all determination of an object, requires an intuition, but we can 
have no intuition of the soul, nor of its simplicity, endurance, etc.   The determination of 
the soul as a supersensible object, or this “I, or he, or it (the thing), which thinks”84, as 
Kant famously puts it, remains a task outside the capacities of human reason, beyond the 
limits of reason’s self-knowledge.   
     It should be mentioned that Kant insists that there is a formal, though merely formal, 
validity to the claims of the paralogisms.  I must think myself as substance, in the sense 
that I as subject cannot be used as the determination of another thing, or that I am simple, 
                                                 
82 KRV A343/B401. 
83 KRV A342/B400. 
84 KRV A346/B404. 
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in the sense that my self-representation does not contain manifoldness, etc.  But these 
merely logical, even tautological, statements can never have objective reality, because the 
latter would require an intuition which we never have.  The logically valid claims of the 
paralogisms, Kant says, have no use in proving the “usual conclusions” of rational 
psychology, because they are powerless in determining the thinking being as an object to 
which these predicates can be applied.  
     Now, this hints at a subtle ambiguity at work throughout the section on the 
Paralogisms.  On the one hand, Kant seems to be drawing on an analogy with what was 
said in the Transcendental Analytic about cognition of external objects.  There we were 
directed to recognize that objective experience of an object, that is, the representation of a 
sensible manifold unified in accordance with the categories—i.e. unified under the 
concept of an object in general (transcendental object=x)—is the representation of the 
object only in appearance.   We have no knowledge of the object as noumenal, either in 
the negative sense (the object abstracted from all subjective conditions of thinking), or in 
the positive sense (the intelligible object of a non-sensible intuition).  Sometimes it seems 
as if the paralogisms, insofar as they putatively determine the nature of the soul, are 
illusory for the same reasons.  They make claims about the metaphysical nature of the 
“thinking being [das denkende Wesen]” as noumenon, abstracted from the conditions of 
sensible intuition.  The soul is an object of inner sense, but as such merely an appearance.  
We cannot apply any real predicates or attributes to the thinking being “as it is in itself”, 
the supersensible substratum of the soul, precisely because it is a noumenal “object”. 
     In other words, the illusion of the paralogisms consists in attempting to determine the 
nature of the thinking being, the ‘I’, abstracted from the conditions of sensible intuition 
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(in this case inner sense).   Seen in this light, the lesson of the Paralogisms is that we 
cannot ascribe any predicates to the noumenal self— the “subject” of the ‘I think’, the 
thinking thing—for the very same reasons we cannot ascribe predicates to any noumenal 
“object”.  On the other hand, Kant also says things to suggest that the error of rational 
psychology consists precisely in the tendency to “look underneath” the ‘I think’ at all, to 
treat it analogously to an object to which predicates can determinately be applied.  Kant 
calls this the hypostatization of the ‘I think’.   “One can place all illusion in the taking of 
a subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an object.”85  The paralogistic 
inferences represent the “subreption of hypostatized consciousness.”86  
     Highlighting this line of thought tends to throw the very intelligibility of the former 
diagnosis of the paralogisms under suspicion.  It is not just that rational psychology’s 
attempt to determine the noumenal self must fail because it is an attempt to determine a 
noumenal object qua noumenal, it’s that it must fail because it is an attempt to determine 
the self as an object.   In this context, the very idea of a noumenal self can come to seem 
suspect.   Whatever one thinks about the intelligibility of the concept of “noumena”, or 
however problematic one considers it, there is an asymmetry that must be admitted 
between the purported “noumenal self” and any other “noumenal object”, however that is 
to be understood.   If we understand noumena in the negative sense, for instance, as 
objects—ordinary, empirical objects, e.g.—abstracted from the subjective, transcendental 
conditions for knowing them, that is, the conditions of empirical thought in general, this 
possesses a kind of intelligibility simply lacking in the case of the noumenal self.   
Understood the same way, asking about the nature of the noumenal self , the self-in-itself, 
                                                 
85 KRV A396. 
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would entail thinking about the nature of an “object” abstracted from all subjective, 
transcendental conditions for knowing it, when the putative “object” in question—the 
self—is defined by an activity which is subject to those conditions; the conditions are 
conditions of the activity to begin with.  There is a kind of self-destructiveness here that is 
not present in the former case.  In the first case—in trying to conceive of the thing-in-
itself, of what such a thing could mean—I can interpret what I’m asking for in the 
following way:  I can try to imagine what the object is like, or would be like, 
independently of me or my way of thinking of it, in other words, how it would be if I, or 
anyone, weren’t around.   In the latter case, I am essentially trying to imagine what I am 
like independently of me, what I would be like if I weren’t around.  For Kant, as we have 
seen, to be an ‘I’—or at least to be a theoretical subject—is to unify a manifold of 
representations under the condition of the unity of apperception.  Now to think of a 
noumenal object then is to abstract from this condition, and to think it outside its relation 
to this condition.  But how can I now even think of the I “in itself” at all, if the “I in 
itself” is to be conceived along the lines of the “thing in itself”, that is, abstracted from 
the very conditions that constitute I-hood?  In this case, the alleged analogy upon which 
the former diagnosis of the paralogisms rests simply doesn’t hold.   
     This asymmetry suggests that rational psychology rests in fact on a kind of 
metaphysical category mistake.  It suggests that subjectivity, that is, original synthetic 
activity, the unity of which is formally designated by the principle of apperception, ‘I 
think’, is a different category of being from things altogether.  The mistake made by 
rational psychology is not just that it investigates the noumenal self qua noumenal, but 
that it treats the self (subjectivity) as something that can be treated like an object at all (a 
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determinable thing with determinate properties).  Now, I called this an “ambiguity” in 
Kant’s argument because it is not always clear where he is locating the actual source of 
the error of the paralogisms.  Consider the following passage: 
From all this one sees that rational psychology has its origin in a mere 
misunderstanding.  The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is 
here taken for an intuition of the subject as an object, and the category of 
substance applied to it.  But this unity is only of the unity of thinking, through 
which no object is given; and thus the category of substance, which always 
presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject 
cannot be cognized at all.87   
 
It is not entirely clear here if the “mere misunderstanding” is due to rational psychology’s 
allegedly finding an intuition where there in fact is none—that “no object is given”, that 
the subject “cannot be cognized at all”, because an intuition of it is lacking—or if the 
misunderstanding is due to the kind of category mistake I have hinted at—that “no object 
is given”, because the subject is simply something that can never be an object. The latter 
interpretation gets its clearest expression in the distinction Kant makes, present in both 
editions, between the determining self and the determinable self.   
Now it is indeed very illuminating that I cannot cognize as an object itself that 
which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all; and that the 
determining self (the thinking) is different from the determinable self (the 
thinking subject) as cognition is different from its object.88   
 
All modi of self-consciousness in thinking are therefore not yet themselves 
concepts of the understanding of objects (categories), but mere functions, which 
provide thought with no object at all, and hence do not provide my self as an 
object to be cognized.  It is not the consciousness of the determining self, but 
only that of the determinable self…that is the object.89  
       
                                                 
87 KRV B421-422, emphases mine; Kant himself emphasizes “thinking” and “intuition” in the last 
sentence.  
88 KRV A402. 
89 KRV B407. 
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In these passages, it seems evident that the paralogisms make a category mistake.  The 
object to which the paralogisms illegitimately apply the properties of substantiality, 
simplicity, etc., is merely the determinable self, i.e. the empirical self, the object of inner 
sense, the soul in appearance.  Now, the paralogisms do err in their putative attributions 
because they treat the soul as if it were an object in itself, and their claims lack objective 
reality.  But the real error consists precisely in mistakingly locating the ‘I think’, the “sole 
text of rational psychology”, in the determinable self rather than in the determining self, 
i.e. the thinking.   The determining self simply is the spontaneous synthetic activity of 
unifying an intuited manifold.   
     So, returning to our initial question about the relevance of the Paralogisms chapter for 
the search for the common root, that is, the ground of the unity of (theoretical) 
subjectivity, I have tried to argue that it is relevant, but not quite for the same reasons that 
Henrich advances.  Henrich is right that the paralogisms belie the claims of rational 
psychology in the Leibniz-Wolff metaphysical tradition, and consequently, show the 
futility of investigating the nature of the soul, the self as a supersensible object.  Thus the 
attempt to locate the common root in a basic power of the soul as substance is doomed to 
failure.  But the Paralogisms section, in highlighting the distinction between the 
determining and determinable selves, also points to another way of approaching the 
question of the common root, of the ground of the unity of theoretical subjectivity, that is, 
through the nature of the determining self, the kind of spontaneous activity that can never 
be considered identical with a (determinable) object.   The common root as a fundamental 
capacity would have to be located somehow within this activity itself.  The critique of the 
paralogisms forbids, as it were, further investigation into the nature of the thing which 
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thinks [das Ding, welches denkt], and Henrich is right that the common root cannot be 
found somehow in the nature of that thing, but it leaves open further investigation into 
the nature of the thinking [das Denken] itself.   
     Seeking the ground of the unity of subjectivity needn’t, as Henrich supposes, be 
confined to the region of Kantian Dunkelheiten.  Kant asks in the Paralogisms section, 
“what use can the ‘I think’ have in extending our knowledge regarding the metaphysical 
nature of the subject?”  If we, in the manner of the paralogisms, hypostatize the ‘I think’, 
and treat it as a determinable object with determinate properties, the answer is ‘none’.  
The nature of the thinking being, “the thing which thinks”, taken as the underlying 
supersensible substratum of thinking, must always lie outside of reason’s capacity for 
self-knowledge (if it is intelligible at all).  But if we instead focus our attention on the 
nature of the thinking itself, perhaps there is more to be said.   
Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the logical function and hence the sheer 
spontaneity of combining the manifold…in the consciousness of myself in mere 
thinking I am the being itself [das Wesen selbst], about which, however, nothing 
yet is thereby given to me for thinking.  But the proposition ‘I think’, insofar as it 
says only that I exist thinking, is not a merely logical function, but rather 
determines the subject (which is then at the same time an object) in regard to 
existence, and this cannot take place without inner sense, whose intuition always 
makes available the object not as a thing in itself but merely as appearance.90 
   
Properly speaking, the ‘I think’ of apperception is merely a formal principle of unity.  It 
expresses the act, Kant says, of determining my existence.91  This act, the thinking, the 
determining self, is sheer spontaneous activity (bound by the conditions of sensible 
intuition) which determines itself in regard to its own existence as an empirical self.  It is 
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this self-determining activity which gives subjectivity its unique ontological character.92  
To repeat the quote from the Anthropology, “the fact that the human being can have the 
‘I’ in his representations [that is, expresses its self-activity through the ‘I think’ as the 
principle of the unity of that self-activity] raises him infinitely above all other living 
beings…through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things.”   
     For Kant, this self-determining spontaneous activity is a kind of basic fact of human 
subjectivity.  But it is a fact which lies at the heart of the so-called Copernican Revolution 
which inaugurates transcendental philosophy.  It must be remembered that the 
Copernican Revolution is a revolution within metaphysics.  Kant’s task in the first 
Critique is to set metaphysics on the secure path of a science.   The revolution requires 
not a rejection of metaphysics per se but a “change in our ways of thinking”93, an “altered 
method of our way of thinking”94 with regard to metaphysics.  He says that the concern of 
the first Critique is “to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics.”95  To be sure, 
and as we have seen, this transformation does require a rejection of the procedures of the 
speculative metaphysics in the Leibniz-Wolff tradition.  But it is clear from the second 
edition preface, at least, that Kant’s intent is to substitute another system of metaphysics 
in its place.  He says that the critique is not the system itself but merely a “treatise on the 
                                                 
92 Of course in the case of theoretical reason, the self-determination does not go all the way down, but is 
always limited by sensible intuition.  Kant highlights this in the section on the “transition form rational 
psychology to cosmology”, from which the previous quote is taken.  There he begins to contrast theoretical 
reason with practical reason, which has a “spontaneity through which our actuality is determinable without 
the need of conditions of empirical intuition.”   The former spontaneity signals the finitude of finite human 
subjectivity, which as we will see, the Idealists perhaps lose sight of.  But we can see here how the 
Idealists’ focus on spontaneous activity will be brought to bear on the problem of the unity of theoretical 
and practical reason.  The unconditioned spontaneity of practical reason becomes the model of human 
reason tout court, and incorporated into the picture of theoretical reason.   
93 KRV Bxvi. 
94 KRV Bxviii. 
95 KRV Bxxii.   
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method” of the new science.  “The future system of metaphysics” prescribed by the 
Critique was offered as a plan to be carried out.   
     Kant himself sees the new system as consisting of two parts, the metaphysics of nature 
and the metaphysics of morals, both of which Kant himself produces in one form or 
another.  Metaphysics as Kant describes it, at least in the preface, is the elaboration of 
what is a priori in reason’s relationship to its object. 
Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be 
cognized a priori, and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, 
either merely determining the object and its concept (which must be given from 
elsewhere), or else also making the object actual.  The former is theoretical, the 
latter practical cognition of reason.96 
 
Kant’s actual description of the Copernican Revolution involves a shift in our 
assumptions.  “Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the 
objects…let us once try whether we do not get further with the problems of metaphysics 
by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition.”97   Transcendental 
philosophy is a systematic elaboration of the a priori subjective conditions of theoretical 
and practical cognition.   As we have seen, the fundamental such condition elaborated in 
the first Critique is the spontaneous self-activity which is the a priori ground of all 
empirical cognition—both of the empirical self and of objects of outer sense—and, 
though we have not yet discussed it, of the moral law.  It is the systematic elaboration of 
this self-determining activity that, I am claiming, will be a major concern of the Idealists 
and Heidegger.  They are impressed with the idea that it is this feature of subjectivity 
which makes it metaphysically sui generis.  They are concerned with the metaphysical 
import of the Copernican Revolution vis-à-vis subjectivity itself.  For them, the fact that 
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the spontaneous self-activity of subjectivity lies at the ground of reason’s theoretical and 
practical cognition is a metaphysical claim, in need of metaphysical elaboration.  The 
Copernican Revolution requires a re-imagination of what metaphysics is.  The pure self-
determining activity of subjectivity, the feature which makes subjectivity metaphysically 
sui generis, is taken to be the starting point of the post-revolutionary metaphysics. 
     In essence then, they attempt to construct a metaphysics of subjectivity which is to 
stand alongside the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals as part of the 
promised “future system of metaphysics”98.  In this way they see it as the fulfillment of 
the Kantian project.  Indeed, as they conceive it, the metaphysics of subjectivity does not 
just “stand alongside” the others, but acts as the unifying link between them, the ultimate 
fulfillment of the promise of the Copernican Revolution.  As we will see in the following 
section, one can perceive a problem with the coherence of the theoretical and the practical 
standing together as a unified science.  The metaphysics of subjectivity is seen as a 
necessary means of explaining the unity between them, as a means of solving the 
“problem” of the unity of reason, and of directly answering Kant’s question which stands 
as the ultimate goal of philosophy, “what is the human being?”  In this way, the task of 
finding the unity of theoretical subjectivity via the common root is linked to the task of 
finding the unity of subjectivity in general, both as theoretical and practical subjectivity.   
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3)  The Unity of the Theoretical and the Practical Subject 
 
a)  The Unity of Reason’s Demands and the Unified Subject 
 
I now want to address the problem of the unity of subjectivity as a whole, or what has 
come to be known as the problem of the “unity of reason”, i.e. the unity of the faculties of 
theoretical reason and practical reason.  Ultimately, the question for the Idealists and 
Heidegger will be how the metaphysics of subjectivity which they see as necessitated by 
the problem of the unity of theoretical subjectivity can be brought to bear on 
understanding the relationship between theoretical and practical rationality.   How is the 
alleged metaphysics of subjectivity itself to act as a unifying link between theoretical 
cognition and practical activity?  First we have to understand what this “problem” is, how 
Kant himself understood it and how he attempted to resolve it.  Kant writes in the preface 
to the second Critique: 
When it is a matter of determining a particular faculty of the human soul as to its 
sources, its contents, and its limits, then, from the nature of human cognition, one 
can begin only with its parts, with an accurate and complete presentation of 
them…But there is a second thing to be attended to, which is more philosophic 
and architectonic: namely to grasp correctly the idea of the whole and from this 
idea to see all those parts in their mutual relation by means of their derivation 
from the concept of that whole in a pure rational faculty.99 
 
He goes on to remark: 
In this way the a priori principles of two faculties of the mind, the faculty of 
cognition and that of desire, would be found and determined as to the conditions, 
extent, and boundaries of their use, and a firm basis would thereby be laid for a 
scientific system of philosophy, both theoretical and practical.100 
 
                                                 
99 KPV, 5:10. 
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Kant, of course, dedicates two critiques to the “parts” of the pure rational faculty, i.e. the 
faculties of cognition and desire, respectively.  To what extent do these two taken 
together “attend to the second thing”, that is, as he says, the genuinely philosophical task 
of understanding their mutual relation and derivation from the concept of the whole, that 
is, the concept of the whole human being (qua rational being)?  How far has Kant gone in 
laying the foundation for the whole “scientific system of philosophy”, as he calls it? 
    At the outset, it is interesting to note the dissimilarity between Kant’s attitudes 
regarding this project and the one we’ve already discussed, namely that of finding a 
common root which would unify our concept of the theoretical subject.   Kant’s attitude 
regarding the latter is, as we have seen, ambiguous:  the two stems of theoretical 
cognition may perhaps originate in common root, which is nevertheless unknown to us.  I 
have argued in the previous section that the project of finding such a root remains open, 
even on Kantian grounds.  But Kant himself never seems to be interested in bringing this 
project to fulfillment.  His attitude toward the problem of the “unity of reason” however 
is very different.  Indeed, as the above quote indicates, it can be seen as a recurring theme 
which informs the entire development of the Critical philosophy.    And in contrast to the 
pessimism Kant seems to exhibit with regard to the common root, he remains throughout 
his works expressly hopeful about the possibility of arriving at a principle of the unity of 
reason.  In the “Critical Elucidation of the Analytic” of the second Critique, he says that 
the propositions presented there “rightly occasion the expectation of perhaps being able 
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some day to attain insight into the unity of the whole rational faculty (theoretical as well 
as practical) and to derive everything from one principle.”101   
     But why is the problem of the unity of reason a problem to begin with?  Why would 
we not be content with two separate analyses of the “sources, contents, and limits” of two 
distinct human faculties, the faculty for attaining theoretical knowledge of the world, and 
the faculty for acting within the world?  Wouldn’t this be enough to give us a picture of 
the world and the human being within it, both as a cognitive subject possessing 
knowledge about the world and as a practical agent within it?   What exactly are we 
asking for when we ask for or expect a unified account of the human being beyond an 
analysis of its two special faculties? 
     There are two separate but closely related reasons why the problem of the unity of 
reason is a problem—and therefore two reasons why the Kantian dualism between 
theoretical and practical reason can appear troubling—generated by two separate 
concerns or sets of concerns.  The first concern requires that there be unity within our 
world-conception, the second that there be unity in our self-conception.  The first is more 
familiar: there seems to be a threatening inconsistency between the pictures of the world 
that theoretical reason and practical reason respectively yield.  A clearer, and perhaps 
more Kantian, way of putting this is the question of the consistency and coherence 
between the respective demands that theoretical and practical reason make on the world.  
Theoretical reason culminates in the concept of nature, practical reason in the concept of 
human freedom.  Kant thus prefers to speak of the putatively singular (pure) rational 
faculty as having two separate uses, and thus as operating according to two separate 
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interests.  And because (pure) reason always operates according to a priori principles, that 
is, according to laws that it itself legislates, Kant speaks of reason as having legislative 
power over two separate domains102.  Kant writes,  
Now the legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and 
freedom, and thus contains the natural law as well as the moral law, initially in 
two separate systems but ultimately in a single philosophical system.  The 
philosophy of nature pertains to everything that is; that of morals only to that 
which should be.103 
 
     Because reason legislates over two separate domains, it makes two separate demands 
on these domains.  As a faculty of cognition, reason demands that the world of experience 
possess a certain kind of unity, one consistent with a robust concept of nature, in which 
every event is determined by “natural mechanism” within a finite, simple and closed 
system of empirically discoverable causal laws.   As a faculty of desire, reason demands 
the possibility of events resulting from the causality of freedom, which is a requirement 
of truly moral action out of respect for the moral law.  In this context the problem of the 
unity of reason requires an account of how these two demands of reason are to be 
simultaneously satisfied.  In other words, we can understand the desideratum of a unified 
account of reason as a call for a single account of the world in which both of reason’s 
demands are satisfied, an account of the world in which reason’s concept of nature and 
concept of freedom co-exist, and in which its legislations coincide and harmonize, and 
don’t contradict one another.    
     The second reason that I think the problem of the unity of reason can be seen as a 
problem is perhaps less familiar, but I will argue that it is equally troublesome.  This 
reason does not focus on the problem of the consistency between the pictures of the world 
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that theoretical and practical reason respectively require, but rather on the coherence of 
the pictures of the subject that they respectively generate.  There is an ambiguity here.  In 
some sense this can be taken as simply a special case of the first concern.  After all, the 
human being, as a natural being, is to be included within the concept of nature.  So to ask 
about the unity of reason is also to ask about how we are to understand a being who is at 
once a part of nature—whose behavior or actions, as natural processes and events, are 
thus thoroughly determined by natural mechanism—and also in possession of the kind of 
freedom morality requires, who is capable, in other words, of autonomy.  But this is as it 
were to ask the question as it were wholly from the third person: how can this being, the 
human being, be both part of nature and also free?  But we can also ask it from the first 
person, either singular or plural.  This, I believe, changes the import of the question and 
perhaps adds a new desideratum to any proposed solution to the problem.  Theoretical 
and practical reason are, after all, faculties that I, or we, as rational beings, possess.  They 
are supposed to be my (or our) faculties.  Since they are our faculties of theoretical and 
practical reason, they give us not only pictures of, and an understanding of, the world—
which we human beings are a “part” of—according to the demands they (and thus we) 
make on the world, they also give us a picture and understanding of ourselves (and 
hopefully, then, a picture of how we fit into that world).  To frame the problem of the 
unity of reason in this way is to ask for or require a unified account of our subjectivity—
as both cognitive subjects and as practical agents—such that this bifurcation is intelligible 
to us as belonging to our (unified) subjectivity.     
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     So there are three schisms which a putative solution to the problem of the unity of 
reason may address, and thus three dualisms which it might attempt to reconcile.  They 
are:  
1) the dualism between the world conceived of as a natural world and conceived of 
as a “moral world”—which means a world admitting of, amenable or even 
conducive to moral interest and concern  
2) the “dual identity” of the subject (a being with subjectivity) as a part of the 
world—the subject as a natural being and as a moral agent 
3) the dual capacity of a human being (a being with subjectivity) to both know the 
world and to act within it.   
 
More concisely put, these three dualisms are those between:  
1) the natural world-order and the moral world-order 
2) the human being as a natural being and the human being as a moral agent 
3) the human being as a knower and the human being as a doer.    
 
     How do these two problems—those of the unity of world-conception and the unity of 
self-conception—and thus these three dualisms, relate to each other?  In what follows I 
will trace the development of Kant’s engagement with the problem of the unity of reason, 
and the various attempts he makes to solve it.  In anticipation, Kant in general has three 
strategies for attacking the problem, describable in terms of three more or less familiar 
“doctrines”: the doctrine of the “highest good” (grounded in the idea of God as moral 
author of the natural world); the doctrine of the “double character of the I” (as a special 
application to subjects of the general claim that all things have both an empirical and 
intelligible character); and the doctrine that “beauty is the symbol of morality”.  As we 
will see, these strategies loosely map onto the three senses of dualism just mentioned.104  
Ultimately I will argue then that though at various stages Kant seems sensitive to each of 
the respective dualisms, a satisfactory solution to the second set of concerns—regarding 
                                                 
104 Though as we will see as well, if the doctrine of the double character of the I is supplemented with the 
doctrine regarding the “primacy of the practical”, the general strategy seems to extend from the second to 
the third dualism.      
  
80 
our self-conception, and in particular in reference to the third dualism—is lacking.  This 
is to say that while he attempts to show both the possibility of the harmony between the 
natural and moral world-orders, and the consistency and mutual dependence of the 
faculties of cognition and desire as pure rational faculties, he fails to illuminate the unity 
of the subject itself as both knower and doer, and thus to clarify the deeper affinity 
between the subject’s own cognitive and practical activities.  
 
b)  The “Transition” from Theoretical to Practical Reason 
 
I want now to take a closer look at how the problem of the unity of reason arises in 
Kant’s works, and the course of his engagement with it.  I have remarked that we may see 
this engagement as a guiding thread throughout the development of the Critical 
Philosophy.  It is a familiar fact that Kant did not begin the Critique of Pure Reason with 
the intention that it would be the first of three such critiques, nor did he have this 
tripartite division in mind even after he felt the need to add a second critique to the first.   
Kant insists, as we have seen, even in the second edition of the first Critique, that it is 
only a “treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself”.  Presumably, he 
intended to elaborate this “future system of metaphysics” directly in the form of a 
metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals.  But the first Critique is also 
supposed to at least provide a hint as to how the concepts of nature and freedom are to be 
related and unified in the “scientific system of philosophy”.  He says in the beginning of 
the Dialectic that “perhaps the [transcendental] ideas make possible a transition 
[Übergang] from concepts of nature to the practical, and themselves generate support for 
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the moral ideas and connection [Zusammenhang] with the speculative cognitions of 
reason.  About all this we must expect to be informed in due course.”105   
     Of course, by the time he was preparing the second edition, Kant had already 
completed his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals.  In the preface to that work, 
Kant explains that it is precisely its failure to provide such a solution to the problem of 
the unity of reason that disqualifies it for the title of a critique of pure practical reason.  
He requires, he says there, that such a critique, “if it is to be carried through completely, 
be able at the same time to present the unity of practical with speculative reason in a 
common principle, since there can, in the end, be only one and the same reason, which 
must be distinguished merely in its application.”106  But when Kant writes such a critique 
soon afterwards, he seems to have backed away from such a strict requirement.  As 
quoted earlier, he credits it with, at best, “occasioning the expectation of perhaps being 
able some day to attain insight into” the unity of reason.  It is likely that one of the 
reasons Kant was motivated to produce yet another critique, the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, was precisely the “insight” he believed it provided into the relationship 
between theoretical and practical reason.  He writes in the published introduction to that 
work that it is the faculty of the power of judgment which “provides the mediating 
concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes 
possible the transition [Übergang] from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, 
                                                 
105 KRV A329/B385-6, my emphases.   
106 GMS 4:392.  Grounding the two uses of reason in a common “principle” might represent yet another 
sense in which the problem of the unity of reason might be resolved, but if so, it would seem to refer more 
to the set of concerns dealing with systematicity, which I have said I am bracketing here.   
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from lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the 
latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature.”107   
      Notice that the passages I have been quoting oscillate between talk of finding a 
“common principle”, which would unify the concepts of nature and freedom in a single 
philosophical system, and talk of a “transition” from one concept to the other.  It’s not 
clear at the outset what the relationship between these two desiderata is.  I want to bracket 
at the moment the issue of how seriously Kant takes the possibility of providing a 
“common principle”—which would presumably be the task of the “future system of 
metaphysics”, which it is not clear Kant ever provided or even in the end thought 
possible—and focus instead on how Kant ultimately construes the “transition” from 
nature to freedom.  In doing so, I want to elaborate Kant’s considered position on the 
relationship between the two faculties of cognition and desire.       
     Interestingly, as I’ve already mentioned, Kant’s own usage of the phrase “unity of 
reason” in the first Critique doesn’t quite match the issue with which we are concerned 
here108.  There, Kant is mainly concerned with the relationship between the understanding 
and reason in its theoretical use, that is, with the unity between the two faculties 
considered as faculties of cognition.  In the first Critique Kant defines reason as the 
faculty of principles, whose function is to give unity to the rules of the understanding. 
If the understanding may be a faculty of the unity of appearances by means of 
rules, then reason is the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under 
principles.  Thus it never applies directly to experience or to any object, but 
instead applies to the understanding, in order to give unity a priori through 
concepts to the understanding’s manifold cognitions, which may be called “the 
unity of reason”.109 
                                                 
107 KU, 5:196 
108 See footnote 14 above; I believe this holds not only for the first Critique but for the others as well.  




So the unity of reason is not to be understood as the unity within reason as a whole, i.e. 
the unity between its theoretical and practical functions or uses, but rather the type of 
unity which reason in its merely theoretical use brings about, the unity of the rules of the 
understanding which themselves are responsible for bringing about the unity of 
experience.110   If the understanding by itself provides for the concept of the unity of 
experience, then, reason alone can provide for a genuine concept of nature, that is, a 
system of possible appearances governed by a finite number of empirically discoverable 
laws, in other words, the type of unity which makes possible natural-scientific activity.  
That is, reason in its theoretical use—which, as Kant is mainly concerned to emphasize, 
means the regulative employment of reason’s “transcendental ideas”—first gives us the 
concept of nature.   
     But it is these very transcendental ideas that, Kant says, also “perhaps make possible a 
transition from concepts of nature to the practical”, about which we must “expect to be 
informed in due course.”111  It’s not very clear when we are in fact informed about this.  
We may perhaps look to the section where Kant introduces the regulativity of the 
principles of reason as a resolution of the antinomies which are associated with the 
cosmological ideas.  One such idea of course is the idea of transcendental freedom.  Kant 
defines freedom there as “the faculty of beginning a state from itself”, that is, a faculty of 
empirically unconditioned causation; he says that “reason creates the idea of a 
spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without needing to be preceded by any 
other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal 
                                                 
110 “The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different than 
that, which is the unity of understanding.” KRV A307/B363. 
111 KRV A329/B385-6. 
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connection.”112  As is the case with all the antinomies, Kant marshals in the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism, in particular the distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves, in order to resolve the problem of the apparent contradiction between natural 
causation and causation through freedom, in other words, between nature and freedom 
itself.  Here the central question is framed in terms of the “possibility” of freedom, which 
seems to be ruled out by the conception of nature which Kant has developed.   
[T]he difficulty we encounter in the question about nature and freedom is only 
whether freedom is possible anywhere at all, and if it is, whether it can exist 
together with the universality of the natural law of causality, hence whether it is a 
correct disjunctive proposition that every effect in the world must arise either 
from nature or freedom, or whether instead both, each in a different relation, 
might be able to take place simultaneously in one and the same occurrence.113 
 
     It is here that Kant introduces the notion of the “double aspect” character of objects of 
sense.  All objects of sense have both an empirical and an intelligible character.  As 
appearances, all objects of sense have an empirical character according to which its 
actions are fully intelligible according to and determined by natural laws.  But considered 
as things in themselves, abstracted from all sensible conditions, they also possess an 
intelligible character according to which they are capable of a causality through freedom, 
the effects of which are nevertheless sensible and detectable as appearances.  Because all 
appearances have an intelligible ground, we are able to think of all events as being the 
effects of both natural-mechanistic causality and causality through freedom.  Now the 
most interesting of such events of course would be human actions.  
                                                 
112 KRV A533/B561; my emphasis.  We might wonder what the relationship is supposed to be between this 
spontaneity and the spontaneity which is responsible, say, for originary synthesis associated with pure 
apperception.  This latter spontaneity did not seem to be “relegated” to the status of a “mere” idea, but was 
rather accorded the status of the highest point of transcendental philosophy (see, e.g. B134fn.). 
113 KRV A536/B564. 
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The human being is one of the appearances in the world of sense, and to that 
extent also one of the natural causes whose causality must stand under empirical 
laws.  As such he must accordingly also have an empirical character, just like all 
other natural things…Yet the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the 
whole of nature solely through sense, knows himself also through pure 
apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which cannot be 
accounted at all among impressions of sense; he obviously is in one part 
phenomenon, but in another part, namely in regard to certain faculties, he is a 
merely intelligible object, because the actions of this object cannot at all be 
ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility.114  
 
     Kant immediately goes on to say that it is the concepts of reason, which possess an 
intelligible character unconstrained by natural necessity, which are the ground of all 
practical imperatives and of the ought.  And it is reason that “with complete 
spontaneity…makes its own order according to ideas”, that is, the moral order of things.  
So we have here something resembling a “transition” to a practical employment of the 
ideas.  Because human beings possess a double character, even though their actions are 
determined and fully explainable by natural necessity, i.e. have an empirical character, it 
remains possible that those very same actions, are at the same time the result of a non-
natural causality, i.e. attributable to one’s intelligible character.  But Kant, in 
summarizing his points here, insists that not even the possibility of freedom, let alone the 
reality of freedom, has been so far proven, but only that the concepts of nature and 
freedom do not contradict each other.  But why does Kant say this?  Why does not the 
existence of an intelligible character prove that non-natural causation, that is, causation 
through freedom, is at least possible?  The answer can only be that we are dealing here 
still only with the theoretical use of reason.  The resolution of the third antinomy shows 
only the unity between the understanding and reason in its theoretical use; the latter 
                                                 
114 KRV A546/B574; Here again it is suggested that the spontaneity of theoretical subjectivity—
apperception—is ‘outside the order of nature’, and thus spontaneous in the robust sense of not being wholly 
empirically conditioned.   
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cannot even take an interest in the possibility of freedom.  It is interesting to note in the 
quote above that Kant uses the spontaneity of pure apperception to indicate the 
intelligible character that may possess the faculty of causality through freedom which can 
create effects in the sensible world.  Even though Kant seems to hint at an identity 
between the spontaneity of theoretical reason and the spontaneity involved in moral 
action, this is an identity which he is not entitled to, which he must be fully aware of.   
     It is not until the Canon that Kant addresses the issue of the unity of the theoretical 
and practical uses of reason.  This is the second place, then, we should look within the 
first Critique for the “possibility of a transition” about which we can “expect to be 
informed”.  The ideas affect the transition through being employed differently, that is, not 
for the sake of a picture of nature, and for the sake of the unity of our cognitive faculties 
in producing the coherence of such a picture, but rather for the sake of moral activity 
itself.  “The final aim to which in the end the speculation of reason in its transcendental 
use is directed concerns three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, 
and the existence of God.  With regard to all three the merely speculative interest of 
reason is very small”115, and, Kant goes on, essentially not worth the effort, because, from 
a theoretical point of view, they are superfluous.  Theoretical reason’s only concern, after 
all, is “the investigation of nature”.  Theoretical reason is sufficient in itself for this task; 
it has done its work in showing that the idea of a non-natural cause which has sensible 
effects does not contradict its own requirement that all events nevertheless must have 
natural causes. 
In a word, these three propositions always remain transcendent for speculative 
reason, and have no immanent use, i.e. one that is permissible for objects of 




experience and therefore useful for us in some way, but are rather, considered in 
themselves, entirely idle even though extremely difficult efforts of our reason. If 
then, these cardinal propositions are not at all necessary for our knowing, and yet 
are insistently recommended to us by our reason, their importance must really 
concern only the practical.116 
 
What is particularly interesting here is the claim which Kant goes on to make, namely the 
claim that from a purely practical point of view, it doesn’t matter whether the will is free 
in the transcendental sense.  This is a question for theoretical reason, a question in which 
theoretical reason itself actually takes very little interest. In its practical use, reason is 
only interested in adducing what the moral law is, that is, in adducing what ought to 
happen.   Reason in its practical use only prescribes (practical) laws.  In itself, qua 
practical reason, it is not concerned with whether what does happen is really in 
accordance with what ought to happen, or indeed if it is even possible that what happens 
in fact happen in accordance with what ought to happen.   This is to say that practical 
reason’s sole concern is the investigation of the moral law, a task for which it is sufficient 
in itself, and it has done its work when it has spelled this out.117   
But whether in these actions, through which it prescribes laws, reason is not itself 
determined by further influences, and whether that which with respect to sensory 
impulses is called [practical] freedom might not in turn with regard to higher and 
more remote efficient causes be nature—in the practical sphere this does not 
concern us, since in the first instance we ask of reason only a precept for conduct; 
it is merely a speculative question, which we can set aside as long as our aim is 
directed toward action and omission.  We thus cognize practical freedom through 
experience, as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the 
determination of the will, whereas transcendental freedom requires an 
independence of this reason itself…from all determining causes of the world of 
senses, and to this extent seems to be contrary to the law of nature, thus to all 
possible experience, and so remains a problem.  Yet this problem does not belong 
to reason in its practical use.118 
                                                 
116 KRV A799-800/B827-8. 
117 It is from considerations like this that causes Kant in the first Critique to actually exclude moral 
philosophy from transcendental philosophy altogether.  See KRV A801/B829fn. 




This puts the problem of the unity between the respective uses of reason in the starkest 
possible contrast.  Reason in its strictly theoretical use is only concerned with producing 
the concept of nature, reason in its strictly practical use only with producing the moral 
law.  This is to say that each respective use creates a demand which it is fully capable of 
satisfying.  It is self-sufficient within its own sphere.   
     When Kant continues in the Canon by reducing all the interest of reason to the three 
questions—“what can I know?”, “what ought I to do?”, “what may I hope?”—the first 
two questions, he says, belong to the respective purviews of the theoretical and practical 
uses of reason.  The first has just been answered in the first Critique, and the second first 
gets an answer in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, written between the first 
edition and the revised edition of the first Critique: my actions ought to be directed by the 
categorical imperative.  It is only the last question, “what may I hope?”, which engages 
both of the uses of reason.  Within the respective domains of each use of reason—that is, 
as long as reason focuses on one use and does not look to the other—reason has, Kant 
says, “cause to be content”.  The problem, of course, and this is the main issue we are 
addressing here, is that reason cannot remain blindered or schizophrenic in this way for 
long.  Reason is also interested in the unity of its respective uses in the theoretical and 
practical spheres.  It is interested in both of its demands being simultaneously satisfied.  It 
cannot ultimately rest content by bracketing out one of its interests for the sake of the 
other.  Reason’s interests extend beyond merely answering the first two questions.   
     This is where Kant informs us of how the transcendental ideas offer the possibility of 
a transition from the theoretical to practical uses of reason.  The respective uses of reason 
are united in the ideal of the highest good, or in the expectation, or hope, that nature has 
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its ground in a supreme intelligence, or moral author of the world, which will ensure that 
happiness is distributed in proportion to worthiness to be happy, in other words, moral 
worth.   
I say, accordingly, that just as the moral principles are necessary in accordance 
with reason in its practical use, it is equally necessary to assume in accordance 
with reason in its theoretical use that everyone has cause to hope for happiness in 
the same measure as he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct, and the 
system of morality is therefore inseparably combined with the system of 
happiness, though only in the idea of pure reason.119 
 
The picture of nature in which the theoretical use of reason culminated, driven by the 
regulative use of its transcendental ideas in ordering the rules of the understanding in 
accordance with its principles of unity, that is, the picture of the world as the “purposive 
unity of things” grounded in a supreme intelligence120, now receives reinforcement 
through its connection with the moral demands that reason in its practical use exerts.  It is 
this “systematic unity of ends”, Kant says finally, which “unifies practical with 
speculative reason.”121  
     The idea of God as moral author of the world—an idea necessitated by the interest 
reason takes, when its uses are unified, in the highest good—is the idea of the greatest 
unity and harmony between the concepts of nature and freedom.  Kant also calls this the 
idea of a highest reason, because it is a reason in which all the demands of reason are 
simultaneously satisfied.   This is why Kant calls it self-sufficient reason [selbständige 
                                                 
119 KRV A809/B837. 
120 “This highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purposive unity of things, and 
the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as if it has 
sprouted from the intention of a highest reason.  Such a principle, namely, opens up for our reason, as 
applied to the field of experience, entirely new prospects for connecting up things in the world in 
accordance with teleological laws, and thereby attaining to the greatest systematic unity among them.  The 
presupposition of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the world-whole, but of course, merely in the 
idea, can therefore always be useful to reason and never harmful to it.”  KRV A6686-7/B714-5. 
121 KRV A815/B843. 
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Vernunft], of which our reason is “only a weak copy” 122.  Our reason, as a whole, is not-
self-sufficient because it depends on a rational belief in God as moral author and thus as  
guarantor of the highest good for the complete satisfaction of its rational demands.  
     Following Kant’s language in the Canon, I spoke of reason in its strictly practical use 
as only concerned with answering the question what the human being ought to do, that is, 
as solely concerned with the moral law itself.  Of course, this might have seemed strange, 
because it would seem that we have a practical interest not just in what the moral law is, 
not just in knowing what we ought to do, but also in acting according to that law, in 
actually doing what it is that we ought to.  But this interest can precisely only be 
grounded in the rational hope which the presupposition of a moral author affords.   
It is necessary that our entire course of life be subordinated to moral maxims; but 
it would be at the same time impossible for this to happen if reason did not 
connect with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause which 
determines for the conduct in accord with this law an outcome precisely 
corresponding to our highest ends, whether in this life or in another.  Thus without 
God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majestic ideas 
of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration but not 
incentives for resolve and realization, because they would not fulfill the whole end 
that is natural for every rational being and determined a priori and necessarily 
through the very same reason.123 
 
According to the first Critique, practical interest in being moral, that is, moral incentive 
or moral interest, is grounded only in rational hope.124  Kant glosses the third question as: 
“If I do what I should, what may I then hope?”  The hope that the idea of reason entitles 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., KRV 678/B706.  Cf. KPV 5:119. 
123 KRV A812-3/B840-1, first emphasis mine. 
124 It is important to emphasize here that this point of view is in fact limited to the first Critique, and 
represents a view that, as we will see momentarily, Kant will later change his mind about.   
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me to grounds my moral interest, and thus unifies both my theoretical and practical 
interests.125  
     Kant had addressed the problem of moral interest in the Groundwork.  That work can 
be divided into two main parts, the first of which proceeds analytically, the second 
synthetically.  In the first part, consisting of the first two sections, Kant proceeds with an 
analysis of the concept of morality, specifically that of an unconditionally good will, a 
concept which is available, he says, to “common human reason”.  Kant is here explicating 
what it means to have moral duties, what it means for our wills to be bound by moral 
obligations.  He is here pursuing practical reason’s interest—as described in the first 
Critique—in knowing what the moral law is, or what it says to do, assuming that there is 
one.  Essentially, Kant is concerned in these sections only with proving the truth of the 
following conditional: if we have moral duties, then these duties must be grounded in the 
categorical imperative126.  What he has not proved thereby is the “reality and objective 
necessity” of the moral law, that the concept of duty is not in fact, as he says, a “chimera” 
or a “phantom”.  He has not yet proved that we really do have moral duties, and that the 
categorical imperative really does create a binding obligation for our wills. This is the 
synthetic task of the infamously obscure third section. 
     He begins by taking advantage of the analytic connection he has elucidated in the 
second section between dutiful action and autonomous action.   
                                                 
125 “The human mind takes (as I believe is necessarily the case with every rational being) a natural interest 
in morality, even though this is not undivided and practically overwhelming.  Strengthen and magnify this 
interest, and you will find reason very tractable and even enlightened for uniting the speculative with the 
practical interest.” KRV A829-30/B857-8fn. 
126 GMS 4:425.  “We have therefore shown at least this much: that if duty is a concept that is to contain 
significance and real lawgiving for our actions it can be expressed only in categorical imperatives.” Cf. 
GMS 4:440, 4:445.    
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But the proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself [viz. is 
autonomous], indicates only the principle, to act on no other maxim than that 
which can also have as object itself as a universal law.  This, however, is precisely 
the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality; hence a 
free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.127 
 
This is to say that the conditional has been revised: if our wills are free, then they are 
bound by moral obligations in the form of a categorical imperative.  That is, we must 
presuppose that our wills are free if we are to consider ourselves bound by the moral law. 
And, Kant says, we are in fact beings that cannot act otherwise than “under the idea of 
freedom”, and are thus “really free in a practical respect.” 
     But the problem in fact goes a little deeper.  As I have indicated, for all Kant has said 
in the first two sections, it is open for us to respond in the following way.  I may agree 
with Kant that what we mean by morality is dutiful action according to the categorical 
imperative, but insist that morality is an empty concept, so that there are no real 
obligations binding my will.  Now, I might even assent to Kant’s revised conditional, and 
agree that all free wills are subject to obligations, and I might even go so far as to admit 
that I must at least take myself to be free insofar as I put my reason to practical use.  For 
all that, the question could still remain what incentive I have to abide by, or what interest 
I must take in, these obligations which my rational nature creates.  I am, after all, not just 
a rational nature, but one also subject to sensible conditions.  What worth does acting 
morally really have, or better, what is the ground of the worth I might take it to have?  
    Kant puts the problem in the following way: 
We have finally traced the determinate concept of morality back to the idea of 
freedom; but we could not even prove the latter as something real in ourselves and 
in human nature; we saw only that we must presuppose it if we want to think of a 
being as rational and endowed with consciousness of his causality with respect to 
                                                 
127 GMS 4:447, my gloss. 
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actions, that is, with a will….But there also flowed from the presupposition of this 
idea consciousness of a law for acting: that subjective principles of actions, that 
is, maxims, must always be so adopted that they can also hold as objective…But 
why, then, ought I to subject myself to this principle and do so simply as a rational 
being…I am willing to admit that no interest impels me to do so…but I must still 
necessarily take an interest in it and have insight into how this comes about….for, 
if someone asked us why the universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the 
limiting condition of our actions, and on what we base the worth we assign to this 
way of acting…and asked us how it happens that a human being believes that only 
through this does he feel his personal worth, in comparison with which that of an 
agreeable or disagreeable condition is to be held as nothing…we could give him 
no satisfactory answer.128 
 
One would have thought that Kant had already provided an answer to this question in the 
Canon: what grounds my moral interest is the rational hope that there is a supreme 
intelligence which ensures that happiness will be proportionate to moral worth in the 
afterlife.  But Kant seems to dismiss this resolution here: 
We do indeed find that we can take an interest in a personal characteristic [moral 
worthiness] that brings with it no interest at all in a [agreeable or disagreeable] 
condition, if only the former makes us fit to participate in the latter in case reason 
were to effect the distribution, that is, that mere worthiness to be happy, even 
without the motive of participating in this happiness, can interest of itself; but this 
judgment is in fact only the result of the importance we have already supposed 
belongs to the moral law.129    
 
     Instead, then, Kant thinks that the problem regarding moral interest brings out the 
suspicion of a “hidden circle” in his reasoning so far.   
It must be freely admitted that a kind of circle comes to light here…We take 
ourselves as free in the order of efficient causes in order to think ourselves under 
moral laws in the order of ends; and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to 
these laws because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will. 130 
 
In this formulation, it’s not entirely clear how the problem of moral interest engenders 
this circle.  The implication of the former in the latter is perhaps clearer if we understand 
                                                 
128 GMS 4:448-450. 
129 GMS 4:450, my emphases and bracketed glosses. 
130 GMS 4:450. 
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Kant in the following way. The only reason we have felt the need to presuppose the 
freedom of the will was because it was a necessary condition of seeing ourselves as moral 
subjects, that is, as possessing wills that stand under certain moral obligations, but if we 
then ask why we must think of ourselves as really subject to those obligations, that is, 
why we must take an interest in fulfilling those obligations, the only answer we have is 
that it is because we possess freedom of will.   This makes it seem that it is because we 
are free that we assign ourselves the personal worth and dignity which would underwrite 
our interest in moral action as an expression of the autonomy that this freedom entails.  
This is clearly a thoroughly Kantian sentiment, but it is not quite the way he proceeds 
here.   
     Instead, Kant insists that the way out of the circle is to show that we have independent 
reason to take ourselves to possess freedom of will.  It is here that he appeals to the 
discussion of the double character of the I introduced in the third antinomy.  We may, 
after all, consider the practical agent from two standpoints: as an appearance, the I 
belongs to the world of sense and is to be considered not free but rather subject to 
determination by natural mechanism, here meaning empirical desires and inclinations; but 
as a thing in itself, the I belongs to a world of understanding, and as such, we may 
consider it to be free.  “For now we see that when we think of ourselves as free we 
transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and cognize 
autonomy of the will along with its consequence, morality.”131  And because the world of 
sense and its laws are grounded in the world of understanding and its laws (the laws of 
freedom), insofar as I think of myself as a member of the world of understanding, I think 
                                                 
131 GMS 4:453. 
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of myself as subject to, obligated by, the moral law, and I think of my will as genuinely 
bound by it.  I take an interest in morality insofar as I can see myself as a member of the 
intelligible world, insofar as I see myself as a thing in itself.   
     Kant calls the I insofar as it is a member of the world of understanding—the “I as it  
may be constituted in itself”132—the proper self [das eigentliche Selbst].   
This much is certain: it is not because the law interests us that it has validity for 
us (for that is heteronomy and dependence of practical reason upon sensibility, 
namely upon a feeling lying at its basis, in which case it could never be morally 
lawgiving); instead, the law interests because it is valid for us as human beings, 
since it arose from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self.133 
 
It is the fact that each of us, as human beings, possess a capacity to resist all 
determination through impulses of sensibility, and to determine our actions through 
reason alone, that is, the fact that we are capable of practical self-determination, a 
capacity we enjoy only insofar as we may think ourselves as members of an invisible, 
unknown world of understanding, which grounds the individual’s feeling of dignity and 
“the greater inner worth of his person.”  But, of course, this freedom which grounds the 
feeling of personal worth must needs remain only an idea, so that the “subjective 
impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of 
discovering and making comprehensible an interest which the human being can take in 
moral laws”.134  So it turns out that the felt need for “insight into how this moral interest 
comes about” must ultimately remain unsatisfied; it must be relegated to the realm of 
Kantian Dunkelheiten.  This is to say that reason, that is, our reason, finite human reason, 
itself cannot ultimately legitimate its demand for moral action, for action which 
                                                 
132 GMS 4:451, preferring “I” for “sein Ich” rather than Gregor’s “ego”. 
133 GMS 4:460-1; second emphasis mine. 
134 GMS 4:459-60. 
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engenders the creation of a moral world.135  The demand may be real, the interest in the 
demand being fulfilled may be real, but I cannot explain to myself the source of this 
interest.  This means that I cannot justify the interest I feel I ought to take in being moral.  
Reason is not self-legitimating in this sense.  I can at best point to the feeling of worth 
and dignity that such moral action engenders, a worth and dignity that accrues to my 
proper self as the only possible source of such action, a proper self that must nevertheless 
remain invisible and mysterious to me.   It is the rational hope, supported by both the 
speculative and practical interests of reason, in the existence of a “highest reason”, a 
supreme intelligence which could ensure the harmony of nature and morality in the 
highest good, the kingdom of God136, which ultimately convinces me that all the interests 
of reason are capable of being simultaneously fulfilled, so that reason in fact has a unity.   
     This is in essence Kant’s response to the problem of the unity of reason.  We may ask 
then why Kant felt the need to add two more critiques to the first Critique and the 
Groundwork before he could go on to the task of writing the metaphysics of nature and of 
morals, which was his expressed plan.  As I have said, we can see these subsequent 
critiques, at least from one perspective, as attempts to clarify this picture of the 
relationship between theoretical and practical reason.  As evident from the preface to the 
second Critique, Kant is interested there in responding to two issues we have already 
addressed.  The first concerns practical reason’s lack of ability to legitimate the moral law 
in the sense that it is helpless in explaining the force that the law exerts on us, that is, its 
inability to expose the ground of our moral interest.  The second concerns the issue of the 
double character of the I. 
                                                 
135 The kind of world. e.g., which Kant characterizes as the “kingdom of ends”. 
136 See, e.g. KPV 5:128. 
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     As we have seen, Kant asserts in the first Critique that the theoretical use of reason, on 
its own, cannot even prove the possibility of freedom.   It was only the practical use of 
reason which could establish the possibility of freedom, because it was a necessary 
requirement of the moral activity with which it is concerned.  Now Kant, in the second 
Critique, puts the problem of the legitimacy of reason’s practical demand slightly 
differently.  Instead of emphasizing that our moral interest—which would ensure that the 
moral law is sufficiently motivating—must remain unexplained, Kant conceives of the 
task of a critique of practical reason as answering a different problem.  Now he seems to 
think that for all that has been said so far, it still could be an illusion that reason has a 
genuinely practical use at all.  Here, Kant has amended his stance in the Canon that the 
practical use of reason merely amounted to the discovery of the moral law itself, a task 
for which the Groundwork’s analysis of the common concept of morality could suffice.  
But this is what created the possibility that the moral law could nevertheless fail to be 
genuinely motivating in itself.   As it is now conceived, reason having a practical use 
means that reason itself can be genuinely causally effective in determining empirical 
action, that respect for the moral law can be a determining ground of action, i.e. 
motivating of itself.   This explains Kant’s description of the task of a critique of reason 
in its purely practical use at the beginning of the preface to the second Critique as 
“merely to show that there is pure practical reason” at all.  In doing so, he thinks it 
manages to establish not only the possibility of freedom, but its objective reality, though 
only internal to the practical use of reason.137  
                                                 
137 “[N]ow practical reason of itself, without any collusion from speculative reason, furnishes reality to a 
supersensible object of the category of causality, namely to freedom (although as a practical concept, only 
for practical use), and hence establishes by means of a fact what could there be only thought.  KPV 5:6. 
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     This is famously accomplished through the assertion that the consciousness of the 
moral law is a simple “fact of reason”, which “forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic 
a priori proposition”.138  With the establishment of this fact, Kant thinks he has proven 
that reason indeed has a practical use, i.e., that it is “practical of itself alone” and is 
“immediately lawgiving”139.   The fact that consciousness of the moral law is a fact of 
reason itself provides the incentive to moral action.   
Now, if by incentive is understood the subjective determining ground of the 
will…then it will follow…that the incentive of the human will (and of the will of 
every created rational being) can never be anything other than the moral law; and 
thus that the objective determining ground must always and quite alone be also 
the subjectively sufficient determining ground of action if this is not merely to 
fulfill the letter of the law without containing its spirit.140 
 
In other words, moral interest is built into the notion of practical reason having a use at 
all.  If our reason has a practical use, then we necessarily take an interest in the moral law 
serving as subjective ground of our actions, that is, in acting out of respect for that law.  
Since Kant thinks that the consciousness of the moral law proves that reason has a 
genuinely practical use, he has thereby also allegedly proven that we have an a priori 
incentive to moral action.  Practical reason, then, is self-legitimating after all, at least on 
its own terms, that is, immanent to the use to which it is put.    
     Now, put in this way, the doctrine of the fact of reason can seem entirely ad hoc.  Of 
course, the latter doctrine has engendered an enormous controversy which we are entitled 
to pass over for the moment.  It is sufficient that the connection between the fact of 
reason and the self-legitimacy of reason in the practical sphere be clear.  But it’s 
important also to be clear about Kant’s attitude in this regard.  Again, the self-
                                                 
138 KPV 5:31. 
139 KPV 5:31. 
140 KPV 5:72. 
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legitimating character of practical reason accrues only from the fact that the human being 
must understand itself as free insofar as it is a practical agent.   The consciousness of 
“mastery over one’s inclinations” that practical reason engenders is only analogous “to 
the self-sufficiency [Selbständigkeit] that can be ascribed only to the supreme being.”141  
“For, how a law can be of itself and immediately a determining ground of the will 
(though this is what is essential in all morality) is for human reason an insoluble problem 
and identical with that of how a free will is possible.”142   The limits of moral inquiry 
adumbrated in the Groundwork remain in place, merely pushed back a step.  I may now, 
from a perspective internal to the practical use of reason, comprehend that the moral law 
of which I am conscious itself creates a moral interest.  But the moral law has objective 
reality only internal to that perspective.  If we ask how that perspective meshes with the 
perspective internal to the theoretical use of reason, we are left with essentially the same 
story the Canon gave us.  The perspectives merge in the concept of the highest good, 
which is also the “whole object of a pure practical reason” and in which “everything 
stands together in the most perfect harmony”.143  The transcendental ideas internal to the 
theoretical perspective receive confirmation from the practical postulates resulting from 
reason’s practical use: freedom in the “positive sense” (as self-determining), the existence 
of God and the immortality of the soul.  These practical postulates are necessitated, now 
from a purely practical perspective as well, because they are necessary grounds of the 
highest good as the sole object of practical activity, the practical use of reason in its 
fullest sense.     
                                                 
141 KPV 5:119. 
142 KPV 5:72. 
143 KPV 5:109-110. 
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     But, even within the purely practical use of reason, the doctrine of the highest good 
engenders an antinomy.144  The necessary connection between virtue, or worthiness to be 
happy, and happiness, which the highest good assumes, is after all a synthetic one.  They 
must relate to each other as cause and effect, motive and result.  So either, Kant says, the 
desire for happiness serves as the ground for moral action, or the moral law must serve as 
the ground—not just for moral action—but for actions that are the efficient cause of 
happiness.  The first option is ruled out because such action would not be moral at all, but 
rather heteronomous action.   
But the second is also impossible because any practical connection of causes and 
effects in the world, as a result of the determination of the will, does not depend 
upon the moral dispositions of the will but upon knowledge of the laws of 
nature…consequently no necessary connection of happiness with virtue in the 
world, adequate to the highest good, can be expected from the most meticulous 
observance of moral laws…If therefore, the highest good is impossible in 
accordance with practical rules, then the moral law, which commands us to 
promote it, must be fantastic and directed to empty imaginary ends and must 
therefore in itself be false.145 
 
     The threat of morality turning out to be an illusion, which guided Kant’s argument in 
the third section of the Groundwork, returns here in a different form.  The moral law 
itself provides us with a moral interest, but the practical use of reason is directed at the 
highest good.  If action directed at the highest good is impossible, because practical 
reason itself cannot comprehend how virtuous action can be the efficient cause of 
happiness, then the moral law as a genuine command is in fact an illusion.   This 
antinomy of practical reason is resolved in the very same way as the theoretical one, 
namely by resort to the doctrine of the double character of the I.   
                                                 
144 see “The Antinomy of Practical Reason”, KPV 5:113ff.   
145 KPV 5:113-4, my emphases.  
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[O]ne and the same acting being as appearance (even to his own inner sense) has 
a causality in the world of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature, 
but with respect to the same event, insofar as the acting person regards himself at 
the same time as noumenon (as pure intelligence, in this existence that cannot be 
temporally determined), he can contain a determining ground of that causality in 
accordance with laws of nature which is itself free from all laws of nature.146 
 
The agent, whose activity, qua manifestation of practical reason, is directed at the goal of 
the highest good, can be seen as the efficient cause of the happiness implicit in the latter 
only insofar as it is considered as noumenon, even though, as appearance, all of its 
activity must be considered the result of natural mechanism.   It is clear then that the 
entire structure of Kant’ s solution to the problem of the unity between the theoretical and 
practical reason hangs upon the doctrine of the double character of the I.147  Clarifying 
this doctrine was the second concern that I attributed to Kant in writing the second 
Critique.  There is ample proof of this in the preface.  There, in fact, he takes the two 
concerns to be intimately linked. 
[N]ow practical reason of itself, without any collusion from speculative reason, 
furnishes reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, namely to 
freedom (though, as a practical concept, only for practical use), and hence 
establishes my means of a fact what could there only be thought.  By this, the 
strange though incontestable assertion of the speculative Critique, that even the 
thinking subject is in inner intuition a mere appearance to itself, gets its full 
confirmation in the Critique of Practical Reason.148  
 
     The latter Critique then, Kant says, clarifies one of the “most considerable objections” 
to the former, namely “the paradoxical requirement to make oneself as subject of 
freedom a noumenon but at the same time, with regard to nature, a phenomenon in one’s 
                                                 
146 KPV 5:114. 
147 “The union of causality as freedom with causality as natural mechanism, the first of which is 
established by the moral law, the second by the law of nature, and indeed in one and the same subject, the 
human being, is impossible without representing him with regard to the first as a being in itself but with 
regard to the second as an appearance, with former in pure, the latter in empirical consciousness.  
Otherwise the contradiction of reason with itself is unavoidable.”  KPV 5:6fn., my emphases.   
148 KPV 5:6; I substitute Kant’s emphases with my own. 
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own empirical consciousness”149.  It’s not entirely clear why Kant himself describes the 
fact that the subject’s self-knowledge, i.e. the subject’s awareness of itself in empirical 
consciousness, is limited to its appearance within inner sense as “paradoxical”, if his use 
of that word is indeed more than merely rhetorical.  This is, after all, an alleged 
consequence of the fact, derived from the critique of theoretical reason, that knowledge of 
all objects is limited to appearances, that is, necessarily restricted to the conditions of 
sensible intuition.  In fact, Kant already refers to the same doctrine in the first Critique as 
a “paradox”.  He devotes a section of his revision of the Deduction in the B-edition to its 
clarification.  There, Kant says, the paradox arises from the fact that it seems 
“contradictory” that “we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected…since we 
would have to relate to ourselves passively”150. 
     What exactly is the contradiction which gives rise to the appearance of paradox here?  
It is important to proceed slowly.  Firstly, we have been treating—as Kant himself seems 
to be doing—the doctrine that the I’s self-knowledge is limited to its appearance in inner 
sense and the doctrine of the double character of the I as the same.  Of course, they are 
very closely related—perhaps even mutually entailing—doctrines, but they are being put 
to slightly different uses.  In the first Critique, Kant’s main concern is to deny that we 
have knowledge of our selves as we are constituted in ourselves, as noumena.  Kant 
resolves the “paradox” here quite quickly by reminding us that, unlike “customary” 
systems of psychology, he makes a careful distinction between inner sense and 
apperception.  The doctrine only appears contradictory if you are already assuming that 
                                                 
149 KPV 5:6, my emphasis.   
150 KRV B152ff, my emphasis.  This passage, and the puzzle about activity and passivity, will come up 
again in our discussion of Heidegger.  
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the faculty of inner sense is a kind of spontaneity.   The appearance of paradox derives 
from seeing the problem like this: how can we be said to only intuit ourselves as we are 
internally affected, i.e. insofar as we are affected by ourselves?  “To be affected” is to 
have a passive relationship to something outside.   But we ourselves are the things 
(actively) affecting ourselves.  We then actively relate to ourselves passively.  But for 
Kant the inner sense is just a passive faculty, that is, a faculty of receptivity, which is 
affected by apperception, a faculty of spontaneity.   The latter “under the designation of a 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination…therefore exercises that action on the 
passive subject, whose faculty it is, about which we rightly say that the inner sense is 
thereby affected.”151   In this regard the object of inner sense—namely, myself—is no 
different from any object of outer sense, except that the former is determined as 
appearance in time and the latter as appearance in space.  “[H]ence if we admit about the 
[determinations of outer sense in space] that we cognize objects by their means only 
insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense 
we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by our selves.”152 
     The air of paradox remains only if we press Kant on the idea that our self-knowledge is 
thereby limited to our appearance to ourselves within inner sense, i.e. insofar as we are 
affected, because there is also the part that is active with respect to ourselves—the part 
that does the affecting—the part, in other words, which is self-active with respect to 
itself.  But Kant’s answer is that this cannot be a part of our empirical self-knowledge.   
Knowledge of ourselves as spontaneity occupies, as I discussed in the last chapter, a 
troubled place in the Kantian scheme of the first Critique.  Admittedly not an empirical 
                                                 
151 KRV B153-4. 
152 KRV B156. 
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fact about ourselves, this self-activity, the spontaneity of original synthetic activity, 
seems to be rather a metaphysical fact about the type of beings which we are, 
acknowledgment of which is necessitated by the Copernican Revolution and thus by the 
standpoint of transcendental philosophy itself.153  This problematizes Kant’s strategy of 
resolving the “paradox” in the section of the first Critique discussed above, namely by 
assimilating the problem of self-knowledge to the problem of knowledge of things in 
themselves in general.  Presumably, whatever the thing in itself which affects our outer 
sense is supposed to be, it is not something self-active as the “object”—“our selves”, 
Kant says—which affects our inner sense is.  And this because we do not, and perhaps 
cannot, treat ordinary, non-human objects of empirical experience as possessing “rational 
natures”.  I have previously discussed the potential problems with understanding the 
“noumenal self” along the same lines as the “noumenal object”, and in fact proposed a 
reading of the paralogisms in which Kant can be seen as making precisely this point, 
though ambiguously.   The self as a thing-in-itself is an impossible object of knowledge 
precisely because subjects can never be treated as objects, as things, at all.  Subjectivity is 
a fundamentally different ontological category from thinghood.   
     This does not require a denial that other human beings, even ourselves, show up, in a 
manner of speaking, within empirical consciousness, also as objects.  They are “objects” 
of outer and inner sense respectively.  But from a theoretical perspective, i.e. internal to 
the purely theoretical use of reason, this is not a problem.  The latter, in itself, is directed 
only at the concept of nature, that is, only interested in things insofar as they are capable 
of showing up within the unity of nature which theoretical reason prescribes, and can be 
                                                 
153 See KRV A546/B574: “Yet the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature 
solely through sense, knows [erkennt] himself also through pure apperception, and indeed in actions and 
inner determinations which cannot be counted at all among impressions of sense”.   
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seen as purely natural beings, subject to the laws of natural mechanism.  This is why, 
from the theoretical perspective, we are interested only in the empirical character of 
sensible objects, and are content that human actions—others’ and my own—are fully 
intelligible by reference to that character alone.  From the theoretical perspective, we 
simply “pass over as entirely unknown” the intelligible character, because “this 
intelligible ground does not touch the empirical questions at all”.154  This is also why, 
internal to the perspective of the first Critique, Kant’s ambivalence toward, or perhaps 
even neglect of, the metaphysical import of reason’s self-activity, can be overlooked, or 
simply taken for granted.155  
      It is only now, from the practical perspective, internal to the practical use of reason, 
that the intelligible ground—which Kant calls the “proper self”—matters quite a bit, and 
thus that Kant’s ambivalence becomes more pressing.  In the Groundwork, Kant says:    
Now, a human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes 
himself from all other things, even from himself insofar as he is affected by 
objects, and that is reason.  This reason, as pure self-activity, is raised above the 
understanding by this: that though the latter is also self-activity and does not, like 
sense, contain merely representations that arise when we are affected by things 
(and are thus passive), yet it can produce from its activity no other concepts than 
those which serve merely to bring sensible representations under rules and thereby 
to unite them in one consciousness, without which use of sensibility it would 
think nothing at all; but reason, on the contrary, shows in what we call “ideas” a 
spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes far beyond anything that sensibility can 
ever afford it, and proves its highest occupation in distinguishing the world of 
sense and the world of understanding from each other and thereby marking out the 
limits of the understanding itself.156 
 
                                                 
154 KRV A546-7/B573-4. 
155 Except, of course, for the confusion it causes regarding the question of the locus of theoretical self-
activity, and the subsequent ramifications for the question of the common root, discussed in the last 
chapter.  
156 GMS 4:452, Kant’s emphases substituted for my own. 
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This description of reason seems intended to apply to both its theoretical and practical 
uses.  Reason’s self-activity, as opposed to the understanding’s, is pure because it is a 
spontaneity which acts only on itself, as opposed to acting on a sensible manifold, which 
results from receptivity.  It is spontaneous activity acting on spontaneous activity.  But 
we do not have here an account of the unity of reason with itself in both of its uses, but 
rather a clear indication of the tension between the uses.  For whereas the use of reason’s 
activity in the theoretical sphere is merely regulative, giving the concept of nature a 
certain unitary character, in the moral sphere it is constitutive.  Reason’s self-activity in 
its practical use produces the moral law, that is, creates a binding obligation on itself, and 
thus the “idea” of its own freedom, which is expressible in moral action.  This freedom of 
self-activity—which is, as we have said, the source of all dignity and personal worth, all 
personality157, and ultimately all moral interest—is attributable to the self only as a 
noumenon, as a member of an intelligible world.  The concept of a “noumenal self”, 
problematic but ultimately dispensable from a theoretical perspective, is absolutely 
essential to the practical perspective, and it is here, subsequently, that the “paradoxical 
requirement” that my self-knowledge is limited to myself as appearance is felt more 
forcibly.   
     As I have said, the theoretical use of reason takes an interest only in the empirical 
character of things, including ourselves as natural beings.  The practical use of reason, 
however, must take an interest only in our own intelligible characters.  The unity of 
reason in its two uses ultimately rests, with regard to our self-conception, on the double 
character of the I.  I want now to describe the ramifications of this doctrine for both the 
                                                 
157 see KPV 5:87ff.  
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practical perspective itself and for the perspective which tries to describe the relationship 
between the theoretical and practical perspectives themselves.  The author of the 
“considerable objection” which I said partially motivated Kant in writing the second 
Critique, H.A. Pistorius, reiterates his objection in his review of that work: 
For one and the same subject can by no means actually have and express both 
kinds of freedom [practical and transcendental], since they contradict and cancel 
each other.  Similarly, it seems incomprehensible that the human being, who 
comprises only one person, should at the same time really possess a double self-
opposing character [einen doppelten sich entgegengesetzten Charakter], sensible 
and intelligible, as a member of two different worlds, and should in fact comprise 
two self-opposing I’s.  I readily confess that this double character of the human 
being, these two I’s in the single subject, despite all the explanations that Kant 
himself and his disciples have given and all the uses they have made of it, 
particularly for the resolution of the well-known antinomy of freedom, is to me 
the most obscure and incomprehensible thing in the whole critical philosophy [das 
Dunkelste und Unbegreiflichste in der ganzen kritischen Philosophie].158    
                
     Kant’s main concern in the section of the second Critique in which he attempts to 
clarify the “misinterpretation [Mißdeutung]” which he takes to underlie Pistorius’ 
objection—the “Critical Elucidation” at the conclusion of the Analytic—is to reaffirm the 
first Critique’s “consistent way of thinking”159, that is, to prove that the concepts of 
nature and freedom do not contradict each other, and that the distinction between the 
doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morality do not oppose one another.  In fact, 
Kant spends much of his time here arguing, by elimination, that the doctrine of the double 
character of the I is the only way to “remove the apparent contradiction between the 
mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action”.  Thus he argues both 
against the kind of empiricist/compatibilist line which wants to  reduce freedom to a 
                                                 
158 Hermann Andreas Pistorius, “Rezension der “Kritik der praktischen Vernuft” (1974), p. 175; included in 
Materialen zu Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”, ed. by Bittner and Cramer, Suhrkamp, 1975.  
Translation my own. 
159 KPV 5:6-7. 
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psychological property—which produces at best, Kant says, a “freedom of a turnspit”—
and the kind of rationalist/Spinozistic line which attributes human actions to the causality 
of a supreme being—which makes the human being into “a marionette or an automaton”.   
Both of these strategies, Kant maintains, fail to make my actions genuinely something 
“within my control”.   He then reiterates his stance that only through seeing the I as 
possessing a double character does the apparent contradiction between nature and 
freedom disappear, that morality is only possible through the transcendental freedom 
which we can ascribe to ourselves as noumena, and that this freedom is a necessary 
postulate for reason in its practical use. 
     Putting aside, then, the worries about the intelligibility of the noumenal self seen from 
the theoretical perspective which I have already mentioned, what does the requirement of 
seeing myself as a noumena—resulting from the assumption of the practical 
perspective—entail within that perspective?  The noumenal self—the intelligible 
character—is something which exists necessarily outside of time.  Even though the 
“actions” of the noumenal self are supposed to ground the effects in the sensible world160, 
it cannot strictly speaking be said to “act” at all.   
Now this acting subject, in its intelligible character, would not stand under any 
conditions of time, for time is only the condition of appearances but not of things 
in themselves.  In that subject no action would arise or perish…since, in it, 
insofar as it is a noumenon, nothing happens…Of it one would say quite 
correctly that it begins its effects in the sensible world from itself, without its 
action beginning in it itself.161 
 
                                                 
160 KRV A538/B566.  “[O]ne can consider the causality of this being in two aspects, “as intelligible in its 
action as a thing in itself, and sensible in the effects of that action as an appearance in the world of sense.” 
161 KRV A539-41/B567-69.   
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As Pistorius points out, we can attribute to the noumenal self only “a single unchangeable 
act of will”.162   
     The noumenal self, “invisible and active of itself”163, is also something with which we 
are “not acquainted”164 and of which we are “not cognizant”165.  So Kant’s character-
dualism makes the ordinary process of moral deliberation extremely obscure, if not 
completely incomprehensible.  Because my intelligible character is something completely 
unknown to me, nothing that I know about myself is relevant for practical deliberation 
and thus moral action.  This fact is not the same as the familiar Kantian point about the 
possibility of self-deception, namely that I can never, in any particular case, be certain 
that my action is truly done out of respect for and not just in conformity with the moral 
law.  That kind of uncertainty can be allowed as a basic and unthreatening fact about 
moral deliberation and action, and about our basic cognitive and moral fallibility.  It is 
rather that I am separated, as an empirical being facing actual moral situations, from the 
true source of my moral being by an absolutely unbridgeable chasm.  In principle, none 
                                                 
162 “Rezension...”, p. 176.  As Pistorius goes on to say, this—ironically for Kant—attributes god-like 
properties to the noumenal self.  “Though if one conceives of the double character of the human being and 
of his two I’s not as existing together at the same time, but rather as following one another, so that the 
human being in the sensible world had nothing more than the disposition for intelligible character, nothing 
more than the purpose of one day becoming a pure intelligence, then one can merely assume—if the above 
remark is right—that he will approach this intelligible character and all of the properties and virtues 
connected with it only asymptotically, but will never be able to attain it.  Should he in fact attain it, he 
would in fact be raised to the position and virtues of a deity, for according to the depictions of the 
properties and virtues of such an intelligence, all of his wishes and his actions (since he could no longer, as 
in the sensible world, act like this and that, and he would not be subjected to any change) had to be for him 
nothing more than a single unchangeable act of his will (as it must be thought for an infinite unchangeable 
being) and, alongside all the causality of the changeable that is attributed to him, he himself had to be 
considered as entirely unchangeable.” emphasis added.   
163 GMS 4:452. 
164 KRV A551/B579. 
165 GMS 4:453. 
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of my self-knowledge, which can only be empirical self-knowledge, matters in moral 
deliberation.   
     The doctrine of the double-I, then, can be seen as representing a profound self-
alienation and disempowerment in the moral sphere.   My intelligible character is 
something that I can only in a very thin and nominal sense identify with and consider 
“within my control”.  It can seem that only in a formal and technical sense does the 
concept of freedom attributable to our intelligible character allow us “to find the 
unconditioned and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without going outside 
ourselves.”166  As unseen and unknowable, the noumenal self can seem precisely 
something “outside” and alien.  And yet it is, Kant says, my proper or authentic self 
[eigentliches Selbst], and the only possible source of my personality, my moral interest, 
my dignity, inner worth and self-respect as a human being.  
     But these are potential problems only from the viewpoint of moral psychology and 
ethical theory itself.  They are also extremely contentious issues, which thankfully we 
may pass over here.  Abstracting from the perspective internal to practical reason, then, 
and considering rather the perspective which the doctrine of the double-I gives us on the 
unity of the two rational perspectives themselves—which is after all the main concern 
here—it requires of course that we see the human being as both subject to natural 
mechanism and free from natural necessity simultaneously.  The double-I represents, after 
all, “the absolute unity of a phenomenon”.  It is the “very same subject” which is both a 
natural being and has a “rational nature”, so that the “very same actions”, belonging to 
the “very same will”, are to be seen as both free and unfree at the very same time.  
                                                 
166 KRV 5:105. 
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Theoretical reason requires that I see myself as subject to natural mechanism and all my 
actions as resulting from prior sensible conditions, and practical reason requires that I see 
myself, that is, the very same self, the very same I, as unconditioned and free from 
determination from those very same sensible conditions.  The doctrine of the double 
character of the I however cannot itself illuminate or make intelligible to me, from within 
the first person perspective, say, how I can be at once both a natural and free—practically 
rational—being, nor does it explain how my own cognitive activities hang together with 
my practical doings—for example, how what I know about myself relates to what I do.  In 
fairness, Kant never claims that it does.  It is rather, he claims, “simply unavoidable if 
one wants to maintain both these mutually repellent concepts together; but in application, 
when one wants to explain them as united in one and the same action, and so to explain 
this union itself, great difficulties come forward, which seem to make such a unification 
unfeasible [untunlich].”167  So while the account of the unity of reason in the first two 
critiques can help us understand how the first sense of dualism can be resolved—namely 
how the natural world-order is compatible with a moral world-order—and to some degree 
it helps with the second as well—namely how a being can be seen, from an impersonal 
perspective as it were, to be both a natural being and a moral agent—the account does not 
help us at all with the third sense of dualism.  It fails to give us any account of how our 
theoretical and practical activities hang together in a unified self-conception of who we 
are.     
                                                 
167 KPV 5:95, my emphasis.  One can see this passage as the analogue to the quote from the Anthropology 
regarding the common root.  What is in other places optimistically hoped for is elsewhere pessimistically 
dismissed.   
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     But Kant has one more point to make in the second Critique regarding the relationship 
between theoretical and practical reason.  It is the famous doctrine of the “primacy of the 
practical”, which seems to take a step toward reconciling the third dualism.   
But if pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of 
the moral law proves it to be, it is still one and the same reason which, whether 
from a theoretical or practical perspective, judges according to a priori principles; 
and then it is clear that, even if from the first perspective its capacity does not 
extend to establishing certain propositions affirmatively, although they do not 
contradict it, as soon as these same propositions belong inseparably to the 
practical interest of pure reason it must accept them—indeed as something offered 
to it from another source, which has not grown on its own land but yet is 
sufficiently authenticated—and try to compare and connect them with everything 
that it has within its power as speculative reason, being mindful, however, that 
these are not its insights but are yet extensions of its use from another, namely a 
practical perspective; and this is not in the least opposed to its interest, which 
consists in the restriction of speculative mischief.  Thus, in the union of pure 
speculative with pure practical reason in one cognition, the latter has primacy, 
assuming that this union is not contingent and discretionary but based a priori on 
reason itself and therefore necessary.  For, without this subordination a conflict of 
reason with itself would arise …But one cannot require pure practical reason to be 
subordinated to speculative reason and so reverse the order, since all interest is 
ultimately practical and even that of speculative reason is only conditional and is 
complete in practical use alone.168  
  
Assuming, that is, that reason must ultimately be unitary, a subordination of one set of 
interests to another is required in order to avoid an unacceptable internal conflict within 
reason itself.  The theoretical perspective on things, including on myself, taken by, say, 
science, must be subordinated to the moral perspective because, simply put, morality is 
more important to us than science, viz. to theoretical inquiry and its results.  The self-
conception that contemplation of “the moral law within” engenders—which reveals to me 
a “life independent of animality”, “reaching into the infinite”—is more important to us 
than the self-conception engendered by contemplation of the “starry heavens” which 
                                                 
168 KPV 5:121, my emphasis.  
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“annihilates my importance as an animal creature”.169  As I say, this helps resolve the 
tension to a degree, that is, insofar as it helps me understand how my theoretical and 
practical identities, as it were, fit together, namely by one being subordinated to the other.  
My moral identity as free from the causal order of nature trumps as it were my 
“theoretical identity”, which I might get for example from neuroscience—what I am, and 
thus everything I feel and do, is wholly explainable in terms of an enormously complex 
neurophysiological system.  But why must the subordination go only in this direction?  
     It might seem strange that Kant puts this point so ambiguously by saying that “all 
interest is ultimately practical”.  This seems at first blush either tautological or false, 
neither of which makes the point that the subordination must go only in one direction.  Of 
course all interest is “practical” in the sense that it is essentially involved in all goal-
oriented activity.  Science itself is a human activity guided by interests of a kind, which 
makes it practical in this broader sense.  If Kant means here that all interest is purely 
practical, i.e. moral, then this is simply not true.  Aside from non-moral practical interests 
(even in a stricter sense, e.g. prudential and technological interests), theoretical reason 
has its own interests, namely in producing a unitary concept of nature, on the one hand, 
and, as Kant himself has just said, in avoiding “speculative mischief” on the other, neither 
of which must be seen as in themselves moral concerns or reducible to moral concerns.   
It’s not entirely clear why one might not instead ultimately feel the need to subordinate 
moral interest and its insistence on freedom—an assumption as important and necessary 
as it might be admitted to be within the domain of action, to the interest in, say, plain 
scientific truth, which could insist that that freedom and that morality is ultimately an 
                                                 
169 See the famous conclusion to KPV, 5:161ff. 
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illusion.  Such a (contrary) resolution of the conflict of reason through subordination of 
one use of reason to another could simply insist that—though “pretending” we are free is 
indeed necessary internal to the standpoint of action—at the end of the day we are not, 
and this because science says we are not.   We will return indirectly to these 
considerations in a moment, but it remains first to remark on Kant’s return to the problem 
of the unity of reason in his third and last critique.  Here Kant seems to make another 
attempt to address the third dualism.   
     It is evident that Kant himself did not remain completely satisfied with all that has 
been said so far regarding the relationship between the theoretical and practical 
perspectives.  In the introduction to the third Critique, Kant now asserts that it is a third 
faculty altogether, the power of judgment, which is capable of mediating the two.   
Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the 
concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as 
the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter (thus by means of the 
theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible, just as if there were so many 
different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second: yet the 
latter should have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom 
should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and 
nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the 
lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that 
are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom. – Thus there must 
still be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that grounds nature with that 
which the concept of freedom contains practically, the concept of which, even if it 
does not suffice for cognition of it either theoretically or practically, and thus has 
no proper domain of its own, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the 
manner of thinking in accordance with the principles of the one to that in 
accordance with the principles of the other.170 
 
It is, then, Kant later asserts, the power of judgment which “provides the mediating 
concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes 
possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical”, which is the 
                                                 
170 KU 5:175-6. 
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“concept of the purposiveness of nature”171.  Kant here amends his claim in the first 
Critique that the ideas of theoretical reason themselves are capable of providing a 
transition to the practical use of reason.  There, the idea of God as highest reason and 
supreme intelligence and thus guarantor of the highest good was itself the source of the 
concept of “the purposive unity of things”.    
     But we needn’t dwell too long here on whether or not Kant is simply redescribing the 
division of labor among the faculties.  In the third as well as the first critiques, the central 
issue with respect to this question was the way in which we are able to conceive of the 
natural world itself as compatible with and even amenable to the demands that practical 
reason exerts on it.  What is important about the third Critique in this regard is its 
description of the faculty of aesthetic judgment as providing another, non-theoretical and 
in itself non-moral, perspective on the natural world, but one which is connected to 
morality and relevant to moral considerations in two ways.172  Kant says that intellectual 
interest in natural beauty is a “sign of a good moral character” and that beauty itself is a 
“symbol of morality”. 
     Aesthetic experience of natural beauty provides an independent perspective—
independent of the purely moral perspective—in which the natural world nevertheless 
shows up as supportive of moral experience.  The aesthetic power of judgment can 
provide an independent perspective because, as a “higher faculty”, it is, Kant says, 
autonomous.  A faculty can be seen as autonomous insofar as it is self-legislating within a 
                                                 
171 KU 5:196. 
172 I will be restricting my discussion here to the aesthetic experience of natural beauty.   This means that I 
will be excluding, for the sake of brevity, both the cases of artistic beauty and the sublime, as well as the 
logical, as opposed to the aesthetic, use of the power of judgment.  I don’t believe any of these omissions 
affect the validity of my discussion here. 
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particular sphere.  Though the a priori principles of aesthetic judgment, and its concept of 
purposiveness, are not constitutive with respect to the concept of nature—but rather only 
regulative—they are constitutive with respect to the pleasure or displeasure which the 
aesthetic judgment grounds.   
The spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition, the agreement of which 
contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept [of a purposiveness of 
nature] suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of 
nature with the concept of freedom in its consequences, in that the latter at the 
same time promotes the receptivity of the mind for the moral feeling.173   
 
     For Kant, an aesthetic judgment that some natural object x is beautiful involves the 
ascription of the form of purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit] to x, without, however, a 
representation of the actual purpose [Zweck] of x.  The beautiful object of aesthetic 
judgment is beautiful insofar as it is judged to have, Kant says, “purposiveness without a 
purpose”.  The purely aesthetic judgment, and the pleasure attendant upon it, is 
disinterested precisely because it is not based on any representation of the purpose of the 
natural object, e.g. its inherent goodness, agreeableness (pleasing the “senses in 
sensation”), or usefulness.  But though the aesthetic judgment cannot therefore be 
grounded in any interest in the object, it is able to produce an intellectual interest in the 
existence of the object.174  So in addition to the faculty of “merely aesthetic judgment”,  
we also have a faculty of intellectual judgment, for determining a priori for mere 
forms of practical maxims…a satisfaction which we make into a law for everyone 
without our judgment being grounded on any interest, although it produces one.  
                                                 
173 KU 5:197. Bracketed gloss and emphases mine.  
174 KU 5:299:  “Someone who alone (without any intention of wanting to communicate his observations to 
other) considers the beautiful shape of wildflower, a bird, an insect, etc., in order to marvel at it, to love it, 
and to be unwilling for it to be entirely absent from nature, even though some harm might come to him 
from it rather than there being any prospect of advantage to him from it, takes an immediate and certainly 
intellectual interest in the beauty of nature.  I.e., not only the form of its product but also its existence 
pleases him, even though no sensory charm has a part in this and he does not combine any sort of purpose 




The pleasure or displeasure in the first judgment is called that of taste, in the 
second that of moral feeling.175 
 
Though aesthetic experience is capable of producing a moral feeling, Kant is clear here 
that aesthetic judgment is not capable of independently generating the moral interest 
which has vexed us previously.  That is to say that aesthetic experience does not itself 
create an incentive to be moral.  Indeed, it is only for one who has “already firmly 
established his interest in the morally good”, that the judgment of natural beauty will take 
on, as it were, a moral tenor.  It is this which allows Kant to assert that to take an interest 
in natural beauty is “the mark of a good soul” or “at least indicates a disposition of the 
mind that is favorable to the moral feeling”176.   
     But what is it about natural beauty that is evocative of a moral feeling, and makes the 
appreciation of it capable of strengthening or at least expressing a preexisting moral 
interest?  It is the fact that in aesthetic experience of natural beauty, nature is able to show 
up as itself displaying the type of purposiveness—though only formally—which the 
purely practical, i.e. moral, perspective demands; in other words, it allows us to see 
purposiveness as also a feature of nature itself.  
[I]t also interests reason that the ideas (for which it produces an immediate 
interest in the moral feeling) also have objective reality, i.e., that nature should at 
least show some trace or give a sign that it contains in itself some sort of ground 
for assuming a lawful correspondence of its products with our satisfaction… 
[N]ature, which in its beautiful products shows itself as art, not merely by chance, 
but as it were intentionally, in accordance with a lawful arrangement and as 
purposiveness without a purpose.177 
 
Based on this, we might interpret the significance of aesthetic experience for moral 
feeling in the following way: aesthetic experience allows us to experience nature, and the 
                                                 
175 KU 5:300, last emphasis mine.   
176 KU 5:298-99.  
177 KU 5:301, my emphases. 
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purposiveness constitutive of the experience qua aesthetic, as grounded in a will which 
ensures that nature is compatible with our moral demands, i.e. God.  This would 
assimilate Kant’s strategy of unifying reason’s two demands here in the third Critique to 
the one adopted in the first Critique, namely that of seeing the unity grounded in the 
end—shared by the two demands—of the highest good, which God alone could ensure.  
The aesthetic power of judgment would mediate the faculty of cognition and desire by 
supplying another source of reasons for viewing nature as grounded in a supreme 
intelligence which ensures a harmony between our concepts of nature and freedom.  
Nature is beautiful, to put it simply, because we can see it as God’s work, and thus as 
expressive of a purposive design which would itself ensure the possibility of the highest 
good and support our moral activity.  Sensitivity to natural beauty would be the mark of a 
moral nature because it would mirror a sensitivity to the divine ground of nature.  God as 
the moral author of the world would also then be the source of the “cipher by means of 
which nature figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms”, of the “language that nature 
brings to us and that seems to have a higher meaning.”178 
     It is interesting, however, that this is not the route that Kant chooses here.179  In 
defining “purposiveness”, Kant says: 
An object or a state of mind or even an action, even if its possibility does not 
necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely 
because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us insofar as we 
assume as its ground a causality in accordance with ends, i.e., a will that has 
arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain rule.  
Purposiveness can thus exist without an end, insofar as we do not place the causes 
of this form in a will, but can still make the explanation of its possibility 
conceivable to ourselves only by deriving it from a will.180 
                                                 
178 KU 5:301, 302. 
179 Though Kant in fact returns to these themes in the later sections on the teleological power of judgment. 




Again, it might seem natural to assume that the “will which has arranged” nature—the 
possibility of which underwrites the aesthetic judgment of the purposiveness of the 
aesthetic object—refers to God.  But this cannot be, because in this case we could also 
thereby represent to ourselves the end itself, namely the highest good, which would in 
this way be purposiveness with a determinate purpose.  It is crucial to aesthetic judgment, 
as we have seen, that it represents to itself no purpose whatsoever.  The source, rather, of 
the (merely formal) purposiveness of the aesthetic object is the formally purposive 
activity of the cognitive faculties themselves, namely imagination and understanding, in 
their “harmonious free play”.  This becomes clearer in Kant’s discussion of the “ideality” 
of the purposiveness in the beautiful in nature.181   
That nature has the property of containing an occasion for us to perceive the inner 
purposiveness in the relationship of our mental powers in the judging of certain of 
its products, and indeed as something that has to be explained as necessarily and 
universally valid on the basis of a supersensible ground, cannot be an end of 
nature, or rather judged by us as such a thing: because otherwise the judgment that 
would thereby be determined would be grounded in heteronomy and would not, as 
befits a judgment of taste, be free and grounded in autonomy.182 
 
If what mattered for a judgment of beauty contained a representation of the “outer” 
purposiveness of nature, then what is beautiful would be an empirical matter, which 
would rob the power of aesthetic judgment of its autonomy.  It is not primarily the 
concept of the “outer” purposiveness judged to be in nature—which was, after all, already 
evident from reason’s role in the purely theoretical perspective—but rather the “inner” 
purposiveness of the faculties of cognition, in their aesthetic employment, which mirrors 
the purposiveness of moral activity.  “[S]ince we never encounter [purposiveness without 
                                                 
181 See §58 of KU. 
182 KU 5:350, my emphases. 
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a purpose] externally, we naturally seek [it] within ourselves, and indeed in that which 
constitutes the ultimate end of our existence, namely the moral vocation.”183  
For since the beautiful must not be judged in accordance with concepts, but rather 
in accordance with the purposive disposition of the imagination for its 
correspondence with the faculty of concepts in general, it is not a rule or precept 
but only that which is merely nature in the subject, i.e., the supersensible 
substratum of all our faculties…and so that in relation to which it is the ultimate 
end given by the intelligible in our nature to make all our cognitive faculties 
agree.184  
 
But this is just what we were after.  Kant had said that the possibility of a transition from 
“the manner of thinking” contained in the theoretical perspective to that contained in the 
practical was a concept of purposiveness which could serve as the “ground of the unity of 
the supersensible that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains 
practically” 185.   It turns out that, from the aesthetic perspective on nature, it is not 
primarily the purposiveness that nature displays in its beauty, but the purposiveness 
displayed by the judging subject himself—which is nevertheless taken to correspond to 
the purposiveness of nature—which provides the possibility of a transition from the 
theoretical to the practical perspective.  Inner purposiveness allows us to think the unity 
between the supersensible ground of nature, as the sensible, and the supersensible ground 
of the subject, as freedom.  The faculty of the aesthetic power of judgment: 
sees itself, both on account of this inner possibility in the subject as well as on 
account of the outer possibility of a nature that corresponds to it, as related to 
something in the subject itself and outside of it, which is neither nature nor 
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freedom, but which is connected with the ground of the latter, namely the 
supersensible, in which the theoretical faculty is combined with the practical, in a 
mutual and unknown way, to form a unity.186 
 
      This is why beauty may be seen as a “symbol” of morality.   Objects of natural beauty 
“arouse sensations that contain something analogical to the consciousness of a mental 
state produced by moral judgments.”187  It is the experience of the “freedom of the 
imagination” in aesthetic judging which is taken to be an analogy for the freedom of 
reason itself in its moral self-legislation.188  And because imagination is connected to the 
“sensibility of our faculty”, aesthetic judgment is, Kant says, “at bottom a faculty for the 
judging of the sensible rendering of moral ideas”189.   
     This is indeed an improvement on Kant’s earlier strategies for solving the problem of 
the unity of reason, particularly with regard to the third dualism.  As we saw, Kant in the 
first two critiques attempts to give us a picture of the world in which reason’s two 
demands are unified in the idea of the highest good.  In terms of self-conception, the “fact 
of reason” was meant to ensure that the practical demand, in addition to the theoretical, is 
self-legitimating, and that conceiving of ourselves as natural beings poses no threat to our 
moral interest.  This involved conceiving of the I as having a double character, as being 
simultaneous a member of two different worlds, the unity of which itself could receive, in 
principle, no explanation.  The best we have to go on is the assertion that our being as 
moral agents matters more to us than our being as natural creatures.  Now, the self-
conception afforded to us as beings capable of aesthetic experience indeed attempts to 
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take us a step further.  To see this we must look at the last quoted passage carefully.  Kant 
says there that in aesthetic judging, the subject sees itself as related to something x, which 
(1) is inside the subject and outside the subject, (2) is neither nature nor freedom, (3) is 
connected to the supersensible, and (4) combines the theoretical and the practical.  Now 
this x is the purposiveness of the subject’s own cognitive faculties, experienced as a free 
play within aesthetic experience itself as a ground of the aesthetic judgment.  The claim 
here is that in the aesthetic judging of natural beauty I am aware of a certain kind of 
freedom—call it aesthetic freedom—which is neither identical to the spontaneity 
involved in a purely theoretical perspective on nature, nor to the spontaneity involved in 
the self-legislation of the moral law, but is a kind of freedom which is both nevertheless 
in tune with the natural world as natural, and allows an analogy with the freedom of 
moral action.  Aesthetic judgment, finally, makes possible the transition by allowing 
insight into how the “supersensible that grounds nature” can be related to “that which the 
concept of freedom contains practically”, namely, the supersensible that grounds 
freedom.   
    In other words, it allows me a way of thinking the intelligible ground of the unity of 
my faculties (inner purposiveness) in harmony with the unity of nature (outer 
purposiveness)—i.e. purposiveness both “inside and outside the subject”—as also the 
intelligible ground which the moral perspective requires, i.e. freedom.  It allows me to 
think—without reference to the highest good—the harmony of nature and freedom in a 
single supersensible ground.  I say this represents a step further because it involves a way 
of connecting the unity of my faculties with the unity of the world in which nature and 
freedom coexist.  Aesthetic judgment mediates nature and freedom by connecting the 
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supersensible ground of the unity of my faculties (inner purposiveness) with both the 
supersensible ground of nature (outer purposiveness) and the supersensible ground of 
freedom (moral purposiveness).  
     The mediation between the concepts of nature and freedom, and thus the transition 
from one use of reason to the other, functions by connecting one concept, the inner 
purposiveness of aesthetic freedom, to each of the former two concepts individually.  
There are thus, in a manner of speaking, two analogies at work here.  First, there is an 
analogy between the freedom of inner purposiveness and the outer purposiveness of 
natural objects considered aesthetically, i.e. as beautiful; and secondly, there is an 
analogy between the freedom of inner purposiveness (which I called aesthetic freedom) 
and moral purposiveness.  The latter is the freedom involved in moral activity directed at 
achieving the end of a “moral world”.   The first analogy is grounded in the 
correspondence, as Kant calls it, between the purposive activity involved in the aesthetic 
judging itself and the purposiveness of the natural object itself.  The second analogy is 
grounded in the symbolic relationship between aesthetic freedom and moral freedom. 
     Now, these are meant to be merely analogies, of course, which means that they will be 
alike in some respects but unlike in other respects.  But even if we then overlook the 
ways in which the analogies break down in each particular case, that is, if we ignore the 
ways in which inner and outer purposiveness are unalike in some respects, and if at the 
same time ignore the ways in which aesthetic freedom and moral freedom are unalike in 
some respects, accepting of course that in both cases there are germane features that 
make them alike enough to warrant the analogy—the problem remains, however, that this 
does not guarantee a useful correspondence between the features that warrant the analogy 
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in the one case and the features that warrant the analogy in the second case.  What we are 
interested in after all is the features shared by outer purposiveness, i.e. nature, on the one 
hand, and moral purposiveness, i.e. freedom, on the other hand.   
     Without such an account, the alleged ability to think the connection between the 
supersensible ground that unifies the purposive activities of my cognitive faculties with 
nature with the supersensible ground that unifies the purposive activity of my cognitive 
faculties with freedom will fail to illuminate how seeing nature from the aesthetic 
perspective is able to unify the theoretical perspective on how the world is with my moral 
perspective regarding how the world ought to be and thus how I ought to act in that 
world.  Before the third Critique, Kant could only rely on the doctrine that the 
supersensible itself was after all the ground of the sensible.  Though this relationship of 
grounding must necessarily remain unknown and inexplicable, and thus the empirical and 
intelligible characters apparently in contradiction—one determined by natural necessity 
and the other free—it permitted the thought that the intelligible character grounded the 
empirical character, so that in fact there could be no contradiction between them, 
considered from the perspective of the subject as just another being in the world, which 
just like any other object, could be considered as phenomenon and noumenon.  In other 
words, the spontaneity of the subject’s theoretical conception of itself does not factor in to 
this way of reconciling the theoretical and the practical perspectives.  Still, the freedom of 
the unknown intelligible character allowed me to think myself free with respect to my 
actions, even given their simultaneous determination by their empirical and thus 
mechanistic character.   
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     Now, the third Critique indeed takes us a step further in one direction by precisely 
focusing on the spontaneity of the purposive activity of aesthetically judging nature.  This 
permits us to think the unity of the cognitive faculties themselves in that spontaneous 
activity together with the unity of nature in a supersensible ground.  But with respect to 
my actions, I have gotten no further.  For the aesthetic perspective shares with the 
theoretical perspective a merely spectatorial relationship with nature.  Thus the 
experience of aesthetic freedom, the spontaneity of the aesthetic perspective, is no more 
and no less illuminative of the relationship between the spontaneity of the theoretical 
perspective and the spontaneity of the practical perspective than the doctrine of the 
double character of the I.  This is to say that even though the third Critique attempts to 
illuminate not just how the natural world—now seen from an aesthetic rather than 
theoretical perspective—is amenable to the moral demands the practical perspective puts 
on it, but also how the subject’s theoretical perspective on itself is amenable to its 
practical self-conception, ultimately the “transition” in the third Critique can succeed 
only in the first task but not in the second.  Just as the regulative use of the ideas of 
theoretical reason allowed me to conceive of the natural world as amenable to my 
practical demands, aesthetic experience allows me to conceive of the world as displaying 
a certain purposiveness which, because it mirrors the inner purposiveness I experience as 
part of the aesthetic experience itself, portrays nature as open to my moral ends—as I 
find them through the practical use of reason—but unless I can also understand how that 
aesthetic purposive activity relates to the purposive practical activity of setting those 
moral ends for myself  and acting in such a way to bring them about, I have not actually 
shown more than the regulative use of theoretical reason has shown.  This is to say that 
  
126
the aesthetic power of judgment, just like the theoretical use of reason itself, can advance 
our understanding of the possibility of the unity of reason only on the level of a unified 
perspective of the world and not on the level of a unified self-conception.  The new 
strategy in the third Critique has ultimately the same inadequacies as the strategies of the 
first two critiques with regard to the third dualism.   
 
c)  The Self-Legitimation of Reason and the Unity of the Subject’s Self-Conception 
 
Nevertheless, Kant’s strategy in the third Critique can put in plain focus both Kant’s 
considered opinion on the limits of the possibility of a unified account of reason and the 
Idealist strategy for surpassing those limits.  Kant’s strategy was to allow us a way of 
thinking the intelligible ground of the unity of the cognitive faculties (in harmony with 
the supersensible ground of objects of natural beauty) as in harmony with the intelligible 
ground of the practical faculty, i.e. of the subject as free from sensible conditions and 
thus morally self-legislative.  But of course, because the “intelligible ground” is always to 
be thought of as a noumenal object, in this case a noumenal self, and thus unknowable, 
the unity of the cognitive faculties themselves as well as the unity of the faculty of 
cognition, taken as a whole, with the ground of the practical faculty, the moral “proper 
self”, can be shown only to be possible but never ultimately explicable or articulable.  
This is to say that it is impossible to articulate the common ground between the 
spontaneity involved in theoretical activity which legislates the concept of nature—
including our self-conception as natural beings—and the spontaneity involved in practical 
activity which self-legislates the moral law—and thus our self-conception as moral 
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beings with binding obligations on our wills.  This is because by definition it is 
impossible to have insight into the inner constitution of the noumenal self.   
     As I said in the last chapter, from the point of view of the early Idealists and 
Heidegger, Kant shied away from looking for the unity of all our cognitive faculties in a 
common root, and thus in a unitary ground of the original synthetic activity of the 
theoretical subject, assigning it instead to an unknowable noumenal ground, because he 
was not sensitive enough to the metaphysical import of the Copernican revolution he had 
himself enacted, and thus demurred at developing a metaphysics of subjectivity as 
spontaneous self-activity.  I hope that the reasons that the Idealists saw the potential of 
such a metaphysics of subjectivity to also provide a unified account of the subject in both 
its theoretical and practical activities can now be seen in sharp relief.  They hope to show 
the source of both of these activities—and thus the source of the unity of the perspectives 
they afford on both the world and the subject itself—in the metaphysically sui generis 
self-activity of the subject qua subject190.   They hope to show that there is a single 
unitary structure of subjectivity, consisting in its capacity for spontaneous self-activity. 
     It remains to discuss two issues regarding the Kantian solution to the problem of the 
unity of reason in terms of the significance it will have for the Idealists.  The first is the 
issue of self-legitimation.  Reason is self-legitimating with respect to one of its faculties if 
it possesses the resources internal to itself to ensure a priori that the demand it exerts is 
capable of satisfaction.  Theoretical reason demands that experience have the unity of 
nature.  It is able to legitimate this demand a priori through the functioning of the 
understanding’s pure concepts as a condition of experience itself as well as through the 
                                                 
190 Recall Kant’s own description of reason in the Groundwork as “pure self-activity” at GMS 4:452. 
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unity of the understanding’s rules themselves achieved through the rational principles—
employed in the regulative use—of theoretical reason.  This is just what nature is, and it 
explains how objectively valid knowledge of nature through scientific investigation is 
indeed possible.  Kant’s doctrine of the “fact of reason” is, as I mentioned, intended to 
show that reason in its practical employment is indeed self-legitimating.  It ensures that 
practical reason’s demand for moral action, that is, action out of pure respect for the 
moral law unconditioned by any empirical attributes of the subject, is indeed possible.  So 
for Kant reason is self-legitimating within each of its respective domains.  Within the 
theoretical perspective, the demand for a concept of nature and thus the possibility of 
scientific knowledge is satisfied internal to that perspective and without recourse to 
resources outside it.  Likewise, within the practical perspective, the demand for a concept 
of freedom and thus the possibility of genuine morality is satisfied internal to that 
perspective and without recourse to resources outside it.  But reason taken as a whole 
cannot be self-legitimating, in that human reason itself, i.e. without recourse to anything 
outside of it, cannot ensure that both of its demands are capable of simultaneous 
satisfaction.  Rather, human reason must postulate the existence of a highest reason which 
is the ground of the harmony between the concepts of nature and freedom in the idea of 
the highest good.  This is to say that human reason is ultimately not self-sufficient, or 
selbständig, because for Kant, only divine reason can be seen as possessing self-
sufficiency or Selbständigkeit.  And since nature and freedom can only be harmonized 
within the concept of divine, or infinite, reason, there must remain, for finite human 
reason, a disharmony or discord between nature and freedom, between science and 
morality, in our conception of the world.191   
                                                 
191 For a persuasive account of why there must remain such a disharmony or discord in Kant’s account of 
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     The second issue concerns the results of Kant’s account of the unity of reason for the 
subject’s self-conception.  I have said that one desiderata for such an account is not just a 
unified picture of the world which, grounded in divine reason, is amenable to both our 
theoretical and practical demands, but a unified conception of the subject, and thus the 
subject’s self-conception, in both its theoretical and practical activities or capacities.   We 
have seen that for Kant we must rather see the subject as divided into a double character 
whose ultimate unity must remain mysterious.  In addition, my self-knowledge must 
remain limited to my self-conception as a natural being.  In order to avoid an 
irreconcilable conflict within the subject’s self-conception as both a natural being and a 
free, moral being, then, we must simply subordinate the interests of theoretical reason to 
our moral interest, because only through our self-conception as moral beings are we able 
to attribute dignity and inner worth to ourselves.  We may call these two closely related 
features of Kant’s solution to the unity of reason—the necessary schism within the 
subject and the limitation of self-knowledge to the empirical—the “paradox of 
subjectivity”; though Kant himself of course, acknowledging them on some level as 
“paradoxical”, believes the air of paradox is removed through the distinction between the 
phenomenal self and the noumenal self.   
     Now, as we will see in the next part, Fichte, beginning with the notion developed in 
the second section, attempts to develop a metaphysics of subjectivity which 
simultaneously avoids the paradox and proves human reason to be self-sufficient.  He 
locates the “common root”—that is, the unitary ground of all our theoretical capacities—
and the unity of our theoretical and practical capacities within a single unitary structure 
                                                                                                                                                 
the unity of reason, see Susan Neiman’s The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant; Oxford, 1994. 
  
130
of subjectivity, which he calls the self-positing I.   The I is thus for Fichte self-
constituting, which Fichte sees as providing proof that human reason is self-sufficient 
after all.      
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Part II:  Fichte, Self-Constitution and the Self-Sufficiency of Reason 
 
The aim of this part is to describe in outline the direction Fichte takes in developing a 
metaphysics of subjectivity which is sensitive to and takes as its starting point the 
metaphysical import of Kant’s Copernican Revolution, that is, which understands 
spontaneous self-activity as the sui generis feature of subjectivity.  I will be focusing on 
two themes: Fichte’s account of this feature as self-positing, or self-constituting, and his 
understanding of this feature as simultaneously solving the problem of the unity of reason 
and demonstrating the self-legitimacy and self-sufficiency of reason as a whole.  My 
intent is to demonstrate the intimate connection between these issues in the development 
of Fichte’s particular brand of idealism, while maintaining that the two key issues, 
namely self-constitution and self-sufficiency, are not necessarily conceptually tied 
together as they are for Fichte.  This will put us in a position to understand how 
Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik is an ontological account of finite subjectivity which is 
influenced by the Idealist strategy of responding to the Kantian problems I have outlined 
in the last chapters, while simultaneously “moving in the opposite direction” from 





1)  The Metaphysics of Subjectivity and the “Transcendental Circle” 
 
In my discussion of the Paralogisms, I claimed that there was a basic ambiguity regarding 
locating precisely where and why the claims of rational psychology go wrong, and thus 
why the latter inevitably falls into error and illusion.  On the one hand, we can see the 
project of rational psychology as inherently flawed in that it attempts to apply concepts—
substantiality, simplicity, etc.—to the self “as it is in itself”, that is, to the noumenal self, 
which are rather properly applicable to the self only as it appears to itself, that is, the 
empirical self.   In other words, it illegitimately attempts to abstract in the case of the self 
qua object from the subjective conditions of anything being an object at all.  The self 
insofar as it is or can be an object for itself, is conditioned by an a priori form of intuition, 
time, and thus merely an appearance within inner sense.   
     This is in fact the way Kant seems to argue, but I suggested that his account contains 
hints of another diagnosis and another, more basic, mistake.  This latter interpretation 
would locate the problem with rational psychology in its very attempt to treat “the 
subject”, or better, subjectivity, as just another thing among others, a thing qua thing our 
knowledge of which must of course be limited by the conditions of experience, and thus 
restricted to an appearance.  This thought—that the determining subject is not in anyway 
a thing and that subjectivity belongs in a fundamentally different “metaphysical category” 
than that of things—is the guiding motivation behind the development after Kant of what 
I’ve called the “metaphysics of subjectivity”.  The latter attempts to give a metaphysical 
account not of the “determinable self” as it is in itself, that is, into the nature of the 
“thinking thing” considered as a thing, which would thus fall foul of Kant’s critique in 
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the Paralogisms, but rather of the “determining self”, that is, the self considered as the 
activity of determining.  And this account is metaphysical because it treats this activity as 
a sui generis but non-empirical, a priori feature of subjectivity as such.192 
     This thought is present from the very beginning of Fichte’s own philosophical 
development, and we might even refer to it as the original insight which sparks the 
development of the Wissenschaftslehre.  It is present already in Fichte’s review of 
Schulze’s Aenesidemus in early 1794, where Fichte first develops the idea of what I will 
refer to as the “transcendental circle”.  The original Schulze text is a skeptical polemic 
directed against Kantian philosophy in the form of Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie.  
Reinhold had attempted to further systematize Kant’s theoretical philosophy by 
grounding it in a single principle which he called the Principle of Consciousness193.  He 
claimed to have discovered the so-called “common root” in the “faculty of representation 
[Vorstellungsvermögen]” which he derived from an analysis of the Principle of 
Consciousness.  Fichte’s strategy throughout the review is that of largely granting to 
Schulze that Reinhold’s claims to have discovered the absolute first principle of 
philosophy do not succeed, but only because they need to be grounded in a further 
principle, which a closer reading of Kant is able to uncover.  In particular, Fichte accuses 
Schulze—in line with the basic metaphysical claim mentioned at the outset—of falling 
prey to mistaking subjectivity for a kind of determinate thing.  In response to Schulze’s 
doubts about the “objective existence” of the faculty of representation, Fichte writes, 
                                                 
192 This is why I intentionally talk of a “metaphysics of subjectivity” rather than a “metaphysics of the 
subject”; what is metaphysically distinctive about subjectivity is that it is an activity of a certain kind (we 
will see what kind this is supposed to be), and never a special kind of thing, or a thing with a distinctive 
property.   
193 Which reads: “In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from both the subject and 
the object and relates it to them both.”  (Beyträge, I:267) 
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regarding the skeptic, that “as soon as he hears the words ‘faculty of representation’, [he] 
can think only of some sort of thing (round or square?) which exists as a thing in itself, 
independently of its being represented, and indeed, exists as a thing which represents.”194  
Rather:  
The initial incorrect presupposition, and the one which caused the Principle of 
Consciousness to be proposed as the first principle of all philosophy, was 
precisely the principle that one must begin with a fact.  We certainly do require a 
first principle which is material and not merely formal.  But such a principle does 
not have to express a fact [Tatsache]; it can also express a factical activity 
[Tathandlung].195  
 
The problem, as Fichte sees it, with grounding all knowledge in a faculty of 
representation, in the way Reinhold does, is that it can only represent the activity of 
representing through a representation, that is, a representation of an object.   
[I]f everything that can be discovered in the mind is an act of representing, and if 
every act of representing is undeniably an empirical determination of the mind, 
then the very act of representing, along with all of its conditions, is given to 
consciousness only through the representation of representing.  It is thus 
empirically given, and empirical representations are the objects of all reflection 
concerning consciousness.196 
 
This is one way to understand why Kant remains entrenched in what he himself calls the 
“paradox” of subjectivity, namely, that self-knowledge is limited to the appearance of the 
self in inner sense, the empirical self.  Fichte declares here that for this reason the 
Principle of Consciousness is in need of a “new foundation”, and this is the germ of the 
idea of the Wissenschaftslehre.   The new principle, expressing the Tathandlung which 
                                                 
194 FEPW, 67; SW I: 11.    
195 FEPW, 64; SW I: 8.   I will prefer in future to leave the neologism “Tathandlung” untranslated.   The 
reasons for calling it a Tathandlung rather than simply a Handlung [act or activity] are complex; but 
provisionally, it is meant to suggest that the activity has an existence which “stands on its own”, that is, is 
precisely not conceived as an activity inhering in or an activity of some prior object which exists 
independently of the activity anyway.   Fichte says of the Tathandlung that it is “a pure activity [Tätigkeit] 
that presupposes no object, but itself produces it, and in which, accordingly, the acting [das Handeln] 
immediately becomes a fact [Tat]”. IWL, 51; SW I: 468; translation amended, emphases added.  
196 FEPW 63; SW I: 7-8; emphases added.  
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grounds all representation as such, Fichte here calls “the absolute subject, the I” which is 
“not given by empirical intuition; it is, instead, posited by intellectual intuition”197. 
     Before we explore what Fichte means by this, I want to dwell for a moment on three 
further core Fichtean ideas that are present already in the Aenesidemus review—one 
implicit and the other two explicit—that will have crucial significance for our later 
discussion.  The first is related to what Dieter Henrich has referred to as Fichte’s  
“original insight”, namely the inadequacy of what he calls the “reflective theory of self-
consciousness”198.  Such a theory attempts to explain self-consciousness as the result of 
consciousness turning back on itself and turning itself into its own object.  In Henrich’s 
words: 
This theory begins by assuming a subject of thinking and emphasizes that this 
subject stands in a constant relationship to itself.  It then goes on to assert that this 
relationship is the result of the subject’s making itself into its own object; in other 
words, the activity of representing, which is originally related to objects, is turned 
back upon itself and in this way produces the unique case of an identity between 
the activity and the result of the activity.199 
 
     Henrich claims that such a theory must of necessity be viciously circular, because it 
attempts to explain self-consciousness as the result of directing one’s attention onto 
oneself as an object, but in order to determine if such a directing of attention is 
successful, then I must already have a criterion of success, that is, I must already be self-
conscious.  I must already know myself if I am to be sure that, in reflecting, I have 
correctly directed my attention—“originally” directed towards “objects”—to myself, to 
the particular object that is me.  For Henrich, Fichte’s theory of subjectivity should be 
understood as fundamentally motivated by a recognition of the inadequacy and circularity 
                                                 
197 FEPW 65; SW I:10. 
198 See “Fichte’s Original Insight”, hereafter abbreviated as FOI.  
199 FOI, 19. emphasis added.   
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of such a conception of self-consciousness and the effort to avoid it.  Simply put, Fichte 
wants to show that self-consciousness must be rooted in a more fundamental self-relation, 
in which the identity of the activity and the result of activity is not itself merely the result 
of the activity of reflection, but rather in which the (prior) identity makes the reflective 
relation to oneself as an object itself possible.   
     I think this characterization is correct and helpful as far as it goes, but I’d like to 
emphasize another, closely related, point.  As Henrich characterizes it in the quote above, 
the reflective theory fails not just because it is circular, but because it is in principle 
incapable of giving an adequate characterization of the “self” which becomes self-
conscious in the way it attempts to explain.  In granting that the self attempts to “locate” 
itself as a particular type of represented object by means of a reflective activity, that is, in 
turning “away” or “back” from “objects” toward the particular object that is the self, the 
self-reverting self never really manages to fully find itself, namely, itself qua reflective 
activity.  In representing itself as an object at all, it perpetually “mislocates” itself, 
because “it” must be not just the represented object that results from its reflective activity, 
but also the activity itself.  This means that the reflective theory never actually manages 
to produce “the identity between the activity and the result of the activity” at all.  Henrich 
recognizes this problem when he says that the reflective theory essentially “makes the 
mistake of representing the Self merely as one object among others.”200   Thus we can 
identify two conceptually distinct—but closely, perhaps essentially, related—
shortcomings of the reflective theory, namely its vicious circularity and its “category 
mistake”.    
                                                 
200 FOI, 21.  I believe that this point is also related to Henrich’s abiding theme in the essay regarding the 
reflective theory’s inability to account for the “intelligibility” of the I, and Fichte’s (ultimately unsuccessful 
for Henrich) attempt to account for this intelligibility.    
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     It is very instructive in this context to consider the extent to which we can attribute the 
reflective theory to Kant himself.  Henrich is not entirely clear about this.201   Kant in fact 
seems to escape the first sense of the theory’s shortcoming while falling prey to the latter.  
This illuminates the revolutionary character of his conception of self-consciousness as 
well as the sense in which Kant did not carry the revolution far enough.   The doctrine of 
the unity of apperception—that the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my 
representations—seems precisely designed to avoid the reflective theory’s “circularity”.  
In demonstrating in the Deduction that all representing activity—or “judging”—as such is 
subject to the condition of pure apperceptive unity, the a priori self-relatedness required 
for the possibility of empirical self-consciousness (actually attaching the ‘I think’ to the 
judgment) is built into the synthetic activity which itself grounds objective experience, 
judgments about objects in outer sense.  Relation to objects already necessarily includes a 
self-relation.  But while avoiding this first shortcoming, Kant seems to make the mistake 
of mislocation here.  In limiting our knowledge of the self to its appearance to itself, that 
is, to the self as object of inner sense—the temporally ordered succession of 
representations—both the possible “reflective” activity qua activity of actually attaching 
the ‘I think’ to the judgment, as well as the original synthetic activity involved in the 
judging itself, are lost, no longer part of what is represented in self-consciousness.    
     In a locus classicus for these issues, Kant in fact himself goes a little further.  This 
lengthy passage will be crucial for our understanding of Fichte, so it is worth quoting in 
full:  
                                                 
201 He says that his description of the theory is one that “all of Kant’s predecessors” would have identified 
with, but also that it “remains the dominant idea of the Self, even in the Critical Philosophy”.   I think Kant 
is hard to pin down here precisely because, as Henrich says, “Kant did not see it as philosophy’s task to 
interpret the structure of the Self”.  I would amend this sentiment by saying that Kant did not see it as part 
of his task in the first Critique to interpret the structure of the self.   
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The I think expresses the act of determining my existence.  The existence is 
thereby given, but the way in which I am to determinate it, i.e., the manifold that I 
am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not thereby given.  For that self-
intuition is required, which is grounded in an a priori given form, i.e. time, which 
is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable.  Now I do not have 
yet another self-intuition, which would give the determining in me, the 
spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before the act of determination, 
in the same way as time gives that which is to be determined, thus I cannot 
determine my existence as that of a self-active being [eines selbsttätigen Wesens], 
rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the determining, 
and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as 
the existence of an appearance.  Yet this spontaneity is the reason I call myself an 
intelligence.202 
 
Here Kant denies that I can “determine my existence as a self-active being”, while at the 
same time claiming that I represent the spontaneity (which is the same as “self-activity”) 
of my thought, i.e. of my determining.   On the one hand, the self which is reflectively 
represented—in empirical apperception—is a type of object, i.e. the object of inner sense.  
This falls prey to the second shortcoming in that it is “representing the Self as merely one 
object among others”.203  If self-consciousness is the (reflective) determination of an 
object, spontaneity is not one of the object’s determinate properties.  I cannot empirically 
determine myself as a self-active being.204  Self-activity is simply not an empirical 
property of objects.  But Kant in fact seems to be trying to avoid the second shortcoming 
of the reflective theory here by insisting that, along with the sensible (i.e. temporal) 
determination of myself as the object of inner sense, I also represent the spontaneity of 
the determining.   
                                                 
202 KRV B157fn., italics added.  
203 I should be clear here that there is nothing odious about representing the empirical self as an object; 
what the critique of the reflective theory is concerned about is the absence of the element of determining in 
the empirical picture of the determinable self.    
204 This is of course a point with which Fichte will agree.  To anticipate: Fichte does in fact think we must 
have “another self-intuition” in which the determining in me is given, but it is NOT given before the act of 
determination, as Kant suggests it must be.   
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     But this solution can look ad hoc.  Besides the difficulty of understanding the inner 
relation between these two representations—the representation of the spontaneity of the 
determining self on the one hand and of the sensibly determined (or determinable) self on 
the other—there is the further problem of just what kind of representation the 
representation of spontaneity—which is being appended in some manner to the sensibly 
determined representation—is, and how it comes about, in the first place.  It is clearly not 
an empirical representation, so it is neither an empirical concept nor a sensible intuition; 
it is neither a pure intuition (e.g. space, time) nor a pure concept (a category); Kant 
doesn’t call it an idea or a postulate either.  Indeed, it seems to be a unique kind of 
representation for Kant, one which he never explicitly thematizes.205  As we will see, 
Fichte’s theory of “intellectual intuition” is designed to establish and make intelligible 
this awareness of the spontaneity of one’s synthetic activity as well as the inner 
relationship between this latter awareness of activity and the determinacy of the activity 
itself. 
     The second and third issues regarding the Aenesidemus review are closely related.  We 
have seen that Schulze’s criticisms of Reinhold motivated Fichte to propose another first 
principle of philosophy, namely that of the absolute I, which he conceived of as a certain 
kind of spontaneous, self-relating activity, which he calls self-positing.  This conception 
is seen as necessitated by Kant’s own way of treating theoretical subjectivity.  Now, 
                                                 
205 Kant suggests in this Reflexion that the representation of the spontaneity of the determining arises from 
(or within) what he here calls “transcendental consciousness”: “The consciousness when I institute an 
experience is the representation of my existence insofar as it is empirically determined, i.e. in time.  Now if 
this consciousness were itself in turn empirical, then this temporal determination, as contained under the 
conditions of the temporal determination of my state, would in turn have to be represented…which is 
absurd.  However, the consciousness of instituting an experience or also of thinking in general is a 
transcendental consciousness, not experience.” R 5561, in Notes and Fragments, edited by Guyer, p. 
290; my italics.  
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Fichte thinks that this conception of the absolute I directly entails two further claims: i) 
the incoherence of the notion of the thing in itself; and ii) the “absolute self-sufficiency 
and independence” of the absolute I.   Both of these issues are intended to be closely 
related to what I will call the “transcendental circle”.  Fichte repeatedly insists in the 
review that (transcendental) consciousness is trapped inside of a “circle”—this time a 
“virtuous” one—a point which is allegedly a direct consequence of the metaphysical 
move to deny any kind of thing-hood to subjectivity.  Immediately after locating the 
weakness of Schulze’s skeptical criticism in the latter’s assuming that the faculty of 
representation must be some kind of thing, Fichte writes that: 
The faculty of representation exists for the faculty of representation and through 
the faculty of representation: this is the circle with which every finite 
understanding, that is, every understanding that we can conceive, is necessarily 
confined.206 
 
     This is Fichte’s way of interpreting the meaning of Kant’s transcendental idealism.207  
Everything, all possible objects of representation in addition to the absolute I itself, as the 
a priori ground of all representation, “exists” only for the I, that is, can be conceived of 
by the I as existing only in relation to the I.  Like Kant, this transcendental idealism is 
also supposed to be understood as a form of empirical realism; but, ostensibly unlike 
Kant208, Fichte thinks that this very fact nullifies any possible reference to the thing in 
itself, or the thing abstracted from any relationship to an I.     
                                                 
206 FEPW 67; SW I: 11.   
207 This issue is related to what Ameriks’ calls Fichte’s “short argument” for idealism.  See, e.g., Kant and 
the Fate of Autonomy.  Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. 
208 Although, of course, characteristically (especially in his early works), Fichte here insists both that the 
circle was “discovered” by Kant himself; and that, although Kant’s language seems to “authorize” the 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves, Kant intended the distinction to have “validity 
only provisionally and only for him [!]”.   
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[A]ll that is not-I is for the I only; the not-I obtains all of the determinations of 
this being a priori only through its relation to an I; however, all of these 
determinations, insofar as they can be known a priori, become absolutely 
necessary upon the mere condition of a relation between a not-I and any I at all.  
From this it would follow that the notion of a thing in itself, to the extent that this 
is supposed to be a not-I which is not opposed to any I, is self-contradictory, and 
that the thing is actually constituted in itself in just that way in which it must be 
thought to be constituted by any conceivable intelligent I.209  
        
Because it is self-contradictory, Fichte declares that it is “straightforwardly impossible 
[geradezu unmöglich] to think of a thing independent of any faculty of representation at 
all”, and that the thing in itself is therefore “a non-thought [ein Nicht-Gedanke]”.  One 
possible reason for this is deceptively simple: to think of a thing existing independently of 
any relation to a thinking (representing) I is to put it into just such a relation.  The self-
contradiction is performative: in thinking the thing in itself, I am putting it into a relation 
to myself; in this sense it is “mind-dependent”.  We can generalize the point in the 
following way: the concept of “mind-independence” is itself mind-dependent (simply 
because it’s a concept).210   
     There are a host of interpretative issues and worries which would have to be addressed 
here in providing a robust interpretation of Kant’s and Fichte’s particular versions of 
“idealism”, and the exact relationship between them.  I will not be attempting to 
definitively decide these issues here.  But I want initially to distinguish between two 
broad ways of reading Fichte’s notion of the “transcendental circle” here.   As I’ve 
presented it, it can seem that the point is fairly minimal.  We can call it the thesis of 
epistemic, or weak, mind-dependence.  This does in fact seem to be an intrinsic 
presupposition of transcendental philosophy.  But it’s not at all clear what else is 
                                                 
209 FEPW 73-74; SW I: 20; translation amended, my emphases.  
210 I owe this particular way of putting the point to Markus Gabriel. 
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supposed to follow from this.  In particular, it doesn’t of course entail that there are no 
things which exist or could exist independently of my or anyone else’s mind, that is, it 
doesn’t entail that in the absence of minds, nothing exists (though of course, in the 
absence of minds, nothing can be said to exist).  An interpretation of mind-dependence 
which did insist that these latter things are entailed by the circle would amount to what 
we can call an ontological, or strong, notion of mind-dependence211.   
     But there is an intermediate position possible here between the weaker and stronger 
positions.  Even acknowledging that the circle does not entail the robust ontological 
notion of mind-dependence—that the circle does not rule out that there can be things 
“existing anyway” independently of any relation to an I—one might think that the circle 
does entail that the things which “exist anyway” can make no contribution to our 
determinate experience.  At times this seems to be Fichte’s position.  He writes, for 
example, that “if things in themselves, independently of our faculty of representation, are 
unable to produce any determinations whatsoever in us, then we can very well know that 
they are not responsible for the determinations actually present in us now.”212  This is 
why he says, as we will see presently, “the necessity is assumed to have its foundation 
totally in our mind”. 
     We can distinguish then between three different interpretations of the notion of mind-
dependence which might be taken to follow from the transcendental circle.  
                                                 
211 Using “epistemic” and “ontological” here to mark the distinction is potentially misleading, because I 
have already been arguing for, and attributing to Fichte, the claim that the “circle” itself gives us reasons 
for considering subjectivity as having a unique ontological status; what is at the center of the issue here is 
the relationship to the “not-I”, however.  Another way of putting the point is to note that for the case of the 
thinking I, there is no such distinction to be drawn, and this just because the I must be seen as self-
constituting, in the way I will discuss later.  
212 FEPW, 69, SW I:14;  italics added.   
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1) a “weak” interpretation, according to which all that follows is that subjectivity is 
sui generis (for reasons we will see in a moment) or rather, that there is necessary 
asymmetry between the I and the not-I; but an asymmetry according to which it 
does not follow that things cannot “exist anyway” and in their own right outside 
of a relation to an I 
2) a “weak-strong” interpretation—or a weaker version of the strong interpretation—
according to which it follows that “what exists anyway” cannot make any 
contribution to or play any role in our determinate experience213 
3) a (robustly) “strong” interpretation, according to which it follows that nothing 
does or can “exist anyway” outside of any relation to an I   
 
It is very difficult to discern which of these claims Fichte’s form of idealism is committed 
to; I have described that idealism as ambiguous because I think it’s possible to provide an 
interpretation of his idealism according to each of them, though with varying degrees of 
effort.214  Ultimately, I will be suggesting that the second and third are more plausible as 
interpretations of Fichte’s idealism, and that the third is the most likely candidate.  This 
ambiguity will cause problems for how we interpret the core notion of self-constitution as 
well.  But for now, I want to remark that even the weakest claim can give us further 
resources for articulating the asymmetry between the notions of the “thing in itself” and 
the “noumenal self” which we discussed in sections on Kant.  This asymmetry was one of 
the reasons motivating the idea of a “metaphysics of subjectivity” in the first place.  The 
weakest claim admits that although thinking the thing in itself necessarily puts it into 
relation to the thinking I, which must, as thinking, determine it, and thus makes it 
                                                 
213 Some version of this claim seems to motivate the Sellarsian attack on the “Myth of the Given”, insofar 
as the attack does not deny that some things are given, but just that “given-ness” cannot play a 
(justificatory) role in experience.  McDowell, for instance, wants to argue for the “unboundedness of the 
conceptual” but still insist on some kind of “external constraint”.  See, e.g. McDowell, Mind and World, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996; esp. Lecture II; and “Self-Determining Subjectivity and 
External Constraint”, included in Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009. 
214 As we have seen, Pippin, in attributing to Fichte the key insights of the Sellarsian, and by extension, 
McDowellian and Brandomian line of thought, seems to be insisting on the second.  See, for example, his 
“Fichte’s Alleged Subjective, Psychological, One-Sided Idealism”; included in Sedgwick, ed., The 
Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. 
  
144
“dependent” on the I in some sense, at least in the case of cognition; this does seem to 
entail that a thinking I cannot “exist anyway” outside of a relation to a thinking I, that is, 
to itself.  We can understand Kant in the Deduction to have argued that the thinking I 
precisely must exist in this kind of self-relation, or self-determination.  For Fichte, this 
means that the thinking I is originally self-relating, it is a necessary condition of 
subjectivity as such.  It is just this asymmetry which points toward the metaphysically sui 
generis character of subjectivity, and moves us away from conceiving it as “one kind of 
object among others”.   
     Finally, in the Aenesidemus review, Fichte makes the seemingly bald claim that the 
self-positing I is “absolutely self-sufficient and independent [schlechthin selbständig und 
unabhängig]”215.  This claim is closely tied to the idea of the “transcendental circle” as 
well.  Indeed, he suggests that with Kant’s “discovery of the circle”, we have “already 
arrived [!] at absolute autonomy [Autonomie]”216.  Fichte is explicit that the validity of 
this claim must be understood relatively to the circle itself: “the absolute existence and 
autonomy of the I…is valid only for the I itself, [and is not] valid in itself”217.   But this 
does not itself clarify why Fichte thinks there is a necessary connection between 
conceiving of the I as always “within the circle” and conceiving of the I as self-sufficient.   
Should we perhaps seek a still higher foundation for that necessity which is 
assumed to have its foundation totally in our mind?  Should this unconditional 
necessity which is discovered in our minds be conditioned by being derived from, 
explained, and comprehended in terms of something higher?  And where should 
we look for this higher foundation?  Within us, where we have already arrived at 
                                                 
215 FEPW 75; SW I: 22; translation amended.   
216 FEPW 69; SW I:15.  Fichte seems in this essay to be using these concepts—“independent”, “self-
sufficient”, “autonomous”—interchangeably.   
217 FEPW 71; SW I:17. 
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absolute autonomy?  Should absolute autonomy be based upon something else?  
This is self-contradictory.218 
 
Fichte seems to be saying that the pure I must be self-sufficient because, given the 
“circle”, there is no other possible candidate for self-sufficiency.  But acknowledging the 
“circle” seems to commit one to the self-sufficiency of the I only on the basis of (i) the 
assumption that something must be self-sufficient after all, that is, that we must locate 
self-sufficiency somewhere; and (ii) some version of the strong reading [either (2) or (3) 
above] of the thesis of mind-dependence that the “circle” allegedly entails.  The self-
sufficiency of the I follows directly from the “transcendental circle” only on a reading of 
the latter which is stronger than the weak, minimal one.  And we have as yet been given 
no real reason to assume such a stronger reading.  In fact Fichte’s strategy in the review 
for demonstrating the self-sufficiency of the I is a little more nuanced.  He goes on: 
It is precisely the task of the Critical Philosophy to show…that everything that 
occurs in our mind can be completely explained and comprehended on the basis 
of the mind itself…This philosophy points out to us that circle from which we 
cannot escape.  Within this circle, on the other hand, it furnishes us with the 
greatest coherence in all our knowledge.219 
 
Here Fichte indeed seems to be claiming that while the “circle” itself is enough to suggest 
to us that the I must be self-sufficient, we cannot prove this until we have actually carried 
out the task of “explaining everything on the basis of the mind itself”, that is, “within” the 
circle.  I will call this Fichte’s “proof of the pudding” strategy; he develops it further and 
employs it more explicitly in the so-called “New Presentation [Neue Darstellung]” of the 
Wissenschaftslehre of the period 1796-98.220   
                                                 
218 FEPW 69; SW I: 15. 
219 FEPW 69; SW I:15.  my emphases.   
220 The “New Presentation” was never completed: we have extant two introductions and a single chapter.  
My discussion of Fichte henceforth, with one exception, will focus on this period of Fichte’s development; 
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     Fichte declares in the introductions to the “New Presentation” that the task of 
philosophy in general is to “display [angeben]” the “basis or foundation [Grund]” of all 
experience, and that, simply because it seeks the ground of experience, philosophy’s 
“object” must necessarily “lie outside” of all experience.221  Accordingly, Fichte thinks, 
there are only two possible ways of conceiving of the object of philosophy, and thus 
essentially only two forms that philosophy can take.  Philosophy begins with an 
abstraction which separates what is necessarily connected within experience, namely “the 
thing” from “the intellect”.   “Idealism” and what Fichte calls “dogmatism” are 
distinguished by which of these is taken to be the “explanatory ground of experience 
[Erklärungsgrund der Erfahrung]”.  Idealism takes at its explanatory ground the intellect 
in abstraction from its relationship to experience, and dogmatism takes as its explanatory 
ground the thing in abstraction from its being experienced, i.e. the thing in itself.  It is 
clear that Fichte considers the idealistic point of view to be a direct result of accepting the 
Copernican Revolution or “transcendental turn”: it represents the desire “to accomplish a 
complete reversal [Umkehrung] in the way we think about these issues, so that—in all 
seriousness and not simply as a figure of speech—the object will be posited and 
determined by our power of cognition”222. 
     Now, Fichte famously says that the initial choice between these two ways of 
proceeding cannot be decided ahead of time on rational grounds, and that each point of 
view is incapable of directly refuting the other; rather the “choice” depends on “what 
                                                                                                                                                 
but as has become common, I will be treating the additional texts such as the lecture transcripts known as 
the Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, and the Sittenlehre, as belonging to this same period.   
221 SW I: 423-425.  Fichte says that this follows analytically, i.e. “from the mere thought of a ‘ground’”. 
222 IWL 5; SW I: 421; translation amended. 
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kind of person one is”.223   The proof of the correctness of the respective standpoint can 
only come about through the actual carrying out of the project which each has set for 
itself—in the “eating of the pudding”, so to speak.  Interestingly, despite these provisos, 
Fichte takes the project which dogmatism has set for itself to be in principle impossible.  
In line with the way Fichte sets things up, dogmatism is the attempt to explain experience 
on the basis of the thing in itself, understood as the thing in abstraction from experience.  
Dogmatism’s inadequacy can be demonstrated straightaway, Fichte thinks, because 
“experience” must at least minimally mean that something is taken for something by an I.   
A thing…may possess a variety of different features; but if we ask, “For whom is 
it what it is?”, no one who understands our question will answer that “it exists for 
itself.”  Instead, an intellect also has to be thought of in this case, an intellect for 
which the thing in question exists.  The intellect, in contrast, necessarily is for 
itself whatever it is...Through its being-posited as an intelligence, that for which it 
is is already posited along with it [Durch ihr Gesetztseyn, als Intelligenz, ist das, 
für welches sie sey, schon mit gesetzt].224 
 
In taking “things” as basic, dogmatism can never explain the “for-the-I” structure of 
experience, nor can it arrive at a conception of or explanation for the unique feature of 
“an intelligence”, namely that it is what it is necessarily for itself.  Fichte says, “[y]ou 
will not be able to obtain an intellect unless you also think of it as primary and 
absolute”225.   The suggestion here is that the unique ontological feature of subjectivity, 
the “object” of idealism, is its self-constituting structure, acknowledgment of which is 
necessitated by the (Copernican) revolutionary motivation behind “idealism”—its intent 
                                                 
223 IWL 20; SW I: 434.  “Was für eine Philosophie man wähle, hängt sonach davon ab, was man für ein 
Mensch ist“.  Although I will be not focusing on this provocative, ad hominem element of Fichte’s 
argumentation, I think it bears on an ambiguity I will discuss shortly, namely whether “intellectual 
intuition” is a general accomplishment of all subjectivity as such, or only the philosopher’s insight.  It 
seems at times that Fichte is implying that the dogmatist, in refusing to acknowledge the freedom and self-
sufficiency of his intellect, actually lacks these things.   
224 IWL 21; SW I: 436; translation amended, emphases added.    
225 IWL 22; SW I: 437; translation amended.  
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to “reverse” our way of thinking—and which can only be accounted for and made 
intelligible by and within that viewpoint.   
    Idealism thus has an “advantage” over dogmatism, Fichte says, in that “it is able to 
demonstrate [nachweisen] within consciousness the foundation it wishes to employ in its 
explanation of experience, viz. the freely acting intellect”226; but idealism must still make 
good on its promise by demonstrating that experience itself can be grounded in the freely 
acting intellect.   This involves demonstrating that “all of the laws of the intellect”, i.e. its 
determinate modes of acting, are in fact derivable “from the very nature of the intellect”. 
If the presupposition idealism makes is correct, and if it has inferred correctly in 
the course of its derivations, then as its final result…it must arrive at the system of 
all necessary representations.  In other words, its result must be equivalent to 
experience as a whole.227 
 
     My aim here is not to explicate how such a derivation is supposed to work in its 
details.  What I am interested in is the connection Fichte makes between the metaphysical 
status of the I and the question of the self-sufficiency of the I.   Fichte here seems to be 
straightforwardly equating the claim that the I is self-constituting and the claim that it is 
self-sufficient.   
The dispute between the idealist and the dogmatist is actually a dispute over 
whether the self-sufficiency of the I should be sacrificed to that of the thing, or 
conversely, whether the self-sufficiency of the thing should be sacrificed to that of 
the I. 
 
[T]he self-sufficiency of the I itself cannot co-exist with that of the thing.  Only 
one of these two can come first; only one can be the starting point; only one can 
be independent.228     
 
                                                 
226 IWL15; SW I: 430; translation amended. 
227 IWL 31; SW I: 446.   
228 IWL 17; SW I: 432. 
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A commitment to the self-sufficiency of the I is built into the idealist standpoint from the 
very beginning for Fichte.  The dogmatist is fundamentally characterized by a denial of 
the self-sufficiency of the I, from which the Idealist, however, constructs his system [Er 
läugnet die Selbständigkeit des Ich, auf welche der Idealist bauet, gänzlich ab]229.   Now, 
there is a sense in which this might seem, internal to the idealist standpoint, innocuous.  It 
exhibits the same circular structure and enacts the same “proof of the pudding” strategy 
as the assumption of the sui generis character of the I.   The Idealist must begin by 
assuming the self-sufficiency of the I, even though he is only able to validate this 
assumption by actually performing the derivation of the kind required.   
     But I want to emphasize again that the thesis of the sui generis character of the I, 
namely that it is “absolutely” “for itself” and self-constituting, does not itself entail that 
we must think of the I as self-sufficient.  As I’ve noted, it does so only if we think that the  
I’s metaphysically sui generis character commits us to the mind-dependence of all 
content of thought, not just in the sense of its determinate existence for the I, but in its 
existence tout court, or at least to the claim that the thing’s “independent existence” 
makes no contribution whatsoever to the content of the thought, to the determinate 
character it actually has for the I.   So in fact, Fichte seems in the “New Presentation” to 
be committing himself to one of the strong versions of the claim of mind-dependence.   
This is suggested by Fichte’s response to the charge made by Reinhold that he is guilty of 
just this move.  Reinhold puts the concern in this way: 
With respect to its transcendental content (which constitutes only the form of 
empirical cognition), such cognition has its foundations solely within the pure I; 
                                                 
229 IWL 16; SW I: 431. 
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but with respect to its empirical content, by means of which it possesses objective 
reality, it must be grounded within the I by something different from the I.230  
   
Reinhold is of course appealing to the orthodox Kantian conception of the necessity of 
the receptive moment in cognition.  Fichte’s response is instructive: 
When you posit an object that is accompanied by the thought that it has exercised 
an effect upon you, then you also think of yourself as affected in this case.  And 
when you think that this is what occurs in the case of every object you perceive, 
then you think of yourself as generally affectable.  In other words, it is by means 
of this act of your own thinking [durch dieses dein Denken] that you ascribe 
receptivity or sensibility to yourself.  Thus the object considered as something 
given is also only something thought of [auch nur gedacht].231  
 
It is natural to assume that Fichte’s insistence here on the faculty of receptivity being 
something “merely” self-ascribed is a commitment to one of the strong claims of mind-
dependence.  It is possible to interpret it according to the “minimal” view.  Receptivity or 
affectability, given-ness, is mind-dependent solely because the thought that I am receptive 
is itself mind-dependent, because it’s a thought.  Everything depends on what “by means 
of” and “only” mean here.  Under the strictly minimal reading, Fichte is almost trading on 
tautologies here.  Of course I ascribe receptivity to myself by (means of) thinking I am 
receptive; of course, considered as given, the object is “only” a thought.232  But such 
language decidedly lends itself to stronger connotations.  If receptivity is “only” self-
ascribed, then I am not receptive to anything “really” distinct from the I in any sense.  
“All of our cognition does indeed begin with an affection, but not with an affection by an 
                                                 
230 Quoted in IWL 65; SW I: 480. 
231 IWL 73; SW I: 488.   
232 This distorts the German a little, but the point remains intact.  Fichte simply uses the passive, “So wird 
der Gegenstand als gegeben auch nur gedacht.“ 
  
151
object”, but rather by “the act of positing a not-I”.233  We see the ambiguity repeated 
here: 
It is only in his own name [i.e. from the (idealist) standpoint of philosophy] that 
the philosopher asserts that “everything that exists for the I exists by means of the 
I”.  The I that is described within his philosophy, however, asserts that “just as 
truly as I exist and live at all, there also exists something outside of me, something 
that does not owe its existence to me”.  Basing his account upon the first principle 
of his philosophy, the philosopher explains how the I comes to make such an 
assertion.234 
 
     Fichte is relying on a distinction here perhaps more explicitly and clearly drawn in the 
1794 Wissenschaftslehre—namely the distinction between the absolute I on the one hand, 
and the finite or limited I, or the I of theoretical subjectivity on the other.235  It belongs to 
the task of deriving experience from the (initially presupposed) ground of experience that 
an explanation is given as to why it is necessary for the finite I to assume that its objects 
exist independently of it.  Fichte here ascribes the former to that which is seen from the 
standpoint of speculation, and the latter to that which is seen (or experienced) from the 
standpoint of life.   Although, Fichte claims, the standpoint of life is only comprehensible 
[begreiflich] from the standpoint of speculation, the latter exists in the first place only to 
make the former comprehensible.  This leaves open a possible interpretation of Fichte’s 
brand of idealism according to which the standpoint of speculation—which is here 
necessitated by the transcendental circularity of thought—does not describe, as it were, 
the “metaphysical truth of the matter” regarding the “independent existence” of things, 
but rather a necessary standpoint undertaken in order to make such a thought 
“comprehensible”.  My claim is that Fichte’s understanding of what counts as success 
                                                 
233 IWL 74; SW I: 488. 
234 IWL 38 fn.; SW I: 455.   
235 The 1794 Wissenschaftslehre is translated into English by Peter Heath and John Lachs as The Science of 
Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982. 
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here in the task of “making comprehensible” goes hand in hand with how we understand 
the issue of the self-sufficiency of the I which is evoked in the explanation. 
     I have been attempting to show that Fichte seems to understand the self-sufficiency of 
the I as something one is immediately committed to once one has followed Kant in his 
“transcendental turn”, that is, he immediately connects the idealist move toward a 
metaphysical account of self-constituting subjectivity with a claim regarding that 
subjectivity’s self-sufficiency.  Part of my account of self-constitution, to which I now 
turn, is intended to show that the claim that it is the self-constitution of the I which marks 
it as metaphysically sui generis is conceptually separable from the claim regarding the 
self-sufficiency of the I.   One could put the point as follows: the idea that the I is trapped 
in the “circle” in which everything exists “for the I”, including the I, in fact commits us to 
a certain ontological stance vis-à-vis ourselves, but does not itself entail any specific 
ontological commitments vis-à-vis the ultimate mind-dependence of things, and that the 
circle is connected with the self-sufficiency of the I only if other ontological 
commitments are added on from “outside the circle”.   
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2)  The Metaphysics of Subjectivity as Self-Constitution 
 
We have seen from the discussion of the Aenesidemus review that Fichte thinks that the 
problems inherent in conceiving of subjectivity along the lines of a particular type of 
“thing”—the bad circularity of the reflective theory of self-consciousness, for example—
require us to conceive of subjectivity rather as distinctively characterized by a certain 
type of self-related activity.  This kind of self-activity which is a sui generis feature of 
subjectivity can be described as the activity of self-constitution236.   Fichte in the “New 
Presentation” refers to this self-relation as a “self-reverting [in sich zurückgehende] 
activity”, which avoids the explanatory circularity of the reflective theory by asserting 
that the I “originally comes into being for itself by means of this activity, and it is only in 
this way that the I comes into being at all.”237   Such self-constitution avoids the 
circularity of the reflective theory because here the I has no being prior to the activity 
itself, and its “being” is constituted by that very activity.  “Idealism considers the intellect 
[the I] to be a kind of doing [ein Thun] and absolutely nothing more.  One should not 
even call it an active subject [ein Thätiges], for such an appellation suggests the presence 
of something that continues to exist and in which an activity inheres.”238   
                                                 
236 I am following Frederick Neuhouser in this appellation; see, eg. FTS p. 102ff.    
237 IWL 42; SW I: 459. 
238 IWL 26; SE I: 440; emphases added.  Though Fichte is not entirely consistent in this usage, there is a 
sense in which “being” cannot be ascribed to the I at all.  Just prior to this passage he claims the intellect 
“has no real being, no subsistence or continuing existence”;  later he writes that “it possesses only an ideal 
being”, i.e. an “objectivity for mere thinking” (IWL 80).   This way of talking emphasizes the metaphysical 
sui generis character of subjectivity.  He says, “Acting is not being, and being is not acting” (IWL 45), 
which he adds, is true by the definition of acting.  What marks subjectivity qua activity from things is 
precisely that the former is only for itself, the I is only for the I.  It is its self-relating.   
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     As I have mentioned, the core of this Fichtean idea is contained in Kant’s notion of the 
original synthetic unity of apperception in the Transcendental Deduction.239  We now 
must return to the locus classicus mentioned above.  Kant says that the “I think expresses 
the act of determining my existence”.  Theoretical subjectivity is “self-determining” or 
self-constituting in this sense.  In its theoretical synthetic activity, which unifies the 
manifold of intuition according to pure apperception, the determining I also determines 
itself with regard to its existence (“the existence is thereby [dadurch] given”, i.e., through 
or by means of the act itself).  Now, as we have seen, Kant says both that I cannot thereby 
also represent the (determining) I as a self-active being [selbsttätiges Wesen], but I 
nevertheless represent the spontaneity of the activity.  In order to be able to so represent 
the former, I would need to be in possession of a non-sensible intuition.    
     Now the question must inevitably arise regarding where the “representation” of the 
spontaneity of the self-determining activity then comes from.  Fichte famously attributes 
it to “intellectual intuition”, which looks like he is simply attributing to us a faculty which 
Kant baldly denies that we have.  Several comments are in order here.  Firstly, Fichte is 
agreeing with Kant that the putative non-sensible form of intuition is incapable of 
representing the I as “ein selbsttätiges Wesen” if the latter means a kind of thing which 
possesses the property of being self-active.  This is the point of avoiding even calling it 
“ein Thätiges”.  But we can read Fichte as wanting to give a story about how, 
nevertheless, the representation of the spontaneity of the activity arises, that is, how we 
are, or can become, aware of the spontaneity of the self-activity which characterizes the 
(theoretical) I’s self-constitution.   
                                                 
239 Fichte himself says Kant “does not mention [it] (except, perhaps, under the name ‘pure apperception’)”.  
IWL 56.  
  
155
     There can seem then that there are simply two issues here: the first is simply the I’s 
self-constituting self-activity itself, and the second is the question of how the I becomes 
aware of that self-activity through which it constitutes itself.  Indeed, there is a basic 
ambiguity throughout the “New Presentation” regarding Fichte’s usage of the term 
“intellectual intuition” which tracks this very distinction.  At the outset, it is important to 
note that Fichte takes great pains there to justify his use of the term in light of Kant’s 
explicit denial of it.  Fichte insists that he is using the term to mean something entirely 
different than what Kant meant by it.  Because, Fiche says, all intuition is for Kant 
“directed at a being”, intellectual intuition refers to, for Kant, “a consciousness of a non-
sensible being, an immediate consciousness of the thing in itself” which is then—echoing 
the traditional ascription of intellectual intuition to the “divine consciousness”—
considered as “made possible by thought alone”, which would then “amount to a creation 
[ein Erschaffen] of the thing in itself simply from the concept of it”.240   Fichte avoids this 
conception of intellectual intuition primarily because though the latter is indeed for him a 
kind of immediate awareness, it is not an immediate awareness of a thing in itself, simply 
because the activity of which the intuition is aware is not a thing at all, let alone a thing in 
itself.  It is then a self-awareness of an activity.  But at the same time, since the activity in 
question is an activity which is meant to be self-constituting, it looks like the claim is that 
the I creates itself in its activity.  But it is important to be very specific about what the I is 
creating in its activity.  Fichte says that the I “originally comes into being for itself by 
means of this activity [Erst durch diesen Act…wird das Ich ursprünglich für sich selbst].”  
                                                 
240 IWL 55; SW I: 471-472.  Indeed, at the very beginning of the Aesthetic, Kant defines intuition as an 
immediate relation to an object [Gegenstand].   And it is true that for the most part, excepting the allusion 
in the footnote to the Deduction just discussed, Kant characterizes intellectual intuition as a non-sensible 
grasp of the thing in itself, e.g. in the positive (and nugatory) conception of the noumenon as intelligible 
object.   
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Only in the activity does the I “originally” become for itself.  What is being created in the 
activity is the “being for itself” or the “being for the I” of the I, viz. the I’s self-relation, 
which is supposed to be, after all, just what the I is.   
     The ambiguity I mentioned in Fichte’s notion of intellectual intuition—intellectual 
intuition as the activity itself qua self-constituting, and intellectual intuition as the 
awareness of the activity, i.e. as the faculty or means by which the activity becomes an 
item of the I’s “self-knowledge”—maps onto Fichte’s distinction in the “New 
Presentation” between the standpoint of “life” and the standpoint of “speculation”.   
These seem to be straightforwardly different claims, namely that intellectual intuition is 
on the one hand the means by which the I constitutes itself, and the means by which the I 
is aware, or knows, that it constitutes itself, on the other.   Thus Fichte seems to be 
ascribing to intellectual intuition two distinct roles.  Of course, if intellectual intuition is 
associated with the self-constituting activity itself, and if the latter is the sui generis 
feature of subjectivity, then intellectual intuition better be, as Fichte indeed says, “present 
in every moment of consciousness” 241, i.e. it must be conceived of as an a priori 
condition, and thus constitutive of, consciousness in general.  But this does not require 
that the activity itself become an explicit item of awareness.  Recall that according to 
Kant’s conception of pure apperception, the I think—which “expresses” the activity of 
self-determination—must be able to accompany all of my representations, not that it 
always actually must.  A minimal necessary condition of any synthetic unity of a 
manifold is the possibility of attaching the I think to representations, that is, the ability to 
recognize—or be aware of in some sense—that the representations are mine, belong to 
                                                 
241 IWL 46; SW I: 463. 
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me.   We can understand the first sense of intellectual intuition then as this “immediate 
awareness” of what we can call the “mineness” of my representations242, which is a 
condition of the possibility of actually attaching the I think to my representations.  This 
mineness is engendered by the synthetic activity itself; it makes possible but does not 
itself necessitate explicit self-ascription of representations to myself.   Kant says,  
The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong to me 
means, accordingly, the same as that I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at 
least can unite them therein, and although it is itself not yet the consciousness of 
the synthesis of the representations, it still presupposes the possibility of the 
latter.243  
 
Understood in this way, “intellectual intuition” would be an “accomplishment” of all 
subjectivity in general qua subjectivity.  But Fichte also in a number of places speaks of 
intellectual intuition as a special awareness which only the (idealist) philosopher 
“accomplishes”.  He says, for example, that “‘[i]ntellectual intuition’ is the name I give to 
the act required of the philosopher: an act of intuiting himself while simultaneously 
performing the act by means of which the I originates for him.”244  This makes it seem as 
if intellectual intuition is not to be immediately identified with the activity of self-
constitution, but rather with the activity, albeit performed “simultaneously” with the 
latter, by means of which the philosopher is able to become aware of that very self-
constituting activity, which is “happening anyway”, unconsciously, as it were.   This 
impression is strengthened by Fichte’s sometimes talking of intellectual intuition 
(apparently in this second sense) as an “acting directed at an acting”245, or even an 
                                                 
242 Neuhouser calls this “nonrepresentational” or “prereflective” and thus “nondiscursive” self-awareness.  
See FTS, pp. 68ff. 
243 KRV B134;  my italics.  
244 IWL 46; SW I: 463; my italics. 
245 IWL 42; SW I: 459. 
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“activity acting on an activity”246.  The philosopher, he says, is “summoned to engage in 
a type of inner acting that depends upon his own self-activity.”247 
     We can try to make sense of this apparent bifurcation by pointing out that Fichte 
insists that intellectual intuition is “always conjoined with some sensory intuition”248, so 
that “there is no immediate, isolated consciousness of intellectual intuition”.  This point 
squares well with Kant’s approach in the Deduction: the synthetic activity of the unity of 
apperception is after all a synthesis of the manifold of (sensible) intuition.   Fichte reads 
the point of the Deduction then as follows: “sensory intuition is possible only in 
conjunction with intellectual intuition [in the first sense], since everything that is 
supposed to be my representation must be referred to me”; Fichte then adds, crucially, 
“but consciousness of the I comes only from intellectual intuition [das Bewußtseyn (Ich) 
[kommt] aber lediglich aus intellectueller Anschauung].”249   We might think then that 
the philosopher’s intellectual intuition—of “sheer activity”, Fichte says here—comes 
simply through an abstraction, of (artificially) separating out what is “intellectual” (the 
active element) from what is “sensible” (the passive element) within the fundamental 
self-relating of original (apperceptive) synthetic activity.   This seems to be Fichte’s point 
when he describes the origin of the philosopher’s “acquaintance” with and “isolated 
representation” of intellectual intuition as an “inference from the obvious facts of 
consciousness”.250 
                                                 
246 Recall here Kant’s definition of reason as pure self-activity in GMS, which means the activity of reason 
acting on the activity of the understanding.     
247 IWL 45; SW I: 461. 
248 IWL 47; SW I: 464. 
249 Ibid.   
250 IWL 48; SW I: 464-5. 
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     We can put the fundamental problem in the following way: we might try, based on all 
the things Fichte says about it, to give a unitary “definition” of intellectual intuition as 
“an immediate self-awareness of self-constituting activity”.   But then each the two 
senses we have been discussing seems to stretch one feature of this definition beyond 
credulity, to emphasize one aspect while neglecting the other.  In the first sense, 
intellectual intuition refers to the immediate self-relating in synthetic activity which I 
have called “mineness”, but since it can in principle always remain merely implicit, it 
seems misleading to call it an awareness at all, rather than simply something like a 
formal, structural feature of subjectivity, which, though constitutive of the latter, needn’t 
ever be raised to the level of explicit awareness.   In the second sense, the self-relating 
activity is explicitly made into an item of awareness by the philosopher, but it thereby 
seems to lose its immediacy, and becomes something rather known through an 
(additional) inference or act of abstraction from “what would happen anyway”.   In other 
words, the two features in virtue of which intellectual intuition is an intuition, namely that 
it is both immediate and a kind of awareness, seem to exist in a kind of tension with each 
other.        
     If we are to try to reconcile these two senses of intellectual intuition for Fichte, we 
must of course find a way of seeing them as a single activity which captures both 
features, rather than as two distinct activities.  One way to do this would be to understand 
the philosopher’s intellectual intuition as a special instance of the very same type of 
intellectual intuition that “would happen anyway”, one in which the activity which is 
usually only implicit is now performed in a way such that the philosopher is explicitly 
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aware of the activity itself.251   This is indeed what Fichte seems to be suggesting at 
times.   
This self-constructing I is none other than the philosopher’s own I.  He can intuit 
the indicated act of the I only within himself; and in order to be able to intuit this 
act, he must perform it.  He freely chooses to produce this act within himself.252 
 
There are two points here.  The first is that in intellectually intuiting his own self-
constructing I, the philosopher is performing the very same activity that everybody, 
including the philosopher himself in his non-philosophical moments, would be implicitly 
performing anyway, as the a priori condition of object-directed consciousness;  but now, 
the philosopher is “freely choosing” to perform the type of act in question, the self-
constructing act, in which the “mineness” of the activity itself  becomes an item of 
explicit awareness: in which “the act of thinking and what is thought of in the act are one 
and the same”.253   
     There is a final potential difficulty with this view that I want to address.  The 
philosopher is able to make the implicit act of self-constitution explicit by freely choosing 
to perform an activity which would happen anyway.   Does this threaten to “drain” the 
spontaneity from the activity in its merely implicit form?   In what sense is the 
philosopher’s act of self-constitution in which the activity itself becomes an item of 
explicit awareness “freely chosen” in a way that the self-constitution of “ordinary 
consciousness” is not?   This is where Fichte’s ad hominem arguments regarding the 
dogmatist and the idealist can be instructive.  There is nothing straightforwardly 
                                                 
251 Neuhouser also makes the distinction between implicit and explicit self-awareness.  But I take it I am 
making a different point here.  For Neuhouser, explicit self-awareness refers rather to the empirical, 
reflective self-consciousness in which the subject becomes an object. 
252 IWL 43; SW I: 460.   
253 IWL 45: SW I: 462. 
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incoherent in the notion that the implicitly self-constituting I in ordinary object-directed 
consciousness is spontaneous and free without realizing it.   Fichte says that when I 
occupy the “standpoint of ordinary thinking”, “I forget about my own act of thinking” 
and thus about “my freedom of thinking”.254  This is Fichte’s diagnosis, as it were, of the 
dogmatist—namely that he is prone to or even defined by a kind of motivated forgetting 
of freedom—as well as the reason the “acceptance of [idealism] is something that 
depends on freedom”—namely a free choice to recognize one’s own freedom.    
[T]he concepts with which the Wissenschaftslehre is concerned [e.g. intellectual 
intuition] are concepts that are actually operative in every rational being, where 
they operate with the necessity of reason…But to understand the necessity just 
asserted, to think, in turn, of this act of thinking: this is not something that occurs 
mechanically.  In order for this to occur, we must, through freedom, elevate 
ourselves to an entirely different sphere, a sphere to which we do not obtain 
immediate entry simply by virtue of the fact that we exist.255   
 
One could interpret this to mean that in the “actual operations” of rationality (theoretical 
activity, say), the implicit (spontaneous) activity is not yet really freedom.  Latent 
freedom is not freedom.   Indeed, Fichte at one point suggests as much.  It is not that the 
dogmatist is free “without realizing it” or despite his denial of it, but rather the 
dogmatist’s refusal of intellectual intuition means that he is actually not free at all.  “The 
Wissenschaftslehre does not address itself to readers of this sort, for they are lacking in 
absolutely spontaneous self-activity, i.e., that completely independent confidence in 
themselves [der ganz unabhängige Glaube an sich selbst] which this philosophy 
presupposes.”256   Again, it depends on what “absolute self-activity” means here.  What 
could be lacking is just the “absoluteness” of their self-activity, but this is in itself telling.  
                                                 
254 IWL 78; SW I: 492. 
255 IWL 91; SW I: 506.   
256 IWL 52; SW I: 468. 
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In the “New Presentation”, Fichte’s claims regarding the self-sufficiency of the I are 
always attached to this fully “self-conscious” freedom which (only) the idealist 
philosopher is able attain, through the “special type of consciousness”257 associated with 
the philosopher’s intellectual intuition.   Moreover, the self-sufficiency which Fichte 
describes here seems to go hand-in-hand with the stronger (indeed the strongest) claim of 
mind-dependence.   
Anyone who is conscious of his own self-sufficiency and independence from 
everything outside of himself—a consciousness that can be obtained only by 
making something of oneself on one’s own and independently of everything 
else—will not require things in order to support his self, nor can he employ them 
for this purpose, for they abolish his self-sufficiency and transform it into a mere 
illusion.258  
 
                                                 
257 IWL 48; SW I: 465. 
258 IWL 18-19; SW I: 433. 
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3)  The Unity and Self-Sufficiency of Reason 
 
We are trying to understand the meaning of Fichte’s claim regarding the self-sufficiency 
of the I, and the extent to which it is connected to the basic metaphysical claim that 
subjectivity is sui generis because it, unlike things, is characterized by self-constituting 
activity.  We need now to consider another issue which is closely connected to the 
question of self-sufficiency, namely the extent to which Fichte thinks the basic 
metaphysical claim, which he thinks directly follows from the “transcendental turn”, is 
itself enough to demonstrate the “unity of reason”.    
     It is clear from the “New Presentation” that Fichte’s reading of Kantian transcendental 
idealism is fundamentally motivated by the desire to solve the problem of the unity of 
reason in a way which also demonstrates reason’s “absolute” self-sufficiency.  We have 
seen that Fichte characterizes the intellectual intuition particular to the philosopher as a 
performance which at once motivates and manifests a confidence, belief or faith [Glaube] 
in and a “full feeling [Gefühl]” of his “own freedom and self-sufficiency”259.   But, Fichte 
says, this belief or feeling can only be fully validated [bewähren] by basing it or 
grounding it in “something higher”.   
The only way in which this can be accomplished is by exhibiting the ethical law 
within us…It is in this way that the I becomes characterized as something 
absolutely active.  Our intuition of self-activity and freedom has its foundation in 
our consciousness of this law…It is only through the medium of the ethical law 
that I catch a glimpse of myself; and insofar as I view myself through this 
medium, I necessarily view myself as self-active.260 
 
                                                 
259 IWL 18; SW I: 433. 
260 IWL 49; SW I: 466; emphases added.  
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We can say that for Fichte the mere belief, derived from theoretical considerations, in the 
I as self-active and self-constituting, is confirmed, or revealed to be absolutely necessary, 
only in the “consciousness of the moral law”.  Intellectual intuition—immediate 
awareness of self-activity—is itself a consciousness of the moral law.  As such, we can 
understand Fichte as saying that the motivating interest toward idealism as a theoretical, 
speculative standpoint is the feeling of freedom (and self-sufficiency!) which is validated 
as absolutely necessary in moral consciousness.  Thus the latter itself creates a moral 
demand on the way theoretical activity is conceived.  Fichte says “I ought to begin my 
thinking with the thought of the pure I, and I ought to think of this pure I as absolutely 
self-active—not as determined by things, but rather as determining them.”261   The 
idealistic starting point is a “practical necessity”, i.e. a moral obligation.  This thought 
explicates both the point behind Fichte’s ad hominem argumentation vis-à-vis dogmatism 
and idealism, as well as at least one sense in which Fichte adheres to the “primacy of the 
practical”.  I will not be pursuing these particular thoughts further, but rather focusing on 
the relationship for Fichte between this thought and the “proof of the pudding” strategy, 
as I have called it, where the “proof of the pudding” is the demonstration of the unity of 
reason and thus, putatively, of reason’s self-sufficiency.   
     It is clear that, for Fichte, beginning with the absolute self-activity of the I 
immediately enables us to see reason in both its theoretical and practical employments as 
unified. 
If philosophy begins with a fact [Tatsache], then it places itself in the midst of a 
world of being and finitude, and it will be difficult indeed for it to discover any 
path leading from this world to an infinite and supersensible one.  If, however, 
philosophy begins with a Tathandlung, then it finds itself at the precise point 
                                                 
261 IWL 50; SW I: 467.   
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where these two worlds are connected with each other and from which they can 
both be surveyed with a single glance.262   
 
With this, transcendental idealism simultaneously reveals itself to be the only type 
of philosophical thinking that accords with duty.  It is the mode of thinking in 
which speculation and the ethical law are most intimately united [sich innigst 
vereinigen].263 
 
     In my discussion of the problem of the unity of reason in Kant, I explicated the 
various ways in which Kant himself tried to affect the “transition” from the concept of 
nature to the concept of moral freedom.  I distinguished between three senses of duality 
which Kant seemed intent on unifying, or at least showing the connection between—
namely, (1) that between our conceptions of the natural and moral worlds, (2) that 
between our conceptions of ourselves as “member” of those worlds, i.e. as natural and 
moral beings, and (3) that between our cognitive and conative capacities, i.e. our senses 
of ourselves as knowers and doers.  I suggested that Kant at various points in the 
Critiques offered different solutions to these worries—through reference to (i) the highest 
good, guaranteed by a highest reason, (ii) the doctrine of the double character of the I and 
of the primacy of the practical, and (iii) the idea of beauty as a symbol of morality.  I 
argued that the issue of the unity of reason was indeed wrapped up with the question of 
the self-sufficiency of reason for Kant, and that we can summarize Kant’s point of view in 
the following way: reason in each of its particular employments, theoretical and practical, 
is self-legitimating in the sense that it is capable of satisfying its particular demand, 
namely of providing a robust concept of nature and a self-motivating respect for the 
moral law, with resources internal to it; but finite reason as a whole or in a unified sense 
is not self-sufficient, because it requires reference to or dependence on something outside 
                                                 
262 IWL 50; SW I: 467; emphasis added.   
263 IWL  51; SW I: 468. 
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of finite reason and its resources to guarantee that all of its demands are simultaneously 
fulfilled or capable of fulfillment, i.e. the concept of divine or “highest” reason, as an 
intelligent, benevolent creator and ultimate guarantor of the highest good, which unites 
all the interests of finite reason.  In particular I claimed that Kant never gives us a 
satisfying account of the unity underlying the last of the dualities I mentioned—the 
relationship between our cognitive and conative capacities—and thus a unified account of 
ourselves as both knowers and doers.     
     The relationship between Fichte’s reading of transcendental idealism and his intent to 
solve the problem of the unity of reason is perhaps most clearly evident in the opening 
lectures of the Wissenschaftslehre from 1804.   There Fichte returns yet again to a 
painstaking discussion of the relationship between the Wissenschaftslehre and Kant’s 
philosophy as a whole, as he perceives it.   In the opening lectures, Fichte makes the 
claim that the “essence of all philosophy” consists in the task to “trace all 
multiplicity…back to absolute oneness [or unity]”264.  It is clear in this context that Fichte 
associates “oneness” or “unity” here with “the absolute”, so that “the task of philosophy 
could be expressed as the presentation of the absolute”265.   He goes on to assert that the 
Wissenschaftslehre and Kantian philosophy belong to the same genus, which he calls 
“transcendentalism”.  The distinguishing mark of transcendentalism is, Fichte says, a 
positing of the absolute as the unity of being and thinking.266    
                                                 
264 Science of Knowing [hereafter SK], 23; GA II, 8.  “[D]as Wesen der Philosophie würde darin bestehen: 
Alles Mannigfaltige…rückzuführen auf absolute Einheit.” 
265 SK, 24; GA II: 10. “[D]ie Aufgabe der Philosophie läßt sich auch ausdrücken: Darstellung des 
Absoluten.” 
266 See, e.g. SK, 30; GA II, 24. “All transcendental philosophy, such as Kant’s (and in this respect the WL 
is not yet different from his philosophy), posits the absolute neither in being nor in consciousness but in the 
union of both…it follows, I say, that for this kind of philosophy the difference between being and thinking, 
as valid in itself, totally disappears”; or SK, 26; GA II, 15. “Like Kantian philosophy, the WL is 
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     I hope that, in light of the foregoing discussion, such an assertion at least has some 
provisional coherence.  This is yet another way of putting the point, first introduced in the 
Aenesidemus review, of the transcendental circle which is itself intended to be a direct 
consequence of the Copernican Revolution or transcendental turn.  The very idea of self-
constituting activity is meant to elucidate the sense, in the case of subjectivity at least, in 
which being and thinking are the same.267   After identifying the common genus of 
transcendentalism so understood, Fichte goes on to describe what demarcates the 
Wissenschaftslehre from Kant’s version of transcendentalism.  Firstly, he complains that 
Kant did not conceive of this absolute—identified here as the unity of being and 
thinking—in its “pure” or “absolute self-sufficiency”268.  Rather, Kant at the same time 
considers this very unity to be the “basic common property or accident” of three separate 
“primordial modes [Urmodifikationen]”269, which he labels ‘x, y, and z’.  Essentially, 
then, Fichte accuses Kant of being saddled with, or “trapped in” three absolutes, which 
Fichte associates with each of the three critiques.  The problem, given Fichte’s 
conception of the task of philosophy in general, is that Kant is never able to “trace” this 
multiplicity of absolutes “back to a unity”.   
     The three absolutes are identified by Fichte as: 1) x=sensible experience, 2) z=the 
moral world, 3) y=”the common but wholly inscrutable root” of—or alternatively, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
transcendental philosophy, and thus it resembles Kant’s philosophy in that it does not posit the absolute in 
the thing, as previously, or in subjective knowing…but in the oneness of both.” 
267 What makes this Parmenidean formula so alarming as a description of Kant’s transcendental idealism, I 
want to maintain, is precisely the ambiguity involved in the transcendental circle’s larger metaphysical 
commitments, i.e. how strong of a reading of mind-dependence is implied here. 
268 See, eg., SK, 31, 34; GA II: 27, 36. 
269 Ibid.   
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“connection [Zusammenhang]” between—the first two.270  At this stage Fichte is ready to 
formulate the distinctive feature of the Wissenschaftslehre which demarcates it from 
Kantianism.   The Wissenschaftslehre begins, Fichte says here, with the “insight into the 
immediate inseparability of these two modes of division”271, that is, between the two-fold 
division into being and thinking, on the one hand, and the three-fold division into the 
sensible world, the moral world, and the connection between them, on the other.  
Additionally, Fichte asserts that the Wissenschaftslehre is able to comprehend the “total 
identity” between the absolutes which represent the unities behind these two modes of 
division, in “one self-contained stroke”.272 
     We can re-formulate Fichte’s complaint here in a way which leans on our prior 
discussion of Kant.   The crucial issue here is of course Kant’s conception of 
“spontaneity”.   We can read Fichte’s claim that Kant is saddled with three different 
“absolutes” as related to Kant’s refusal or inability (principled or otherwise) to identify or 
unify the three types of spontaneity that are necessarily at work in each of the critiques:  
1) the spontaneity involved in the originary synthesis which produces the self-
relatedness characteristic of the unity of apperception, associated with the 
theoretical use of reason and the ground of our concept of nature 
2) the transcendental freedom required for the self-legislation of the (itself self-
motivating) moral law, and as such for all dutiful and moral action, associated 
with the practical use of reason and thus the ground of the moral world 
3) the “aesthetic freedom” in the spontaneous, purposive employment of our 
cognitive faculties in aesthetic judgment, which is responsible for grounding the 
“transition” from the concept of nature to the concept of freedom.   
                                                 
270 SK, 32; GA II: 31.  Fichte’s phraseology here is intriguing, in that he takes over Kant’s way of 
describing the so-called “common root” between sensibility and understanding—the “gemeinschaftliche, 
aber uns unbekannte Wurzel” [Fichte refers here to the “gemeinschaftliche, aber völlig unerforschliche 
Wurzel”]—in describing what is clearly meant to refer to the unity of theoretical and practical reason, or the 
“world of sensible experience” and the “moral world”.  Nor does Kant usually refer to the relation between 
the latter two with the term “Zusammenhang”, but rather by the term “Übergang”. 
271 SK, 33; GA II, 35. 




     All three require an a priori spontaneous activity unconditioned by or prior to 
empirical conditions, and are in this sense “absolute”, but Kant does not unify them in a 
single unified account of spontaneous activity, or discuss their internal relationships.   
This can shed some light on Fichte’s description of the “absolute” in Kant’s case being 
considered a mere “common property or accident” of the three spheres.  “Spontaneity”, 
here, is taken to be a shared property of the “ground” of each of the spheres.  But if 
spontaneity is a mere shared property, there are two further issues that Kant leaves 
unresolved which Fichte wants to address.  Firstly, what is the relationship between the 
“spontaneities” manifest or operable in each sphere?  Assuming the language of 
“faculties”, we can still ask:  is the “faculty of spontaneity” at play in the theoretical use 
of reason the very same faculty involved in the self-legislation of the moral law?  The 
issue of the unity of reason touches on this question.  Secondly, what is it about 
spontaneous activity essentially associated with subjectivity itself which makes it 
necessary that it manifest itself in precisely these ways, in these three “guises”?  Fichte 
wants a conception of spontaneity from which the necessity of the division into these 
spheres is seen as itself necessary, that is, to derive the spheres from the initial 
conception.  This evokes again the “proof of the pudding” strategy: 
Its essence [the Wissenschaftslehre] consists first in discovering the root 
(indiscernible for Kant) in which the sensible and supersensible worlds come 
together [zusammenhängen] and then in providing the actual conceptual 
derivation [Ableitung] of both worlds from a single principle.273 
 
It’s clear that in “tracing” this multiplicity among senses of spontaneity “back to a unity”, 
Fichte wants a unitary account of spontaneous activity itself which will elucidate the 
                                                 
273 SK, 32; GA II: 32; emphases added.   
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particular manifestations of spontaneity in each of these spheres.  This is why these tasks 
are to be accomplished “in a single stroke”.  From this perspective, it seems clear that 
Fichte is directly attempting to answer the Kantian problem of the unity of reason from 
the perspective of the third sense of duality I mentioned.  That is, he wants to give us a 
single, unified account of subjectivity’s essential activity which simultaneously makes 
sense of both its theoretical and practical-moral activities.  This task is summarized in the 
introduction to the Sittenlehre.    
I posit myself as active…this means that I make a distinction within myself 
between an ability to know and a real force [ein wissendes, und eine reelle Kraft], 
which, as such, does not know but is; and yet I view the two as absolutely one.  
How do I make this distinction?  How do I arrive at precisely this determination 
of what is being distinguished?274    
  
Fichte then summarizes in very rough outline how the derivation of our cognitive and 
conative capacities from the singular self-positing of pure activity is supposed to work.  
He begins, presumably in addressing the first of the questions in the quote above, by 
appeal to the transcendental circle.  This move is familiar from our discussion heretofore.  
Knowledge and being (the subjective and objective elements), he says, are “separated 
only within consciousness” and that there is “no being except by means of 
consciousness”.275  This separation within consciousness is required [genöthigt] “in order 
to be able to say to myself ‘I’”, that is, the separation is a necessary condition of the 
possibility of the kind of self-relation associated with the unity of apperception.  Now, 
Fichte says, insofar as I consider the subjective side of this separation, I consider myself 
as a knower [als bloß erkenndes…Subject], which means that I am “entirely dependent on 
objectivity”, that is, on the representation of “some stuff that simply cannot be changed 
                                                 
274 System of Ethics (hereafter abbreviated SE), 10; SW IV: 4; emphases added, translation amended.   
275 SE 11; SW IV: 5. 
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by my efficacy [Wirksamkeit]”.  Objectivity from such a theoretical perspective is 
represented merely as a resistance [Widerstand] which is itself simply the result and 
product of the “laws of consciousness”.  This Fichte conceives as a necessary feature of 
self-activity.  “Wherever and whenever you see activity, you necessarily see resistance as 
well, for otherwise you see no activity.”276   So though theoretical activity is an activity, it 
is a determinate activity in which the activity (the subjective aspect) appears [erscheint] 
to be determined and entirely dependent on what is objective.   
     The principle of practical philosophy, by contrast, considers the activity as it is “really 
posited” and ascribed to the “unified and indivisible I”; that is, practical philosophy 
considers what is objective in the I itself, or as Fichte calls it, “real force”.   Real force 
explains how “something objective can come from something subjective”, namely the 
determination of what is objective from a concept, i.e. the concept of an end, which is 
“not itself determined in turn by what is objective but is determined absolutely by 
itself”.277  We can see here another sense in which Fichte solves the problem of the unity 
of reason through a version of the “primacy of the practical”.   Fichte’s talk here of 
practical activity as the determination of the objective through the concept of the self-
determined end has clear Kantian resonances, particularly with Kant’s talk of “causality 
through freedom”.    
[W]e start with activity…the most important result of all this is the following: 
there is an absolute independence and self-sufficiency of the mere concept (that 
which is ‘categorical” in the so-called categorical imperative), due to a causality 
of what is subjective exercised upon what is objective—just as there is supposed 
to be an absolutely self-posited being (of the material stuff), due to a causality of 
                                                 
276 SE 12: SW IV: 7. 
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what is objective upon what is subjective.  With this we have joined together the 
two extremes of the entire world of reason.278   
  
     What is of interest to me here is not how “successful” this alleged derivation of both 
the theoretical and practical uses of reason is, but rather what this particular strategy of 
solving the problem of the unity tells us about the meaning of the claim of self-
sufficiency.   We can say here that for Fichte both theoretical and practical activity taken 
singly—or from the ordinary standpoint of life—involves a certain kind of “illusion”, or 
what Fichte is comfortable here calling mere “appearances” [Erscheinungen].    In 
theoretical activity the thinking subject appears to be constrained by something “outside” 
activity; likewise, practical activity appears to be “an efficacy exercised upon something 
outside me”.  But from the standpoint of speculation, we can say, this claim or 
assumption of “something outside” activity—either determining it or it itself being 
determined—must be seen as a “mere” appearance.    
All the things included in this appearance—from, at the one extreme, the end that 
is posited absolutely by myself, to, at the other extreme, the raw stuff of the 
world—are mediating elements of the same, and are hence themselves only 
appearances [nur Erscheinungen].279  
 
Fichte seems clearly committed here to a strong interpretation of the mind-dependence 
entailed by the transcendental circle here.  That is to say, he thinks the circle commits us 
to the presupposition that nothing “outside” of activity can play any role whatsoever in 
the determination of that activity, and thus that that activity is metaphysically self-
sufficient.   
                                                 
278 Ibid. 
279 SE 17; SW IV: 12. 
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Briefly stated, the result of this investigation is as follows: nothing is absolute but 
pure activity, and all consciousness and all being is grounded upon this pure 
activity…nothing is purely true but my self-sufficiency.280 
 
     That pure activity is metaphysically and essentially self-sufficient means that it is 
entirely self-grounding.  It will help here to return to a comparison with Kant.  I claimed 
that for Kant the experience of beauty—aesthetic judgment—can serve as a means of 
“connecting” the terms of the third duality, i.e. between our cognitive and conative 
capacities, by allowing an analogy between the supersensible ground of the unity of the 
cognitive faculties (now, in aesthetic judgment, in harmony with the supersensible ground 
of the object of natural beauty) with the supersensible ground of the practical faculty, i.e. 
of the subject as free from sensible conditions and thus morally self-legislative.  We can 
say that for Kant, the analogy afforded by aesthetic experience allows us to see the “three 
spontaneities”, the supersensible grounds of the unities of our cognitive, aesthetic and 
conative faculties, as in harmony with each other, or in other words, it affords us a view 
on the possible identity between them.  But for Kant this analogy itself does not afford us 
a positive proof of their identity or unity.  This is why even though, taken individually, 
theoretical and practical reason are self-legitimating, human reason as a whole is not self-
sufficient.  We can now put this a different way: human reason as a whole is not self-
sufficient for Kant because it is not self-grounding, and this in two ways: (1) theoretical 
reason is, in itself, dependent on the noumenal ground of appearances, and (2) human 
reason as a whole is dependent on a divine or highest reason.   
     Fichte’s “proof of the pudding” strategy seems designed to demonstrate the “self-
legitimating” character of reason as a whole.  One must begin by presupposing the 
                                                 
280 SE 17; SW IV: 12. 
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unitary absolute activity of the pure I, a presupposition which is validated through the 
demonstration that everything pertaining to the I, i.e. its cognitive and practical 
experience, can be derived from that presupposition.  If such a derivation is successful, it 
proves that both theoretical and practical reason’s demands, for a concept of nature on the 
one hand and a concept of an absolutely binding moral law on the other, are capable of 
simultaneous fulfillment solely on the basis of resources internal to human reason itself.   
     Seen in this way, the proof of reason’s self-legitimacy stands or falls with the success 
of such a derivation itself.   This project then is compatible with what I have called the 
weak interpretation of the transcendental circle which necessitates the presupposition 
which is to be validated through the (alleged) derivation.  What I am suggesting is that 
Fichte’s commitments are stronger here.  Reason of course is equated with pure self-
activity.    
What then is the overall gist of the WL, summarized in a few words?  It is this: 
reason is absolutely self-sufficient; it exists only for itself.  But nothing exists for 
reason except reason itself.  It follows that everything reason is must have its 
foundation [muss…begründet seyn] within reason itself and must be explicable 
solely on the basis of reason itself and not on the basis of anything outside reason, 
for reason could not get outside of itself without renouncing itself.281  
 
     Reason is to be considered not only as self-legitimating but self-sufficient in the sense 
of being self-grounding because, under the strong interpretation of the thesis of mind-
dependence, there is nothing outside of reason for it to be grounded on.  This strong 
metaphysical commitment is apparent if we interpret Fichte’s slogan in the “New 
Presentation”, “I am only active”, to mean that the I as activity is not, in any sense, 
passive or dependent on anything outside of the activity itself.  But as I have stressed, 
there is nothing in the idea of the transcendental circle itself which necessitates such a 
                                                 
281  IWL 59; SW I: 474.   
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strong claim regarding mind-dependence.  The claim that “I am only active” is not 
directly entailed by the claim that the I is “only for itself”.   This is to say that the claim 
of the self-constitution of the I swings logically free from the claim of the self-sufficiency 
of the I.    I have been suggesting that the circle reveals to us a basic asymmetry between 
the structure of subjectivity and the structure of “what is not subjectivity”.  Within the 
circle, the I is “only for the I”, i.e. it is incoherent to conceive of an I that is not for itself.  
“To be for itself” is just what it is to be an I.  The circle suggests the metaphysical 
uniqueness of subjectivity but itself says nothing regarding the metaphysical status of 
“non-subjectivity”.  
     As I will show in the next chapters, Heidegger in Being and Time gives an account of 
human subjectivity, Dasein, as an ontologically unique “mode of being” [Seinsmodus] 
which shares its essentials with this account.  Dasein is the (unique) being [Seiende] for 
whom its own being [Sein] “is an issue”.  I will argue that (i) the basic ontological 
structure of Dasein for Heidegger is “self-constituting”, (ii) that Heidegger’s account 
unifies the “theoretical” and “practical” aspects of this self-constituting activity, but (iii) 
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Part III:  Heidegger’s Theory of Selfhood 
 
After publishing Being and Time in 1927, Heidegger began a sustained engagement with 
both Kant and the Idealists, particularly Fichte, which lasted for several years282.  In a 
footnote to the most famous result of this engagement, Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics283, he announces that his interpretation of the metaphysical import of Kant’s 
Copernican Revolution shares much in common with the Idealists, but that it “moves in 
the opposite direction” from German Idealism284.  In previous chapters, I have attempted 
to elucidate the potential fault-lines in Kant’s conception of subjectivity which Fichte was 
interested in healing.  I showed how Fichte interpreted the metaphysical import of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy by developing a metaphysics of subjectivity which understood 
subjectivity as a sui generis ontological characteristic of human being, and that the 
fundamental feature of this unique ontological status was self-constitution.  Furthermore, 
I explored Fichte’s attempt to exploit this feature in articulating the unitary structure of 
reason as self-sufficient.   
     The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how Heidegger’s early “fundamental 
ontology”—or, as he glosses it, the “ontological analytic of the finite essence of human 
beings”285—fits into this transcendental conception of subjectivity which begins with 
                                                 
282 At the end of PIK, Heidegger writes that after studying Kant’s first Critique anew, “the scales fell from 
my eyes and it became an essential confirmation of the correctness of the path on which I searched”.   In a 
letter to Jaspers on June 25th, 1929, Heidegger reports that he is lecturing on Fichte, Schelling and Hegel for 
the first time, and that “once again it opens a world for me”.  He goes on to say that it confirms the “old 
experience” that someone else cannot read for you, implying that before the lectures, his opinions about 
German Idealism were at best second-hand.  Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel 1920-1963; ed. 
by Biemel and Saner, Klostermann 1990. 
283 Hereafter referred to, as is common, the “Kantbook”. 
284 KPM 137; fn. 196. 
285 KPM 1. 
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Kant and continues with Fichte, both in the sense in which he is continuing in that 
tradition and the sense in which he is taking it in the “opposite direction” from the one 
Fichte took.  As is well-known, the centerpiece of Heidegger’s Kantbook is his 
identification of the “common root” between sensibility and understanding as the 
transcendental power of imagination, and his interpretation of this latter faculty as the 
essence of human transcendence.  After analyzing Heidegger’s attempt to elucidate the 
transcendental power of imagination as the common root and as the essence of 
transcendence in the Kantbook (§ 1), I turn to considering how we are to understand the 
specifics of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kantian philosophy in relation to the fuller 
statement of his own fundamental ontology laid out in Being and Time.  I give a reading 
of the key concept of Verstehen in the latter text which shows its affinities with the 
Kantian faculty of imagination as Heidegger understands it (§2).  I then consider the 
extent to which, given Heidegger’s emendations to this idealistic conception of 
subjectivity, his conception of selfhood addresses the abiding Idealist concerns with a 






1)  Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant as a Fundamental Ontologist 
 
Heidegger’s attitude towards Kant throughout his early works is, in point of fact, 
ambivalent.  Indeed, in the only sustained, direct discussion of Kant in Being and Time, in 
the section on “Care and Selfhood”, while speaking approvingly of the Kantian ‘I think’ 
as a “genuine phenomenal starting-point”, Heidegger at the same time insists that Kant 
has “by no means achieved an ontological interpretation of Selfhood”286.  His complaint 
is that Kant misconstrues the ontological status of Dasein, or the human being, which 
alone is capable of expressing itself through saying ‘I think’.   
Kant’s analysis has two positive aspects.  For one thing, he sees the impossibility 
of ontically reducing the “I” to a substance; for another thing, he holds fast to the 
“I” as an ‘I think’.  Nevertheless, he takes this “I” as subject again, and he does so 
in a sense which is ontologically inappropriate.  For the ontological concept of the 
subject characterizes not the selfhood of the “I” qua self, but the selfsameness and 
steadiness [die Selbigkeit und Beständigkeit] of something that is always present-
at-hand.287   
 
In short, according to Heidegger, Kant has not rid himself of the Cartesian habit of 
construing the I as a res cogitans, that is, as a (distinct and particular) kind of thing, 
indeed, as something “present-to-hand”.  This assessment of Kant is often repeated 
elsewhere during this period whenever Heidegger makes reference to Kant, in particular 
in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie288.   
     The Kantbook is unique in its attribution to Kant of a “genuine insight”—meaning, 
one that prefigures his own—into the “ontological constitution of the subjectivity of the 
finite subject”, that is, an appropriate metaphysical characterization of the “selfhood of 
                                                 
286 SZ 318. 
287 SZ 319-320. 
288 See also PIK.    
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the I qua self” that in Being and Time he had insisted that Kant had fallen short of.  There 
are two peculiarities we can note here in passing.  The first is Heidegger’s admission on 
the one hand that Kant understands that the I cannot be “reduced” to a substance, but his 
insistence on the other that Kant continues to conceive of the I as something vorhanden.  
The other peculiarity is Heidegger’s seemingly anomalous approval, in the Kantbook, of 
Kant’s achievements.  Kant is usually described as precisely stuck with the main 
shortcoming of modern philosophy in general, from Descartes to Hegel (and indeed 
beyond to Nietzsche), of conceiving of all beings, including those characterized by 
subjectivity, as something vorhanden, that is, as belonging to the flawed traditional 
ontology which he will later identify as the “metaphysics of presence”.  It is only in the 
Kantbook that Heidegger describes Kant as a forerunner in his own attempt to “inquire 
beforehand into the possibility of a suitable interpretation of the subject…that is free from 
the entire tradition”289.    
     I don’t want to dwell too much on the first peculiarity at this preliminary stage of the 
discussion.  We can note however that what Heidegger says is that Kant merely avoids 
“ontically” reducing the I to a substance.290  The Paralogisms make this avoidance 
evident in their criticism of rational psychology’s attempt to “read off” the substantiality 
of the I from the “sole text” of the ‘I think’.291  But he might mean then that what Kant 
does not thereby avoid is ontologically reducing the I to a substance.  Heidegger thinks, 
or must think, that Kant nevertheless “takes the I as subject again” insofar as he insists on 
                                                 
289 GP 207. 
290 Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological will come under discussion later; but 
provisionally, the ontic refers to the concrete and particular metaphysical features of things, while the 
ontological refers more to general metaphysical structures, and is thus always associated with an 
“understanding of being”.  
291 KRV A343/B401.   
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a “supporting ground” for this ‘I think’ in the noumenal self, and he makes it clear in a 
footnote that he understands the traditional ontological categories “subject” and 
“substance” as just such a “supporting ground”, which thus provides its “selfsameness 
and steadiness”.292  Our prior discussion of the ambiguity regarding the exact mistake of 
the Paralogisms can be helpful here293.  If Kant is asserting there merely that the 
Paralogisms go wrong in attributing qualities to the noumenal self which can only be 
properly attributed to the self as it is in appearance, rather than the mistake lying in 
conceiving of the self as a thing at all—even a “thing in itself”—Kant, by Heidegger’s 
lights, is falling prey to the “traditional” mistake of seeing the self ultimately as a certain 
kind of thing—something to which we should understand ontologically as vorhanden.  
     Likewise, in the passage from Being and Time above, Heidegger credits Kant with the 
recognition that the I must always be understood as an “I think”, that is, as an activity of a 
certain sort, but seems to think that Kant fails to grasp the essential intentionality of 
subjectivity. 
Kant has indeed avoided cutting the “I” adrift from thinking; but he has done so 
without starting with the ‘I think’ itself in its full essential content as an ‘I think 
something’, and above all, without seeing what is ontologically ‘presupposed’ in 
taking the ‘I think something’ as a basic characteristic of the self.294 
 
This might seem an odd indictment of Kant, for whom, after all, the conditions of the 
possibility of experience are inseparable from the conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience.  It becomes clear in this context, however, that Heidegger is 
                                                 
292 SZ 317. “Das »Ich« und das »Selbst« wurden von jeher in der »Ontologie« dieses Seienden als der 
tragende Grund (Substanz bzw. Subjekt) begriffen.”  
293 See part I, § 2c. 
294 SZ 321. 
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accusing Kant of missing the full phenomenon of Dasein as “being-in-the-world”295.  But 
as we will see, the Kantbook rather credits Kant with precisely elucidating the structure 
of transcendence, which Heidegger elsewhere identifies with being-in-the-world.  Here, 
Heidegger’s ferocious anti-Cartesianism—along with, perhaps, an overconfident trust in 
the novelty of his thinking—seems to be getting in the way of a more sympathetic view 
of Kant.296   
     Why then Heidegger’s apparent “change of heart” in the Kantbook?—a change of 
heart, too, regarding his dismissive attitude about the very concepts of the subject and 
subjectivity?  It should be remarked that the Kantbook after all is a working up of 
material that Heidegger had prepared for the Davos disputation with Cassirer.  It’s not 
implausible that there is an element of academic jockeying and one-upmanship in 
Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant as an ally at precisely this point in time.  His infamous 
remark that the first Critique has “nothing whatsoever to do with the theory of 
knowledge”297 is best seen as a hyperbolic polemical jab at the then-dominant neo-
Kantians.   But this surely does not explain things entirely on its own.  Indeed, we can see 
Heidegger’s wavering as precisely mirroring the precariousness of Kant’s theory of 
subjectivity which I had been at pains to point out earlier.   Kant, I argued, had not been 
particularly sensitive to the metaphysical import of his own Copernican Revolution when 
it came to subjectivity, nor did providing such a unified metaphysics of subjectivity as 
                                                 
295 “If by this “something” we understand an entity within-the-world, then it tacitly implies that the world 
has been presupposed; and this very phenomenon of the world co-determines the state of being of the 
“I”…In saying “I”, Dasein expresses itself as being-in-the-world.” 
296 As mentioned in the introduction, it is perhaps this abiding anti-Cartesianism that might explain, in 
terms of the interpretative side of things, the lack of attention to the theory of subjectivity in Heidegger and 
thus the relative neglect of KPM. 
297 This is almost a refrain of Heidegger’s in his various interpretive works on the first Critique, but see esp. 
KPM 16-17: “Die [KRV] hat mit “Erkenntnistheorie” nichts zu schaffen.” 
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spontaneous self-activity ever become a direct concern of his.  Heidegger in his direct 
dealings with Kant after Being and Time tends to describe Kant as opening a way out of 
the confines of “the tradition” while himself remaining ultimately on just this side of it.298  
We have seen that in Being and Time in particular he focuses on the ways in which Kant 
remains mired in the tradition, but it is my contention that the Kantbook is the result of a 
genuine insight into the “revolutionary” aspects of Kant’s philosophy, the very ones 
which had animated Fichte and the early Idealists.  It is this insight which caused the 
“scales to fall from his eyes”, as he says, and convinced him that he had taken the 
“correct path” with his fundamental ontology299.   In the remainder of this section I will 
focus on the positive elements of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant which demonstrate 
its affinity with the Idealist tradition. 
 
a)  Ontological Asymmetry and Transcendence 
 
As with Fichte’s understanding of idealism, it is a sine qua non feature of Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology that the human being—Dasein—has a sui generis ontological 
status.  This is clear from the very opening lines of the Daseinsanalytik of Being and 
Time300.  Dasein’s “mode of being” [Seinsart] is to be “essentially” distinguished from 
                                                 
298 This suggests the image of Kant as a kind of Moses figure who leads the way to the promised land but 
does not himself enter it.  Heidegger in the Kantbook, e.g., famously suggests that Kant remains mired in 
the tradition because he “shrank back” from certain crucial insights offered by his own revolutionary 
philosophy.  
299 PIK  431. 
300 See SZ §9. 
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Vorhandensein.301   Heidegger is equally clear that Dasein can never possess the kind of 
being which belongs to “equipment” [Zuhandenheit].  Heidegger says that Zuhandenheit, 
Vorhandenheit, and the “Weltlichkeit von Welt” “must be kept in principle distinct”, and 
that  
This third kind of being gives us an existential way of determining the nature of 
being-in-the-world, that is, of Dasein.  The other two concepts of being are 
categories, and pertain to entities whose being is not of the kind which Dasein 
possesses.302 
 
Since the former two correspond in a naïve way to “things of nature and things ‘invested 
with value’ [Naturdinge und ‘wertbehaftete’ Dinge]”303, Heidegger is adopting the point 
essential to the Idealist tradition as we have been discussing it that subjectivity is 
metaphysically sui generis and never to be construed as a kind of thing.  We can call this 
Heidegger’s fundamental doctrine of the “ontological asymmetry” between entities that 
are Dasein (human beings)304 and all other entities.   This doctrine is intimately related to 
the more famous doctrine of the “ontological difference”, implicit throughout Being and 
Time and explicitly thematized soon thereafter in the aforementioned lecture course from 
1927, the Grundprobleme.   
     The “ontological difference” asserts that there is a fundamental distinction between 
being and entities [das Sein und das Seiende].   Heidegger evokes this distinction in the 
                                                 
301 SZ 42: “Dasein ist daher nie ontologisch zu fassen als Fall und Exemplar einer Gattung von Seiendem 
als Vorhandenem.“   
302 SZ 88. 
303 SZ 63; though to describe them as such (i.e. “naïvely”) is to neglect their “worldly” character.   
304 For the most part, I will adopt the usage of Dasein as just a name for concrete human entities 
[Menschen], following Carman’s persuasive discussion in Heidegger’s Analytic, though unlike Carman I do 
not think the term is completely unambiguous in Heidegger’s usage.  For example, in KPM in particular 
Heidegger often uses the phrase, “the Dasein in human beings [Dasein im Menschen]”.   For the most part 
‘Dasein’ refers to concrete individuals, though sometimes to something more like the (sui generis) mode of 
being of human beings, to which Heidegger usually refers with the technical term Existenz.   I think this 




service of his central point that “being is not itself an entity”, which is itself crucial for 
the very formulation of his guiding question of the “Seinsfrage”, or question about the 
meaning of being (in general).  The Seinsfrage asks about the meaning of being, over and 
above beings, and is what distinguishes his conception of philosophy as “ontology”, 
separated in principle then from the “ontic sciences”.  The concomitant principle of 
“ontological asymmetry”—that “Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as compared 
with other entities”305—necessitates that ontology first take the shape of a “fundamental 
ontology”, or an “ontological analytic of Dasein in general”306.  Because Dasein’s special 
distinctiveness lies in “the fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it”—a 
feature that Heidegger denotes through the term “existence” [“Existenz”], which is then 
“allotted solely to Dasein”—fundamental ontology “must be sought in the existential 
analytic of Dasein”.   
     The doctrine of ontological asymmetry then is as important as the ontological 
difference in understanding the most basic motivations and direction of Heidegger’s early 
thought.  It is the fact that Dasein alone has a relationship not just to beings but to 
being—that is, the only entity for whom the distinction matters at all, for whom being, 
not least its own, “is an issue”—that necessitates that philosophy take the form of a 
fundamental ontology and thus a metaphysics of Dasein, an ontology whose goal is the 
articulation of the structure of Dasein’s sui generis “way of being”.  Heidegger’s primary 
way of formulating the peculiarity is to say that Dasein alone and essentially “has an 
understanding of being” and “discloses being”.   The goal of fundamental ontology is to 
make explicit what that understanding and that disclosure consists in.    
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     The relationship between these two doctrines can begin to illuminate how Heidegger 
came to see Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a precursor to this way of thinking.  The 
ontological difference means that being is different from beings, it is “something” “over 
and above beings”—in other words, being “transcends” beings.   “Being is the 
transcendens pure and simple.”307   In having an understanding of being, over and above 
entities, Dasein is transcending entities.  “Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is 
transcendental knowledge.”308  
     Thought of in this way, Heidegger conceives of fundamental ontology from the 
beginning as “transcendental philosophy”. 
With this distinction between being and beings and the selection of being as 
theme we depart in principle from the domain of beings.  We surmount it, 
transcend it.  We can also call the science of being, as critical science, 
transcendental science.309 
 
In this, and other passages, Heidegger seems to use the term “transcendental” merely as 
the adjectival form of “transcendence”, and is thus comfortable describing fundamental 
ontology as transcendental philosophy just because it deals with the “problem of 
transcendence”, namely how Dasein goes beyond beings in having an understanding of 
being itself, both its own and that of other beings.  This is of course in itself not a very 
convincing justification from a Kantian point of view.  What does this usage have to do 
with Kant’s sense of the transcendental?   
     The first thing that needs to be noted in ameliorating the jarring effect of Heidegger’s 
usage of the term, and its initial un-Kantian flavor, is that the “transcendent” which is 
being “surpassed toward”, and thus the “object” of ontological knowledge thereby 
                                                 
307 SZ 38; italics removed.   
308 Ibid. 
309 GP 23. 
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sought, is of course not any kind of transcendent entity, or thing in itself.  It is “being”, or 
the constitution of the being of entities, both of Dasein and of other kinds of entities—
which is, according to the ontological difference, never itself an entity.   Further, Kant 
characterizes what he means by “transcendental” in a number of ways, but 
paradigmatically, and in line with the Copernican Revolution which announces the shift 
to transcendental philosophy, he says “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied 
not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this 
is to be possible a priori”310.  Heidegger’s gloss on this passage is instructive.   
Hence, transcendental knowledge does not investigate the entity [das Seiende] 
itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of being, i.e., at 
one and the same time: the constitution of the being of the entity.311 
 
What Heidegger means exactly by “being” and by the “constitution of being 
[Seinsverfassung]” is not easy to straightforwardly state, and articulating it will be a task 
of what follows.312  But here we have a preliminary answer, taking Heidegger’s 
identification with Kant as a clue.  To have an understanding of the being of entities—
ontological knowledge—beyond ontic knowledge of entities—is to understand the 
conditions of the possibility of there being entities for Dasein.  This matches quite closely 
in fact Kant’s sense of the goal of transcendental philosophy as synthetic a priori 
knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of objects of “experience”.   For Kant, 
what we know when we have knowledge of these conditions is what it is for something to 
                                                 
310 KRV A11/B25.  Though of course Kant’s own usage of the term ‘transcendental’ is not exactly 
univocal; in particular, he also often refers in discussing the “logic of illusion” to the “transcendental use of 
the categories”, where it now looks like an adjectival form of the “transcendent” where the latter refers to 
noumena. 
311 KPM 16. 
312 In Heidegger’s Analytic, Carman glosses Heidegger’s concept of Sein as “what it is for entities to be 
understood as entities”.  This fits well with Heidegger’s description of it as “that on the basis of which 
entities are entities”.   
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be an object of experience, and thus the kind of thing about which we can make 
objectively valid judgments.  In this sense, Kant’s question “how are synthetic a priori 
judgments possible” is directly translatable into Heidegger’s question about “the inner 
possibility of ontology”, and this is why Heidegger identifies Kant’s critical philosophy 
as an ontology.   
Accordingly, the legitimate interpretation of the sense of the “Copernican 
Revolution” is renewed.  Hence, with this revolution Kant forces the problem of 
ontology to center stage…the ground-laying must pursue the a priori synthesis 
exclusively in itself, pursue it to the seed which provides its ground and which 
allows that synthesis to develop into what it is (allows it to be possible in its 
essence).313 
 
b)  “Ontological Synthesis”, Schematism, and the “Common Root” 
 
In the earlier chapters on Kant, I urged a metaphysical reading of the originary synthetic 
activity upon which Kant’s conception of theoretical subjectivity depends.  In his 
interpretation of Kant, Heidegger similarly focuses on this synthetic activity, which he 
calls the “ontological synthesis”.   The ontological synthesis is understood as the 
condition of the possibility of ontological knowledge, that is, that which gives rise to an 
understanding of the being of entities, which is a sui generis characteristic of human 
subjectivity.  In this section I will explicate and argue for the cogency of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of ontological synthesis as rooted in the transcendental power of 
imagination.  I evaluate Heidegger’s claim relative to the criterion established in the 
chapter on Kant in response to Henrich’s (unsuccessful, or so I argued) challenge that the 
common root is in principle impossible from within a genuinely Kantian framework.  
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This criterion insists that any successful identification of the common root must itself 
render intelligible the faculties or capacities it is supposed to ground, in this case, the 
capacities for sensibility and understanding.  In the following section I will then initially 
compare Heidegger’s account of the “unity of subjectivity” grounded in the 
transcendental power of imagination with Fichte’s account of “intellectual intuition”.314   
     For Kant, in the Transcendental Deduction, as we have seen, spontaneous, pure, a 
priori synthesis (the transcendental unity of apperception) is the highest condition of the 
possibility of the objectivity of objects, and thus, of the possibility of objectively valid 
judgments.  For Heidegger, this synthesis, or better, this synthetic activity, is 
“ontological” because it first makes possible knowledge of the being of entities, and thus 
reveals the constitution of the being [Seinsverfassung] of entities.  Heidegger then 
understands Kant’s project in the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique in the 
following way: 
So the question concerning the possibility of a priori synthesis narrows down to 
this: how can a finite being [ein endliches Wesen], which as such is delivered over 
to entities and is directed to acquiescence in these same entities, know [erkennen], 
i.e. intuit, entities, prior to all (actual instances of such) ascquiescence, without 
indeed being their “creator” [“Schöpfer”]?  In other words, how must this finite 
being be with respect to the constitution of its own being, so that such a bringing-
forward of the constitution of the being of entities which is free from experience, 
i.e. ontological synthesis, is possible?315 
 
     The meaning of Heidegger’s “metaphysical reading” of the first Critique, as it is often 
called—and thus his understanding of the ontological import of the Copernican 
                                                 
314 It is because Henrich sees the only possibility of the common root to consist in the kind of intellectual 
intuition that Kant vehemently denies that he declares the common root to be impossible “from within a 
Kantian framework”.  Though I pointed out earlier that Fichte’s sense of intellectual intuition doesn’t 
obviously fall foul of this restriction, it is true, it seems to me, that the latter does move into un-Kantian 
territory that Heidegger will avoid, precisely because of the fact that transcendental imagination remains 
essentially “acquiescent”. 
315 KPM 38-39; italics mine, translation amended.   
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Revolution—is evident in this passage.  Investigating the conditions of the possibility of 
synthetic a priori knowledge of objects—of a priori synthetic judgments—demands, or 
amounts to, an investigation into the constitution of the being of the single kind of entity 
(human being, Dasein) which is capable of such knowledge, such that this (kind of) 
knowledge is made intelligible as belonging to the essence of that entity.  This is why 
Heidegger describes the first Critique as not “essentially” a “theory of knowledge”, but 
rather as a metaphysics of Dasein, or in my parlance, a “theory of subjectivity”.316   
Because what is distinctive about this entity is that it is “transcending”, that is, transcends 
entities in having an understanding of the constitution of their being, the  
problem of the possibility of ontology is accordingly the question of the essence 
and essential ground of the transcendence of the preliminary understanding of 
being.  The problem of the transcendental, i.e. of the synthesis which forms 
transcendence, thus can be put in this way: how must the finite entity that we call 
human being be with respect to its innermost essence so that in general it can be 
open to an entity that it itself is not and that therefore must be able to show itself 
from itself.317     
 
     As is clear from these passages, Heidegger’s understanding of the Kantian problematic 
emphasizes from the beginning that that entity whose being is under investigation, 
Dasein, is finite.318  What does Heidegger mean by finitude here?  It is interesting to note 
that Heidegger does not have in mind initially the sort of temporal finitude that is the 
                                                 
316 Heidegger does not always resort to the hyperbolic claim that KRV has “nothing to do” with a theory of 
knowledge.  The proper point is that the theory of knowledge in KRV, based on the very nature of its way 
of proceeding, i.e. inspired by the Copernican Revolution, amounts to or requires positive metaphysical 
claims about “subjectivity” (“the mode of cognition”).   
317 KPM 42-43.  italics mine. 
318 That is why Heidegger describes Kant’s project repeatedly throughout KPM, understood as essentially 
the same as fundamental ontology, as the articulation of the “ontological constitution of the subjectivity of 
the finite subject in its finitude”. 
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focus of Being and Time.319   Rather, the talk of “finite subjectivity” here refers primarily 
to the fact that knowledge is fundamentally dependent on beings that “exist in their own 
right” independently of being known.  Heidegger takes his cue here from Kant’s 
discussion of intuition and the distinction between intuitus derivativus and intuitus 
originarius, which Kant of course equates with our familiar “intellectual intuition”.  To 
say that Dasein is a “finite being” is to say that it exists “in the midst of beings that 
already are”320.  Intuition is of course one of the fundamental sources or stems of human 
cognition or knowledge, and is the way in which knowledge is an “immediate” relation to 
an object that “exists anyway” alongside Dasein.  Human intuition (as an intuitus 
derivatus) is a capacity for the receptivity of objects, that is, it depends on independently 
existing objects to be “given” to it, or to “affect” it.   
     Heidegger captures the finitude of human intuition by calling it “acquiescent” 
(hinnehmend).321   Of course, the assumption of an acquiescent stance or relationship to 
an immediately given object depends on there being an object to acquiesce to.   
Finite intuition, however, cannot acquiesce without the entity to be acquiesced to 
announcing itself.  According to its essence, finite intuition must be approached or 
affected by what is intuitable in it.”322   
 
What is being acquiesced to, or acknowledged, in finite intuition (and thus human 
knowledge in general) is the entity itself in its being, i.e. both that it is and what it is.  
                                                 
319 Though of course these types of finitude are intimately related.  Because Dasein is “ontologically” finite, 
dependent on other entities and thus “acquiescent”, it is temporally finite because the pure form of 
acquiescent intuition is time.   
320 KPM 26. 
321 This is my translation of “hinnehmend”.  Churchill’s “receptive” is insufficient because Heidegger also 
uses Rezeptivität.  Taft’s “taking-in-stride” is better, and has the virtue of displaying the root sense of 
hinnehmend as a “taking-in” but to my mind evokes a sense of “aloofness”, of being “unaffected”, that is 
inappropriate here.  While hinnehmen can mean “putting up with something”, this doesn’t seem to make 
much sense here.  “Acquiesce” captures more the positive sense of a willful consent or agreement; it is a 
commitment to making oneself beholden to the being itself.   
322 KPM 26.  
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Being acquiescent to the being of the entity is a precondition of that entity becoming an 
“object [Gegendstand]” at all for subjectivity, that is, something that “stands-against” 
subjectivity in its own independent that-being and what-being [Daß-sein und Was-sein].   
Finite intuition, as essentially acquiescent, is to be contrasted with an “infinite” or 
“absolute” intuition—intuitus originarius.  “Infinite knowing is an intuition which as 
such allows the entity itself to be generated or originated [entstehen läßt].”323  
    The distinction, between finite intuition (and thus human knowledge) and infinite or 
divine knowledge, Heidegger says, “can only be made intelligible…by explicitly basing it 
on the problematic of the finitude of the human being.”324  How then to understand 
exactly what this “problematic” is?  The “problem of transcendence” is: that while our 
“finite knowledge is noncreative [nichtschöpferisch] intuition”, we nevertheless have 
knowledge of an entity that is “outside of us, insofar as we are ourselves not this entity, 
and yet we have a means of access to it”.325  So the question is: ‘how can this finite being, 
which did not create the object and is essentially dependent on and acquiescent or 
beholden to the object, know anything about the object prior to actual acquiescence (i.e. 
a priori)?’  This is the same as Kant’s question: ‘how can we know anything about 
objects prior to experience when all empirical knowledge relies on sensation’?   
     Kant’s answer consists in showing how I can know a priori, ‘free from experience’, 
what it means or what it is for anything to be an object, that is, a possible object of 
experience, at all.  Heidegger takes this task to be showing how it is that I can have an 
                                                 
323 KPM 30.  We will return to this theme later; in particular to what is implied hereby regarding the 
“transcendental circle” we encountered in Fichte and the latter’s claim that the thing-in-itself is a “non-
thought”.   
324 KPM 34-35. 
325 KPM 34;  italics mine.   
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understanding of being (even a preliminary or tacit one), i.e. of what it means for 
something to be, at all.  Spelling out such conditions of the possibility of a preliminary 
understanding of being is to spell out what my being is such that I can have such an 
understanding of the being of entities prior to any concrete encounter with entities. So 
this then is the special problem of human (i.e. finite) transcendence.   For a “creative 
intuition”, there is no problem, for the latter can have an understanding of the being of 
entities simply because it gave those entities their being.  They owe their being to it.  But 
as a finite being, I am “delivered over”, i.e. already in the midsts of beings that are not me 
(that is, do not have my mode of being) and whose being I therefore did not create.   
     We can give Heidegger’s answer in a nutshell:  it must “belong to my being” that in 
knowing entities I create not the entities themselves but rather the horizon within which 
entities can be encountered and show themselves as the entities they are.  Though Dasein 
is not “ontically creative”, we can say that it is “ontologically creative”, that is, Dasein’s 
essential and distinctive activity must lie in creating or forming a priori the “pure look” of 
entities as entities.326   Dasein, in being “ontologically creative”, is creating neither 
entities nor the being of entities but rather the horizon of Dasein’s access to the being of 
entities, namely, as objects.    
In order to be able to encounter an entity as the entity it is, it must already be 
“recognized” generally and in advance as an entity, i.e. with respect to the 
constitution of its being.  But this implies that ontological knowledge (which is 
here always pre-ontological)327 is the condition for the possibility that in general 
something like an entity can itself stand-in-opposition [entgegenstehen kann] to a 
finite being.  Finite beings must have this basic capacity to turn-toward while 
                                                 
326 The meaning of Heidegger’s talk of “looks” will be discussed in what follows.   
327 Pre-ontological [vorontologisch] knowledge does not mean a state of knowledge that one has before a 
proper ontological knowledge, but rather something more like a “first” or preliminary or provisional 
ontological knowledge.  Pre-ontological knowledge is then already (a kind of) ontological knowledge.     
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letting-stand-in-opposition [dieses Grundvermögen einer 
entgegenstehenlassenden Zuwendung-zu…].328 
 
     This “basic capacity” is, in simpler terms, an ability to attend to something which lets 
it become an object for me.  That an entity “stands-in-opposition” [gegenstehen] here—
that it “opposes me”—just means that it is an object [Gegenstand] for me, which in turn 
means therefore that it is not me, that its being is not my being, that it is what it is “as 
opposed” to being me, and finally, that it “exists in its own right”.  As we will see, for 
Heidegger this basic faculty is the transcendental power of imagination.  “In this original 
turning-toward, the finite being first allows a play-space [Spielraum] within which 
something can ‘correspond’ to it.  To hold oneself in advance in such a play-space, to 
form it originally, is none other than the transcendence which marks all finite 
comportment to beings.”329   The transcendental power of imagination is understood by 
Heidegger as the power to form transcendence, and thus the power to have an 
understanding of being, which is metaphysically distinctive of human beings.  Moreover, 
this capacity just is the activity of originary synthesis, or for Heidegger, the “ontological 
synthesis”.330    
    But we need to take a step back at this point.  Kant’s goal is to show the conditions of 
the possibility of anything becoming an object of experience and thus of objectively valid 
judgments, that is, the conditions of the possibility of objectivity as such.  Heidegger, as I 
hope to have made apparent, remains faithful to this Kantian project in searching for the 
conditions of the possibility of “having an understanding of being”.   This understanding 
                                                 
328 KPM 70-71.    
329 KPM 71.  




of being must be a self-directed attending to or a comporting oneself to entities which lets 
them show, “from out of themselves”, that and what they are.  This is Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the “basic intention or purpose [Grundabsicht]”, as he says, of the 
transcendental deduction.  Now, surprisingly perhaps, for Heidegger this intention or 
purpose is not fulfilled by the transcendental deduction itself, but rather by the 
transcendental schematism, which he says “must constitute the central core of the whole 
voluminous work”.331  In order to evaluate this claim, we need to explicate Heidegger’s 
interpretation of this section, which he says actually “grounds” the transcendental 
deduction and is the “original sphere of the radical grounding of the possibility of 
ontological knowledge”.332   
     We can give some plausibility to Heidegger’s claim with the following remarks.  In 
Kant’s words the goal of the transcendental deduction is an “explanation of the way in 
which concepts can relate to objects a priori”.333   But how this is so is still a genuine 
question even after the deduction, since after all, as Kant points out, the pure concepts of 
the understanding—under which the unified manifold of all given intuition “must 
stand”334, as the deduction itself had shown—are “entirely unhomogeneous” with all 
empirical intuitions.  It is the task of the schematism rather to “show the possibility of 
applying pure concepts of the understanding to appearances in general”; and Kant’s 
conclusion in that section is after all that “the schemata of the concepts of pure 
understanding are the true and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to 
                                                 
331 KPM 89. 
332 PIK 431.   
333 KRV A85/B117. 
334 KRV B143. 
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objects”.335  But the “schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination”336, and 
the schema of the pure concepts of understanding is accomplished through the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination.  If the goal of the deduction was to show 
how the unity of “pure thinking” with “pure intuition” is possible, then the “ontological 
synthesis” is accomplished through the “schematizing” synthetic activity of the pure, 
productive faculty of transcendental imagination.   
     We have pointed out how, for Heidegger, ontological synthetic activity amounted to 
the a priori “forming of transcendence”, that is, a forming of the horizon within which 
entities, from “out of themselves”, could be encountered as the entities they are, i.e. as 
objects.  In being a self-directed attending to entities which lets them stand-against, that 
is, lets them be objects for me, the ontological synthesis is a forming of the horizon of 
objectivity.   If the ontological synthesis is the work of the productive imagination—
which is also a “faculty of sensibility”—then that work can be described as the “making-
sensible [Versinnlichung]” of the horizon.  Pure productive imagination, in making pure 
concepts sensible, is creating what Kant says are “mediating representations” between 
pure concepts and pure intuitions, the transcendental schemata. 337   These representations 
comprise the horizon of objectivity in providing, prior to experience, or “in advance of 
acquiescence”, the “pure look [reiner Anblick]” of objectivity, of objects in general. 
     What does Heidegger mean here by talking about the “look” of objectivity?  To begin 
with, Kant says that the schema of a concept is a representation of “a general procedure 
                                                 
335 KRV A138/B177; A145-6/B185;  my emphasis.   
336 KRV A140/B179. 
337 KRV A138/B177. 
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of the imagination for providing a concept with its image”.338  Now, Heidegger 
distinguishes between three senses of “image” and thus three ways in which the image of 
something can be related to the “look” of the thing.   Firstly, “look” can mean the 
immediate empirical “look” of something in particular.  This would be the type of thing 
that is asked about when a detective asks, “What did the perpetrator look like?”339    
Secondly, the “look” of something can refer to a general likeness of the thing, as, e.g., 
when the detective asks if the perpetrator looks like the man in this photograph, or in this 
police-sketch.   Both of these senses have an essential reference to an “image” of some 
kind, either the “image” of the thing contained in the empirical representation, or the 
image contained in the likeness.  But Kant says that the “schema is to be distinguished 
from the image” and is rather a representation of the “general procedure” for providing 
an image for the concept.   
     Heidegger says that though the schema is distinguished from images, it is 
“nevertheless related to something like an image” or has an “image-character 
[Bildcharakter]”.  This is because there is a sense in which the schema of a concept itself, 
in “making the concept sensible”, provides the look of things to which the concept 
applies—now in a third sense of “look”.  Heidegger calls this the “schema-image 
[Schema-bild]”.   To see what this could mean, let’s expand on Kant’s example of the 
dog.  We say there is something like the “look” of dogs in general, or perhaps better, “the 
way dogs look”, that is not identical to the “empirical look” of any possible concrete dog, 
nor to the look conveyed by a photograph of a dog, nor to a “mental image” of a dog.  
                                                 
338 KRV A140/B179-80. 
339 Which needn’t itself be a simple listing of more or less prominent physical properties.  The perpetrator 
might have “looked suspicious”, or even “looked like a college student”, for instance.   
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This is the sense conveyed by my saying that, for instance, over and above being in 
possession of the concept ‘dog’—i.e. knowing the rule for applying the concept, or being 
able to list the “marks” which belong to and delineate the concept— “I know what dogs 
look like” or “I know what a dog looks like”.  This look, the “look of x in general” is, as 
Heidegger calls it, the schema-image of the concept x.  The schema-image is never 
identical to any particular concrete image, mental or otherwise, but it is that in virtue of 
which images of x’s are possible.   
     Kant says, “[T]he schema of sensible concepts…is a product and as it were a 
monogram of pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the 
images first become possible.”340   Heidegger claims that this is true in virtue of the 
schema’s corresponding schema-image.  It is because “I know what a dog (in general) 
looks like”—which would mean here, having a “schema-image of the concept dog”—that 
I can conjure up a mental image of a dog, or can recognize this actual dog here as a 
dog.341  The function of the schema-image is to provide the “look of something in 
general”, and is thus a “making-sensible” of the concept in advance of perception so that 
I can recognize perceptual objects as determined by the rule that the concept which 
belongs to them specifies, that is, as the particular objects they are.  The schema-image, 
Heidegger says, “shows us ‘only’ the ‘as…’ in terms of which [the thing as the thing it is] 
can appear”.342    
                                                 
340 KRV A141-2/B181.  If one puts special emphasis on “sensible” here, it looks like Kant is denying 
Heidegger’s very next move, and thus can be no such thing as an entirely pure look.  But, as Heidegger will 
point out, the latter can be understood along the lines of Kant’s “pure image”—e.g. time. 
341 In this case, having the schema-image is a sufficient but not necessary condition of having the mental 
image.  I can know that this is a dog without knowing what dogs in general look like, if , e.g. I am told it is 
by a “dog-expert”.  The same story applies to “pure” sensible concepts, like that of geometrical figures, to 
which Kant also refers in the Schematism.  
342 KPM 95. 
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     So, the schema of a concept is, as Kant says, the representation of the procedure the 
imagination follows in providing an image for a concept.   For Heidegger, to represent the 
“general procedure” is to “represent the way the rule regulates [a] sketching-out within a 
possible look”.343  This means that the schema “necessarily remains relative to possible 
schema-images” which are a “sketching-out” of the rule which forms, ahead of time, the 
horizon for the “range of possibilities” of things that the concept could apply to, that is, 
the range of possible ways of “following the rule”.   
This initial sketching-out [Vorzeichnung] of the rule is no list [Verzeichnis] in the 
sense of a mere enumeration of the “features” found in [the concept, but rather] it 
is a “displaying [Auszeichnen]” of the whole of what is meant by [a term].344    
 
     But Kant says that the schema of a pure concept of the understanding is “something 
that can never be brought to an image at all”.  Now what can this mean?  As Heidegger 
points out, it presents a difficulty, since Kant had defined a schema, in general, as the 
representation of the method for “providing the concept with its image”, or in 
Heidegger’s language, as a “making the concept sensible” in advance, through the 
schema-image, which provides the “look in general” of things to which the concept 
applies.  In what sense now can the schemata of pure concepts “never be brought to an 
image at all”?   To answer this, we must consider how the schemata of empirical and 
mathematical (which are pure and sensible)—concepts can be “brought to images”.   As 
Heidegger points out, concrete images, that is, empirical looks, can serve to represent the 
thing imaged in general.  In other words, the schema-image can be “present” in empirical 
images.  If, for instance, I try to teach you the concept dog, i.e. what ‘dog’ means, by 
                                                 
343 Ibid., italics mine. 
344 Ibid., italics mine. 
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showing you a picture of a dog (saying, “dogs look like this”), the empirical image here is 
intended to represent “dogs in general”. Heidegger’s example is a house.   
We say this house which is perceived, e.g., shows how a house in general appears, 
and consequently it shows what we represent in the concept house…Indeed, the 
house itself offers this determinate look, and yet we are not preoccupied with this 
in order to experience how precisely this house appears.  Rather, this house shows 
itself in exactly such a way that, in order to be a house, it must not necessarily 
appear as it does…What we have perceived [in the empirical look of the house] is 
the range of possible appearing as such, or more precisely, we have perceived 
that which cultivates this range, that which regulates and marks out how 
something in general must appear in order to be able, as a house, to offer the 
appropriate look.345 
 
The distinctiveness of both empirical and mathematical concepts lies then in the 
possibility that any particular empirical look can (might be able to) also offer the schema-
image, the look of the thing in general.  We can say that the schema-image here can be 
“brought to” an image, or that the empirical look can be “adequate” to the “look in 
general”.  Pictures or drawings appended to dictionary definitions, for instance, can serve 
this function.   
     So when Kant says that the schema of pure concepts “cannot be brought to images at 
all”, this must mean that the schema-images of pure concepts—in contrast to the schema-
images of empirical or mathematical concepts—cannot be represented, as it were, in any 
empirical look.  As Heidegger insists, then, Kant is not thereby denying that a pure 
concept has a corresponding schema-image.   True, no empirical look can suffice to 
present or display the schema-images of a pure concept as it can with an empirical 
concept; this just means that no empirical look can ever be adequate to it.  One can 
ostensibly learn an empirical concept, that is, learn to correctly apply the concept in 
experience and thus to correctly recognize certain objects as belonging under that 
                                                 
345 KPM 94-95; italics mine.  
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concept, through the empirical looks they display within my experiencing them.  I learn 
to apply the concept in an appropriate way through developing a sense of the look of the 
thing in general.  With pure concepts it must be otherwise.  No empirical experience can 
ever be adequate to the pure concept ‘cause’ for instance.  The schema-images of pure 
concepts must for this reason be “pure”; and the schema-images of pure concepts must 
present “pure images”.346  
     The schemata of pure concepts, then, produced by the synthetic activity of the 
transcendental imagination, provide the schema-image(s) of an object in general, i.e. the 
“pure look” of any possible object whatsoever, and thus the “pure look of objectivity”.   
But, of course, Kant says that transcendental schemata are also “a priori time-
determinations”.  This is what allows them to be “mediating representations” between the 
category, which is “universal and rests on a rule a priori”, and the appearance (in the 
broad sense of a sensible intuition) which is subject to time as the a priori form of 
intuition.  As a priori time-determinations, Heidegger says, “the schemata of the notions 
[pure concepts]…articulate the unique pure possibility of having a certain look into a 
variety of pure images”347.   But this multiplicity of pure images is unified in the single 
pure image of time itself as a “formal intuition”.  As Kant himself says and as Heidegger 
emphasizes, time itself is the “pure image” of all objects of the senses as such.348   
As ‘pure image’, time is the schema-image and not just the form of intuition 
which stands over and against the pure concepts of the understanding…time is not 
only the necessary pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of the 
understanding but also their sole, pure possibility of having a certain look.  This 
                                                 
346 As Heidegger points out, Kant in several places, including in the Schematism itself, refers to time as the 
“pure image” of all objects of the senses. 
347 KPM 104, italics mine.  
348 KRV A142/B182.  “Das reine Bild…aller Gegenstände der Sinne aber überhaupt [ist] die Zeit“. 
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unique possibility of having a certain look shows itself in itself to be nothing other 
than always just time and the temporal.349    
 
Heidegger gives an example in the Kantbook regarding the pure concept of substance.  
The schema of substance, which Kant says is the “persistence of the real in time, i.e., the 
representation of the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general”, is 
dependent on the pure image of time because in it “time gives the pure look of something 
like lasting in general”; it is the “look of what lasts350”.   
     Now, what role does Heidegger’s reading of the schematism play in his claim that 
transcendental imagination is the “common root”?  We have seen how Heidegger 
interprets the goal of the transcendental deduction, which Kant said was to show how 
concepts can apply to objects a priori, as an unveiling of the essence of transcendence, 
that is, to explain how Dasein can transcend entities in having an understanding of their 
being.  Now, the schematism proves that Dasein has an understanding of being in virtue 
of forming the horizon of the pure look of objectivity in advance of “experience”, the 
horizon within which entities show up as entities.  So if the purpose of the transcendental 
deduction is fulfilled through the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, 
which is itself accomplished through the synthetic activity of the transcendental 
imagination, then we can say that the pure synthesis of the transcendental imagination 
(the ontological synthesis) forms transcendence itself.   That formative work can be 
described as an original “making-sensible” of the horizon of transcendence.  Heidegger 
writes, “if the schematism belongs to the essence of finite knowledge and if finitude is 
centered in transcendence, then the occurrence of transcendence in its innermost essence 
                                                 
349 KPM 104. 
350 KPM 107, my italics.   
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must be a schematism”.351   Simply put, it is the schematism that makes transcendence 
possible.   
     So, Heidegger’s description of the central place of the schematism itself goes a long 
way in explaining why he thinks the transcendental imagination, which does the 
“schematizing”, is the “common root” between understanding and sensibility.  The 
schematism just is the activity of the ontological synthesis, the forming of the 
transcendental horizon, and thus the original creation of the “preliminary understanding 
of being”352.  The ontological synthesis is the synthesis of “pure thinking” and “pure 
intuition”.  As such, it is the unifying synthesis of both the pure concepts of the 
understanding on the one hand and the sensible manifold of intuition on the other, and 
thus the synthetic unity of the understanding and sensibility.   
     In my earlier discussion of Kant’s transcendental deduction353, I emphasized the 
precarious place of the transcendental imagination across both editions, and tried to 
elucidate the sense in which the imagination was there, as Heidegger says, heimatlos. At 
issue was the tension between Kant’s claim that there are “three original sources” which 
contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience (sense, imagination, 
apperception), and his claim that there are “two fundamental sources of cognition 
[receptivity of impressions and the spontaneity of concepts]” and thus two “stems” of 
cognition [understanding and sensibility].354  And, though he attributes original synthetic 
                                                 
351 KPM 101. 
352 Of course, we have here already the fundamental claim of Being and Time that any understanding of 
being must be essentially temporal.   
353 See Part I §2b. 
354 KRV A94; A50/B74.   Though its true that the former is only in the A-edition, but Kant leaves in 
essentially the same claim at A155/B194, where there are “three sources” of a priori representations [time 
as the a priori form of inner sense, imagination, and apperception].   
  
204
activity in the B-edition to the faculty of understanding, he continues to call the 
imagination there the faculty of “synthesis in general”.  The imagination on the one hand 
is a spontaneous faculty, but on the other “belongs to sensibility” and is thus ostensibly a 
receptive faculty.  I said, at the very least, the transient and uncertain place of the 
imagination within the deduction(s) problematizes an easy identification of the dualism 
between understanding and sensibility with the dualism of spontaneity and receptivity.  
Additionally, I argued against Henrich’s insistence that the common root was in principle 
impossible for Kant.  I maintained that at best Henrich had shown two things, 1) that the 
common root cannot be conceived of as a kind of “basic power” [Grundkraft] in the 
Wolffian sense, and 2) that a genuine identification of any faculty as the common root is 
subject to the following criterion: namely that this faculty “render intelligible the faculties 
it grounds”.   
     If Heidegger’s claim, which I have tried to defend, that the purpose of the 
transcendental deduction is fulfilled by the schematism is legitimate, then it seems as if 
we have indeed “found a home” for the transcendental imagination.  The schematism puts 
the imagination, as Heidegger phrases it, at “the formative center [die bildende Mitte] of 
ontological knowledge”, but this doesn’t itself amount to positively identifying it as the 
“common root”; in particular it doesn’t itself demonstrate that the criterion for such an 
identification, which we derived from Henrich, is satisfied.  We should first remark that 
Heidegger explicitly denies that the imagination could be the common root in virtue of 
being a “basic power” in the Wolffian sense.  The transcendental power of imagination, 
he says, 
is not something that could be thought of as a ‘basic power [Grundkraft]’ in the 
soul.  Nothing lies further from this going-back into the essential origin of 
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transcendence than the monistic-empirical explanation of the remaining faculties 
of the soul based on the power of imagination.355  
 
And this because the very idea of a basic power in the sense it has in Wolffian faculty-
psychology depends, as we have seen, on conceiving ‘power’ as “the relation of an 
accident to the substance in which it inheres”.   Henrich writes, correctly, that Wolff’s 
“reduction of the powers of the faculty of knowledge to one basic power was not 
motivated by reasons that lie in the structure of the subject itself.  Rather, those reasons 
stem from his attempt to turn the Leibnizian concept of substance into the foundation of a 
systematic psychology.”   
     But Heidegger, by contrast, is precisely motivated by “reasons that lie in the structure 
of the subject”.   
This intention [that is, the ‘monistic-empirical explanation’ which we can here 
identify as Wolff’s faculty-psychological strategy] is already self-prohibitive 
because in the end the essential unveiling of transcendence decides in the first 
place the sense in which one is permitted to speak of ‘soul’ or ‘mind’, the extent 
to which these concepts originally meet the ontologico-metaphysical essence of 
human beings.356   
  
In simpler terms, Wolff’s strategy is ruled out because it depends on a substance-
ontology that the “transcendental strategy” which Heidegger is pursuing—which rests on 
the claim that subjectivity is not a substance, not any kind of “thing” at all—has 
determined to be false.  So for Heidegger then, 
To understand the faculties of ‘our mind’ as ‘transcendental faculties’ means in 
the first place to unveil them according to how they make the essence of 
transcendence possible.  Faculty thus does not mean a ‘basic power’ which is at 
hand in the soul.  ‘Faculty [Vermögen]’ now means what such a phenomenon [as 
mind] ‘is able to do’ [was ein solches Phänomen ‘vermag’], in the sense of the 
making-possible of the essential structure of transcendence…Thus understood, 
the transcendental power of imagination is not just, first and foremost, a faculty 
                                                 




found between pure intuition and pure thinking.  Rather, together with these, it is 
a ‘basic ability to do [Grundvermögen]’ as a making-possible of the original unity 
of both and with it the essential unity of transcendence as a whole.357 
 
     To say that imagination is not just the faculty “between” the others is to say that it is 
not just an “external bond which fastens together two ends”.  It is rather “original 
unifying” which “forms the unity of both of the others, which themselves have an 
essential structural relation to it.”    But what exactly does Heidegger mean when he says 
that imagination makes possible the “original unity” of both understanding and 
sensibility?  There are two crucial considerations here which we can indicate through the 
following two passages from Kant.  The first is from the first Critique.  Kant says that 
understanding and sensibility “cannot exchange their functions [Funktionen]”; and while 
“only from their unification can cognition arise”, he goes on to insist that “on this account 
one must not mix up their roles [ihren Anteil vermischen], rather one has great cause to 
separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them.”358   The second is 
contained in what I will call the “heterogeneity passage”, from the Anthropology, which 
was emphasized by Henrich: 
Despite their dissimilarity, understanding and sensibility by themselves form a 
close union for bringing about our cognition, as if one had the origin in the other, 
or both originated from a common origin; but this cannot be, or at least we 
cannot conceive how dissimilar things could sprout from one and the same 
root.359 
 
     When Kant says that understanding and sensibility have different functions and parts 
to play in cognition—the heterogeneity of which makes it hard to conceive of them as 
                                                 
357 KPM 134, my italics.  
358 KRV A51-52/B75-76, my emphasis. 
359 GS VII 177, my emphasis.  But note at the outset that they cannot be so completely heterogeneous 
because, as Heidegger points out, they are both “species of representings” which must belong to the same 
genus of representings in general.  Both concepts and intuitions are representations for Kant. 
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having a common origin and makes it thus important to keep them separated—he must 
have in mind that understanding is above all a faculty of spontaneity and activity, and 
sensibility is a faculty of receptivity and passivity.  If imagination is to be the common 
root of these so heterogeneous stems, then it must be shown how imagination is the 
“ground in such a way that it lets the stems grow out of itself, lending them support and 
stability”, while at the same time preserving their independent functions.  The stems must 
remain separate stems with their own distinct and independent structures.  The point of 
“unveiling the original unity” of these two functions is to show how “the structure of 
these faculties has been rooted in the structure of the transcendental imagination.”360 
     The main challenge here, of course—and the main reason for thinking that it would be 
“inconceivable” for any faculty to be the root for both stems—is that the imagination 
would then have to be “structurally” both active and passive, spontaneous and receptive.  
And not just in the sense that it “can be both”, i.e. that it itself has these two capabilities, 
side-by-side and “apart from each other”, as it were, which would be no mystery; but that 
it must be both at the same time and in the same respect.   This is just what Heidegger 
attributes to transcendental imagination.  It is simultaneously receptive and spontaneous, 
and in “this ‘simultaneously’ lies the proper essence of its structure”.361   It is the 
“original unity of receptivity and spontaneity, and not a unity which was composite from 
the first”362.    
      We can make some headway into how this could be if we recall what the structure of 
the transcendental imagination, as original synthetic activity, is.  That imagination forms 
                                                 
360 KPM 138, my italics. 
361 KPM 129. 
362 KPM 153. 
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the horizon of objectivity means that it is a self-orienting turning-towards which lets 
something stand in opposition, or more simply, lets something be an object, existing in its 
own right.  As a schematism, it is a self-giving of a pure look which lets objects appear as 
the objects they are, i.e. lets them look the way they look.  Clearly both of these 
formulations are meant to capture both the activity and the passivity of the phenomenon.  
In the self-directed turning-toward, in the giving of the pure look, I am active and 
spontaneous.  In the standing-in-opposition of the object, in the look being the look of the 
object, I am passive and receptive.  I am beholden to, bound by, the independent features 
of the object as the object it is.   The very phrase “making-sensible” is meant to evoke 
this simultaneous activity and passivity; it means “acting in such a way that objects are 
able to affect me”.   
     Is this enough, or is being active and passive at the same time and in the same respect 
something, as Kant says, we simply “cannot conceive”?   It seems to me that there are 
lots of ordinary everyday cases.  We can take as a paradigm example the phenomenon of 
“accepting a gift”.  Clearly in such a case I am passive; I am the “recipient” of the gift.  
But in accepting the gift, I am also doing something, I am active.  If you offer me some 
money and I demur, simply putting the money in my hand or slipping it into my pocket 
unawares—in which case I would be “merely passive”—then this no longer counts as my 
accepting the gift at all, in the essential meaning of the phenomenon.   In the totality of 
the meaningful action “accepting a gift” which has been offered, I am active in the very 
moment of receiving it.  Another example would be “listening”.  The command to 
“Listen!” is a call to an action of a certain sort, but it is an activity that can only be 
fulfilled through a certain kind of passivity, it is an activity that consists in being passive.    
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     We can understand how the imagination for Heidegger is simultaneously spontaneous 
and receptive in essentially the same way.   We would misunderstand what Heidegger 
means by “forming the horizon”—and what Kant means by “synthetic activity” for that 
matter—if we took it to mean that the imagination is first active, first “sets up” the 
horizon, and then is passive, simply waiting for things to show up in it, or to “bounce up 
against it”.  It is not a matter of “acting or doing something now so that later I can sit 
back and be passive”, akin to opening up a post office box.  It is similarly misleading to 
describe it as “being active in order to be passive”, like getting all the chores done so you 
can go lie on the couch.  It is a rather an activity that is at the same time and in the same 
respect passive.  “In the same respect” here is “in respect to” the function of 
transcending.  In a quite literal sense, the activity of ontological synthesis is, amounts to, 
a passivity; it constitutes passivity, and vice versa.  The synthetic activity is truly 
receptive insofar as it is spontaneous—what it means to be receptive to the object is to 
“take it in”, to acquiesce to it, which is after all something I do.  Likewise, it is 
spontaneous insofar as it is receptive—what it means to spontaneously synthesize a 
“manifold in intuition”, which means I am “affected” by objects, is to make myself open 
to the way the object exists in its own right, i.e. what it is “objectively”, which is after all 
something to which in cognition I must be passive, something that I do not, and am not 
attempting to, control.   I must let myself be “guided” by the object, but this is not the 
same as just being dragged around helplessly by it.363      
                                                 
363 Paradigmatically, this theme is present in Being and Time in the form of Heidegger’s description of 
disclosure as a “letting be [Seinlassen]”.   For an invaluable discussion of this, see Haugeland’s article 
“Letting Be” in Transcendental Heidegger, ed. by Crowell and Malpas. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 
2007.  Indeed, I think this phenomena of the inextricability of the senses of “active” and “passive” is much 
more pervasive then it might seem, and that it is perhaps more difficult to spell out cases of pure activity or 
pure passivity.  I am tempted to say, though it would perhaps be an overstatement, that these latter 
categories can most naturally be associated only with “domain of objects” as opposed to the “domain of the 
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     So the fact that transcendental imagination is structurally both spontaneous and 
receptive goes some way in showing how the structures of understanding as spontaneous 
and sensibility as receptive can be grounded in it.  But we still haven’t made good on 
Henrich’s “intelligibility criterion”.  To be the common root, the faculty of imagination 
must “make intelligible” the other faculties in the sense of making them possible, of 
demonstrating that they are what they are, and have the functions they do, in virtue of 
being rooted in the faculty of imagination.  Indeed Heidegger calls the transcendental 
imagination the “condition of the possibility of all faculties”.364   And he claims both that 
the transcendental power of imagination “makes it possible for pure intuition to be what it 
really can be” and that understanding as pure thinking must “spring forth from [it] in 
order to be able to be what it is.”365    
     The separate functions of the two stems must remain distinct, as Kant insists, and yet 
these respective functions must be shown to be possible and intelligible as the functions 
they are on the basis of being rooted—“originally unified”—in the transcendental 
imagination.   Heidegger’s case will be most convincing if we keep in the foreground the 
fact that the respective faculties should be considered as functions within cognition, for 
the purpose of cognition.  For while if we insist on considering each stem in isolation 
from the other, then we see that their respective distinctive features are spontaneity in the 
case of understanding (the “conceptual or mediate element” in cognition), and receptivity 
                                                                                                                                                 
human”, and that in most aspects of human action and interaction the dichotomy is not so easily drawn.   
This would mean that another way we can understand the ontological asymmetry between persons and 
things is that the “behavior” of persons can be characterized by just this inextricability.  This generalization 
would of course then make sense in Heideggerian terms, since the essence of transcendence is the essence 
of Dasein, and thus of “the human”.    
364KPM 147.  
365 KPM 139, 154. 
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in the case of intuition (the “immediate or given” element in cognition); but as functions 
for the purpose of cognition, these two functions must be complementary and 
cooperative.  As such, they must be understood as “ready to cooperate”, that is, they must 
be such that they are already in themselves able to “work together” to produce cognition.   
These respective functions are co-dependent; the pure understanding can’t perform its 
proper function within cognition without pure intuition, and vice versa.  The claim that 
they are both rooted in transcendental imagination—meaning that they “originally belong 
together” there—is meant to explain, to make intelligible, how these two functions can be 
thus already prepared to cooperate with each other, despite their apparent heterogeneity 
when considered in isolation from each other.   
The question concerning the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thinking is 
the result of the previous isolation of these elements.  Hence the character of their 
unity may be sketched out initially in such a way that it shows how each of these 
elements structurally supports the other.  They indicate joints [Fugen] which point 
in advance to a having-been-joined-together [Ineinandergefügtes].  The 
[ontological synthesis of transcendental imagination] then is that which not only 
fits into these joints, thereby joining the elements, but rather what makes these 
joints “fit” in the first place [was diese Fugen allererst “fügt”].366  
 
We can say that it is the mutual grounding in transcendental imagination—whose 
essential function is to structure transcendence—which makes each of the other two 
faculties not only “fit” together, and thus “fit for” each other, but also what makes each 
“fit to” (ready to) contribute together to this end, what makes them adapted and qualified 
for such cooperation.   
     With this in mind, Heidegger insists that pure intuition, in its functioning within 
cognition, must be not just a “mere” receptivity, but rather a spontaneous receptivity; 
                                                 
366 KPM 61, my italics, translation amended.  Though Heidegger says “veritative synthesis” here, it is clear 
in context that this is just another name for ontological synthesis. 
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likewise, pure understanding is not just “mere” spontaneity, but a receptive spontaneity.  
What does this mean? 
     The case of pure intuition is perhaps easier.  Pure intuition qua pure is not just the a 
priori form of intuition but the a priori formal intuition of space and time themselves.  As 
such they are, Kant says, singular and individual representations.367  Pure intuiting is the 
pure representing of space and time, as “intuitables”368.   This representing, precisely 
because it is a priori and pure, and not based in or derived from experience, must be 
considered “spontaneous” in some sense.  Space and time as representations are formed 
rather in the “synopsis”, the synthetic unity of apprehension; and as synthetic unities, they 
presuppose a synthesis, and thus a synthetic activity which forms them.  Pure intuiting 
forms, we can say, the pure “spatio-temporal look” of objects in general, which 
Heidegger describes as a look which is “self-given”—from out of itself, i.e. spontaneous.  
The synthesis of apprehension is after all the work of the transcendental imagination, so 
that Heidegger can say, “on the grounds of its essence, pure intuiting is pure 
imagination”.369  But intuition doesn’t thereby lose its separate identity, its distinctive 
role or function within cognition.  Kant, as does Heidegger after him, insists that the unity 
which belongs to space and time as singular representations is not the “unity which 
characterizes the universality of a concept”370.   Through the synthesis of apprehension 
                                                 
367 KRV B136fn.  “Space and Time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual representations along 
with the manifold that they contain in themselves.”  See also B160.  “But space and time are represented a 
priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as intuitions themselves…” 
368 Kant calls them ens imaginarium A291/B347; but they are not thereby objects of intuition, or intuited 
objects.   
369 KPM 143, my italics. 
370 KPM 142.  See also KRV B160fn.:  “[T]he formal intuition gives unity of the representation.  In the 
Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, 
though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all 
concepts of space and time first become possible.”   
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“space and time are first given as intuitions, [but] the unity of this a priori intuition 
belongs to space and time, and not the concept of the understanding”371.   
     The case of pure understanding is more difficult.  That intuition could be rooted in 
imagination is perhaps not surprising at all if the synthesis of imagination is, as Kant 
says, “although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible.372”   It can seem as if 
the analogous attempt to root the understanding in a faculty of sensibility would amount 
to an “obvious absurdity”, as Heidegger admits.  The pure understanding must be able to 
“stand on its own”, that is, remain independent of all concrete empirical content, if it is to 
be able to achieve the kind of generality that is essential to logic.  The key here is Kant’s 
insistence that all uses of the understanding, logic included, must be seen as derived from 
the synthetic unity of apperception.  Famously, the latter is “the highest point to which 
one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic…indeed this faculty 
is the understanding itself.”373  In Heidegger’s language, we can say that the faculty of 
transcendental apperception, which brings about the synthetic unity of apperception, is 
the primordial use of the understanding, it is its essential function.   
     As a unifying, synthetic activity which is fundamentally regulated by the possibility of 
an accompanying “I think” to the unified manifold, the synthetic activity is a “pure self-
orienting [reines Sich-Zuwenden]”.   But the whole point of the Deduction was to show 
that the unity of apperception is identical to the unity of the manifold under the 
categories, i.e. according to the concept of an object in general.   “The I is the ‘vehicle’ of 
the categories insofar as this preliminary self-orienting brings the categories to the point 
                                                 
371 KRV B160fn.   
372 KRV A124.   
373 KRV B134fn., italics added.  
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where, as represented regulative unities [vorgestellte regelnde Einheiten], they can 
unify.”374  The indispensible point here is that though this synthetic activity is a “free, 
forming, and projecting ‘conceiving’ of something”, which highlights its spontaneity and 
makes its rootedness in imagination intelligible, it is precisely a unifying activity which is 
not random or haphazard, but strictly governed by necessary rules which are the 
regulative unities that the categories represent.   
The fundamental character of the unity of transcendental apperception that is 
constantly unifying in advance is opposed to everything random.  Hence, in the 
representing self-orienting, only this opposition and no other is taken up.  The 
free, formative projecting of the affinity375 is in itself a representing, acquiescent 
compliance with (or submission to) it [ein vorstellend hinnehmendes Sich-
unterwerfen].376      
     
So the understanding, as synthetic, apperceptive activity, is not just a “mere” spontaneity, 
but a receptive spontaneity, because its free-formative activity is precisely defined by 
compliance or submission to rules, i.e. the categories as regulative unities.  In cognition, 
the understanding is, in Heidegger’s words, “in the service” of the intuition, and thus in 
the service of acquiescence to the objects as the objects they are.  Its function in cognition 
is to determine the manifold of intuition according to rules to which it has “already 
submitted”.  The synthetic activity of understanding has placed itself under “a self-given 
necessity”.  “The rules of binding together [Regeln des Verbindens] (synthesis) are 
represented” in the understanding, as the faculty of rules, “precisely as binding 
[bindende] in their binding character [Verbindlichkeit].”377  But these rules are what serve 
                                                 
374 KPM 150.   
375 Kant defines the “affinity” of the manifold as “the ground of the possibility of the association of the 
manifold insofar as it lies in the object” and as a “thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws”.  
KRV A113-4. 




to constitute the objectivity of the objects of experience.  If pure intuiting formed the 
“pure spatio-temporal look” of objectivity, then we can say that the pure understanding 
forms the “pure ‘ordered, regular and regulated’ look” of objectivity.   
     In this way, the criterion of the common root which we derived from Henrich’s 
criticism is meant to be fulfilled.  Each of the stems is made intelligible as the particular 
faculties they are, with their distinctive functions within cognition, on the basis of the 
structural unity of the transcendental imagination.  It is because pure intuition—whose 
function is to produce the pure spatial-temporal look of things—is a spontaneous 
receptivity that makes it able to contribute to cognition.  And it is because pure 
understanding—whose function is to guide and regulate the synthesis through rules to 
which it is bound—is a receptive spontaneity that makes it able to contribute to cognition.   
And both are able to be such in virtue of being rooted in the original synthetic activity of 
imagination, with is both spontaneous and receptive at the same time and in the same 
respect.   The transcendental imagination is “in itself essentially spontaneous receptivity 
and receptive spontaneity.  Only in this unity can pure sensibility as spontaneous 
receptivity and pure apperception as receptive spontaneity belong together and form the 
unified essence of a finite, pure, sensible reason.”378 
  
c)  Transcendence as Ontological Self-Constitution 
 
The last phrase in the latter quoted passage reveals that like the early Idealists, Heidegger 
saw the problem of the common root—the problem of the unity of theoretical reason—to 
                                                 
378 KPM 197, my emphases.   
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be intimately connected to the problem of the “unity of reason” as a whole.  A solution to 
the former holds immediate promise in also serving as a solution to the latter.   Indeed, in 
a passage which we will quickly pass over here because we will return to this theme later, 
Heidegger “risks” another step and attempts to show that the structure of practical reason 
as Kant conceives of it is also grounded in the transcendental power of imagination.  His 
description of the pure understanding as a receptive spontaneity already suggests this.  
Such a spontaneity already represents the “freedom” involved in “placing oneself under a 
self-given necessity”.  This is also the structure of autonomy and of the moral feeling of 
“respect for law”.  “The essential structure of respect in itself allows the original 
constitution of the transcendental power of imagination to emerge.  The self-submitting, 
immediate surrender-to…is pure receptivity; the free self-profession of the law, however, 
is pure spontaneity.  In themselves, both are originally one…and they form the 
unreflective acting being of the self [Selbstsein].”379 
     Besides the claim regarding the intimate connection between the common root and the 
unity of reason, to which we return in the next section, there are two other main features 
of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant which highlight the affinity with Fichte’s 
engagement with Kant.  The first is the insistence that Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
necessitates a metaphysical claim about the sui generis ontological character of human 
subjectivity.  For Heidegger this claim can be cashed out in terms of what I called 
“ontological asymmetry”, namely that subjectivity, or selfhood, can never be conceived 
of in the same terms which are appropriate for talking about “things”.   The second main 
claim is that selfhood, as opposed to thinghood, is ontologically distinguished by being 
                                                 
379 KPM 159-160. 
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self-constituting.   The first was treated in the beginning of this chapter, so we can now 
turn to the second.  
     We have seen the way in which, for Heidegger, the transcendental power of 
imagination affects the “self-forming of transcendence and its horizons”380 and that, in 
turn, “transcendence determines the being-a-self of the finite self”381.   This means that 
selfhood, the ontological structure of being-a-self, is self-constituting.  To see this clearly, 
we should return, as we did with Fichte, to the locus classicus in Kant regarding this 
theme, namely the footnote at B157-158.382  Kant says that originary synthetic activity—
which is “expressed” by the apperceptive ‘I think’—determines my existence.  The 
existence is given, but not the existence qua self-active being.  For while I have a self-
intuition “which is grounded in an a priori given form, i.e. time, which is sensible and 
belongs to the receptivity of the determinable…I do not have yet another self-intuition, 
which would give the determining in me, the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, 
even before the act of determination, in the same way as time gives that which is to be 
determined”.   We have seen how Fichte’s notion of intellectual intuition was precisely 
meant to fit the bill of such a self-intuition of existence qua self-active being.  But, 
importantly, we should not see intellectual intuition for Fichte as giving “the determining 
                                                 
380 KPM 89.  
381 KPM 188.  
382 For reference, I give the whole passage again: “The I think expresses the act of determining my 
existence.  The existence is thereby given, but the way in which I am to determinate it, i.e., the manifold 
that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not thereby given.  For that self-intuition is required, which 
is grounded in an a priori given form, i.e. time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the 
determinable.  Now I do not have yet another self-intuition, which would give the determining in me, the 
spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before the act of determination, in the same way as time 
gives that which is to be determined, thus I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being 
[eines selbsttätigen Wesens], rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the 
determining, and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as the 




in me…before the act of determination”, but rather in the very act of determination.  This 
is the point of calling self-positing a self-constituting activity.  The latter is an activity 
which constitutes the being of the active “entity”—which is nowise to be seen as a thing 
existing prior to or independently of its essential activity.  Rather, the (sui generis) 
activity of self-positing is the being of the pure I; the activity constitutes the being of the I 
and makes it what it is in the first place.  
     Heidegger’s interpretation is remarkably similar.  For him as well, we do in fact have 
“another” self-intuition which immediately “gives” the self as a self-active entity, namely 
the transcendental imagination in its schematizing activity of ontological synthesis.  In its 
functioning to provide a priori time-determinations, it serves to, as even Kant says, 
“generate time itself.”  This is where the interpretation of imagination as the common 
root has significant consequences.  As Heidegger points out, this passage in Kant lies 
within the context of the latter’s restriction of self-knowledge to the empirical self within 
inner sense, and furthermore, belongs to the B-edition of the Deduction where Kant 
attributes all spontaneity to the pure understanding as the faculty for using categories.  
Kant’s point here is that since all legitimate use of the categories requires a sensible 
manifold grounded in the form of time—“the receptivity of the determinable”—the 
categories, which are required for knowledge, cannot be applied to the self abstracted 
from this sensible form, i.e. to the self as determining, i.e. over and above the self as 
determinable.   In a passage in the Grundprobleme, in which Heidegger discusses 
precisely this footnote, he says:  
Kant is wholly right when he declares the categories, as fundamental concepts of 
nature, unsuitable for determining the I.  But in that way he has only shown 
negatively that the categories, which were tailored to fit other entities, nature, 
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break down here.  He has not shown that the ‘I act’ itself cannot be interpreted in 
the way in which it gives itself in this self-manifesting ontological constitution.383  
 
     But “the way in which activity gives itself in a self-manifesting ontological 
constitution” is precisely through the ontological synthesis of schematism.  In the 
transcendental schematism, as we have seen, the self, in its imaginative synthetic activity, 
forms transcendence, and thus the ontological horizon, “from out of itself”; it is then the 
self-forming of transcendence.  Now, the “way” in which the self-forming ontological 
horizon manifests itself is through a priori time-determinations.  Because the activity of 
the “I act” fundamentally takes the form of a priori synthetic time-determinations, the 
ontological horizon—the possibility of having a certain look—which is thereby generated 
in the ontological synthesis can be described as “just time and the temporal”.   The pure 
look of objectivity formed in the ontological synthesis can also be described then as the 
pure look of temporality.  Objectivity, considered from the “pure standpoint”, “looks” 
temporal.   
     In line with and expanding on Kant’s brief remark that in the schematism, the 
(synoptic) imagination “generates time itself”, Heidegger attempts in §33 of the 
Kantbook to demonstrate how each of the three pure syntheses of the imagination 
functions as “time-forming”, indeed how each respectively functions to form each of the 
ecstatic dimensions of “original time”, namely the past, present, and future.384  Heidegger 
remarks that the fact that each of the syntheses is “time-forming” constitutes the 
“ultimate, decisive proof” that the transcendental power of imagination is the root of both 
stems, and that the former has an “inner temporal character [innere Zeitcharakter]”.  This 
                                                 
383 GP 206,  my italics, which in the original read:  “...wie es sich gibt, in dieser sich bekundenden 
ontologischen Verfassung”.   
384 I pass over the specific arguments because they are tangential to the point at hand.   
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causes Heidegger to make the crucial claim that “time is pure self-affection”.  If time is 
pure self-affection, we can understand it as precisely fulfilling the criterion for being 
“another self-intuition” which gives the self as a self-active being.        
Time is only pure intuition to the extent that it prepares the look of succession 
from out of itself…This pure intuition activates itself with the intuited which was 
formed in it, i.e. which was formed without the aid of experience.  According to 
its essence, time is pure affection of itself…As pure self-affection, time is not an 
acting affection that strikes a self which is at hand.  Instead, it forms the essence 
of something like self-activating.  However, if it belongs to the essence of the 
finite subject to be able to be activated as a self, then time as pure self-affection 
forms the essential structure of subjectivity.385 
 
     To say that pure intuition “activates itself” is to say that it is spontaneous; indeed as 
Heidegger says here, it is the essence of spontaneity as self-activity.  But time as pure 
intuition also means a pure acquiescence, that is, an acquiescence abstracted from 
experience.  This means that the self is affected by itself “free from experience”, i.e. it is 
affected in this regard wholly by itself, and so is a “self-intuition”.  Heidegger attempts to 
find evidence for this view in a passage from the Aesthetic:  
The form of intuition [time], which, since it does not represent anything except 
insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in 
which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely through itself.386     
  
     But something is amiss here, which points to a larger interpretative difficulty.  This 
has been pointed out by Daniel Dahlstrom.387  Kant says that time is the way the mind 
affects itself (so that the mind is self-affecting, through time as pure intuition), not that 
time is self-affection, or that time affects itself.  So to identify ‘time’ and ‘pure self-
affection’ is, Dahlstrom says, “a true but misleading representation of Kant’s remark”, 
                                                 
385 KPM 189, italics mine.  
386 KRV B67-68. 
387 Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Kantian Turn: Notes to His Commentary on the Kritik der reinen Vernunft”, in 
Review of Metaphysics 45 (December 1991): 329-361. 
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and “at best metonymic from a Kantian point of view”.388  This seems right to me, and it 
points to an ambiguous and problematic aspect of Heidegger’s way of talking here.  
There is indeed a difference between saying that: 
(1) “time affects itself”, and  
(2) time is the manner in which “the mind affects itself”.  
  
And this makes a difference to my reading because if Heidegger means the former in 
exclusion of the latter, in accordance with a quite literal meaning of his words, then the 
proper way to put the claim in question would not be that subjectivity, being-a-self—in 
its essential forming of transcendence—is self-constituting, but that time is self-
constituting, and (thereby, somehow) time constitutes being-a-self.   Dasein, then, is itself 
not properly self-constituting, but is rather constituted by “time”.   If it is true that 
Heidegger is accepting that (1) and (2) are distinct, and that he is choosing (1) to the 
exclusion of (2), so that time is self-affecting (but not the self), then we really haven’t 
fulfilled the criterion for identifying “another self-intuition” in Kant’s passage above, 
because it wouldn’t be a self-intuition which would amount to a self-determination, i.e. 
my determination of my existence qua self-active being.  Dahlstrom’s point is that if this 
is true, then Heidegger isn’t really being fair to Kant’s point here, but beyond that, if this 
is true, it would mean that Heidegger’s point would not really reflect Fichte’s insight 
here.389   
     I will be arguing in a moment that Heidegger rather means that (1) and (2) are making 
the same claim, and are thus not distinct, so no choice is required.  But in fact it must be 
acknowledged that it sometimes looks as if Heidegger is making this distinction in so 
                                                 
388 Ibid. p. 353.   
389 This might not be entirely problematic for my project here; if all of this is true, then Heidegger would be 
simply more like Hegel than Fichte.  See footnote 391 below.   
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talking about time as self-affection, rather than the self affecting itself by way of time, 
that is, temporally.  In the Grundprobleme passage quoted above, he seems to gloss 
Kant’s words in the locus classicus by admitting that “we have no self-intuition of our 
self”.390   And immediately after insisting that Kant has not ruled out an interpretation of 
the ‘I act’ as a self-manifesting ontological constitution, he says, “perhaps it is precisely 
time which is the a priori of the I—time, to be sure, in a more original sense than Kant 
was able to conceive it.”  Moreover, in the Kantbook itself, Heidegger says several things 
that make it seem as if these structures—the structure of time (now conceived of as 
“original time”) on the one hand and the structure of being-a-self on the other—are 
different, and that rather than identifying them, we should see the former as having a kind 
of priority over the latter. 
Kant’s laying of the ground for metaphysics leads to the transcendental power of 
imagination.  This is the root of both stems, sensibility and understanding.  As 
such, it makes possible the original unity of ontological synthesis.  This root, 
however, is rooted in original time [Diese Wurzel ist in der ursprünglichen Zeit 
verwurzelt].  The original ground which becomes manifest in the ground-laying is 
time.391 
 
Rather than an identity between the structure of original transcendence with the structure 
of temporality, Heidegger can seem to be suggesting a grounding relation.  Original time 
seems to be described as a distinct root which grounds the root which itself in turn 
grounds pure understanding and pure sensibility.   
     Furthermore, Heidegger says that the attempt to “show the self as temporal” cannot 
succeed, but rather that what has been shown—indeed what is “undisputed”—is that 
                                                 
390 GP 206, italics are Heidegger’s.   
391 KPM 202.   
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“time as such has the character of selfhood”392; so that the elucidation of the “temporal 
character of the subject is first permitted only on the basis of the “correctly understood 
subjective character of time”, which latter, in context, clearly refers to this same 
conception of time as having “the character of selfhood”.393   Finally it is only because 
“original time” has the “character of selfhood” that allows it to be the “ground for the 
possibility of selfhood” and what “first makes the mind into a mind”.  This is by the 
lights of my reading an exceedingly odd way of talking, even by Heideggerian standards, 
and it is hard to make sense of.   Instead of saying that original time grounds selfhood 
because it has “the character of selfhood”, whatever that could mean, why is it not 
enough to simply say that “selfhood has an essentially temporal character?”      
     This is an issue that ramifies fairly widely in interpreting Heidegger.  The key claim 
that I want to attribute to Heidegger, which would align him with the basic Fichtean 
move, is that subjectivity, being-a-self, is self-constituting.  One of the clearest 
expressions of this claim would be, for instance, in another essay from this period, “Vom 
Wesen des Grundes”: “In coming towards itself from out of a world, Dasein produces 
itself as a self [Dasein zeitigt sich als ein Selbst], i.e. as a being entrusted with having to 
be.”394  Zeitigen is a fairly common word which in ordinary usage means to produce, give 
rise to, or to bring about or result in.  The reflexive sich zeitigen is unusual, but taking the 
cue from the non-reflexive use, we can assume it means to produce itself, or to give rise 
to itself, or to bring itself about.  In my parlance, this means Dasein “constitutes” itself—
gives rise to its own Seinsverfassung as a Selbstsein through its own essential activity of 
                                                 
392 KPM 187-188.   
393 KPM 188. 
394 “Vom Wesen des Grundes” [hereafter VWG] in Wegmarken, Klostermann, 2004. p. 157. See also SZ 
365: “Sofern Dasein sich zeitigt, ist auch eine Welt.”  
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forming the horizon of transcendence, i.e. its understanding of being.  But of course 
Heidegger also wants us to note the root Zeit here, so that the standard translation is “to 
temporalize”.   This would yield, “Dasein temporalizes itself as a self”, which would 
signal that Dasein’s essential activity of imagination is “to make temporal”, i.e. to make 
subject to a priori time-determinations.  To say that this self-activity of imagination is a 
self-affecting and a self-intuiting is just to say that in so constituting itself, Dasein makes 
itself temporal.  Combining the two meanings of zeitigen, we can understand that Dasein 
gives rise to itself in and through the activity of making itself temporal.    
     The problem is that in Being and Time in particular the more typical claim is not that 
Dasein zeitigt sich but rather, die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich—which would mean that 
“temporality temporalizes itself” and then “temporality is self-constituting”.  So again, it 
can look as if “temporality” is a separate structure, as if the structure of temporality is not 
identical to the structure of Dasein’s Seinverfassung.    
     But this is, I want to maintain, a mistake.  First of all, Heidegger identifies, in Being 
and Time”, “temporality” with “original time”, on the principle, he says, of ‘a potiori fit 
denominatio’.395  Now, similarly, it seems to me, in the Kantbook, he identifies, for 
reasons we can now understand, the activity of self-constitution and the activity of 
“temporalization”.  Then, precisely on the same principle of ‘a potiori fit denominatio’, 
he identifies the transcendental imagination with “original time”.  Heidegger seems to 
proceed in this way:      
If the transcendental power of imagination, as the pure, forming faculty, in itself 
forms time—i.e. allows time to spring forth—then we cannot avoid any longer the 
thesis that the transcendental power of imagination is original time.396   
                                                 
395 See SZ 377.   
396 KPM 187; my italics.  Consider also, “das Ich so sehr ‘zeitlich’ ist, daß es die Zeit selbst ist”.    
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When Heidegger says that the “imagination is time”, or that the I or the self is time, he 
means simply, I am arguing, that original synthesis, and thus selfhood, is “temporal 
through and through”, or that “the selfhood of the self is inherently temporal”.  The 
structure of selfhood and the structure of temporality are identical.  So in the identity of 
time and pure self-affection which is at issue, “time” here means “original time”, which 
means “temporality”.  As we will see later in the discussion of Being and Time, the 
structure of being-a-self (authentically) just is “temporality”. “Dasein has the definite 
character of temporality” and “temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic 
care.”397    
     So for Heidegger, (1) and (2) are not distinct options, but rather are different ways of 
saying the same thing: Dasein, being-a-self, constitutes itself in and through its activity of 
forming the horizon of transcendence; this forming is also the forming of time, so the 
self-forming of the horizon has an essentially temporal character [Zeitcharakter].  To say 
that (original) time is pure self-affection is just to say that Dasein affects itself purely in 
virtue of temporalizing itself, in virtue of “making itself temporal”.  In temporalizing 
itself (i.e. purely), Dasein constitutes itself as temporal.     
     In spite of Heidegger’s apparent misgivings in the Grundprobleme, then, it is not 
inappropriate to call Dasein’s self-temporalization a self-intuition of the self398, i.e. an 
intuition of itself qua active entity.   This is because we have already arrived at a 
conception of the transcendental power of imagination as both spontaneous and receptive 
at the same time and in the same respect.  The self-affection which essentially belongs to 
                                                 
397 SZ 326. 
398 Though perhaps we might want to qualify this as a self-intuition of the authentic self, for reasons we 
will see later.   
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the structure of being-a-self is the self-forming of transcendence, which as we have seen, 
is essentially acquiescent and thus finite and dependent on “entities which do not have 
Dasein’s way of being”.   Intuition means “immediate relation” to an object, and human 
finite intuition is sensible because it requires being affected by objects.  But pure intuition 
means self-affection—in abstraction from experience, from affection by objects—i.e. the 
self-giving of the pure look of objectivity.  This means “pure acquiescence”, an active 
“giving oneself” over to the object in general, an actively assumed stance of receptivity.  
In assuming this stance, Dasein affects itself, makes itself temporal.  So this is indeed 
“another self-intuition” in Kant’s sense, if the “first” intuition is “what belongs to the 
receptivity of the determinable”, i.e. receptivity to other entities.  The whole point after 
all is that it is a condition of the possibility of being receptive to other entities, of 
acquiescing to other entities, that Dasein, in its own being, is purely acquiescent, that is, 
produces the pure look of objectivity from out of itself.    
     Likewise, according to this interpretation, the way of talking which suggests a 
proliferation of “roots” is simply not necessary.  Temporality is not yet another structure 
which is needed to ground the structure of transcendence in turn.  If this is the case, we 
should not understand Heidegger’s claim that “die Wurzel ist in der Zeit verwurzelt” to 
mean that the imagination as the common root is itself rooted in time so that there is more 
than one root here, but rather that imagination is “intertwined with” and indeed 
inextricable from time and temporality.  The imagination and temporality are “deeply 
ingrained” in each other.  The structure of transcendence is in and of itself temporal; it 
“already” manifests the structure of temporality.   
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     If this is the case, Heidegger could insist on the same minor emendation of the locus 
classicus which Fichte makes, namely that the self-intuition of self-activity 
(“determining” in time, “temporalization”) need not be conceived of as “intuited” in any 
sense prior to the activity itself.  Heidegger’s addition to this point of view—beyond 
Fichte’s—would be the insistence that self-activity and thus self-constitution are only 
possible because the activity in question is essentially temporal.  So in the putatively 
problematic passages alluded to above, we can say that time is what “first makes the 
mind into a mind” not because the structure of temporality somehow exists independently 
of and thus grounds the structure of transcendence, but precisely because the “mind” here 
is self-constituting through its self-temporalizing activity.  Being-a-self is “first” what it 
is in virtue of and on the basis of its self-affecting activity; there is no “mind” before or 
independent from the activity.  This is enough, it seems to me, to make the point here.  In 
forming the horizon, Dasein is giving itself an essentially temporal character—or, as we 
will see in a minute, the care-structure, which is inherently temporal—which is just what 
it is to be Dasein.  Dasein’s transcendence has the (itself temporal) structure of “care”.   
This is entirely in accord with the Fichtean claim that subjectivity—being-a-self, is sui 
generis and self-constituting.  A perhaps more conspicuous way of putting the 
Heideggerian point, though, is that Dasein’s unique mode of being as existence is self-
constituting.  But to see this we need to leave the explicit interpretation of Kant behind 
and turn to the metaphysics of Dasein in Being and Time.399            
                                                 
399 I don’t think these considerations are exactly decisive.  As I say, this strikes me as a specific case of a 
quite general interpretative difficulty regarding the “early” Heidegger.  I think there is a genuine persistent 
ambiguity here, which points to a kind of equivocation on Heidegger’s part.  I am arguing here for one 
possible disambiguating interpretation which is coherent, fits the text to a large extent, and highlights the 
affinities I want to focus on.  But I haven’t done complete justice to the countervailing way of talking, 
whereby, e.g., saying that temporality has the character of selfhood rather than saying that selfhood is 
inherently temporal somehow points to a more “originary” truth.   The fact is that these locutions perhaps 
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2)  The Metaphysics of Dasein in Being and Time 
 
In this section, I want to sketch the links between Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant as a 
fundamental ontologist and his own fundamental-ontological project in Being and Time.  
As we have seen, the centerpiece of the Kantbook is the foregrounding of transcendental 
imagination as the common root and thus as the essence of transcendence.   
But “imagination” seems entirely absent from Being and Time, and talk of 
“transcendence”, though present, does not at all occupy there the central place it does in 
the Kantbook.  And yet in “On the Essence of Ground”, Heidegger remarks in a footnote 
that what he has published so far on “Being and Time” “has no other task than a 
concrete-unveiling projection of transcendence”.400   And indeed the very title of part 
one, which apart from the introduction comprises all of what was published of the book, 
refers to the “explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being”.  
  
     
                                                                                                                                                 
point to a more Hegelian framework and influence which I am not pursuing here.  Crudely put, the 
structure of temporality could be understood as an analogue of the structure of Hegelian Geist, in the way—
very roughly now—in which the “deepest” claim that “temporality has the structure of selfhood” would be 
reminiscent of Hegel’s claim that “substance has the structure of subjectivity”, i.e. a kind of Spinozistic-
monism of time, in which each Dasein is grounded in some larger structure which exceeds it, and in which 
it is a kind of “mere” microcosm of the larger process.  I say Heidegger equivocates here, but he might 
actually mean something like this, at least in an inchoate form.  And in fact it could be that these sorts of 
considerations are what motivate Heidegger to later forswear “fundamental ontology” in favor of a “history 
of being”.  It might be that it is precisely my way of reading the texts of this period that he later wants to 
eschew.  It seems right that however we understand this move, or the change from the early to the late 
Heidegger, it involves precisely giving up on, or at least severely downplaying, the “transcendentalism” 
that I am identifying in the works of this period.  But it is enough that it is in fact there.  And in 
downplaying the other tendency my reading of Heidegger would be no more “violent” than Heidegger’s of 
Kant, namely in focusing on what—by my lights—he should have said.   
400 VWG, 162fn.   
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a)  Understanding, Existence, and Self-Constitution 
 
Heidegger himself starts, however briefly, to make these linkages toward the end of the 
Kantbook.  There, he explicitly identifies the “transcendence of Dasein” with being-in-
the-world and the “unity of the transcendental structure” with care.  In general, 
Heidegger’s word for “transcendence” within the fundamental-ontological project of 
Being and Time is “disclosure” or “disclosedness” [Erschlossenheit].  Remember that 
Dasein’s distinctive “transcendence” in the Kantbook meant that Dasein transcends 
entities towards their being in already having an understanding of being 
[Seinsverständnis], even if a “pre”-ontological one.  The project there of unveiling the 
essence of transcendence meant that we were trying to understand Dasein’s being such 
that it becomes intelligible how Dasein is capable of such transcendence towards the 
being of entities.   
Dasein is an entity [which is] ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very 
being, that being is an issue for it…And this means further that there is some way 
in which Dasein understands itself in its being…It is peculiar to this entity that 
with and through its being, this being is disclosed to it.  Understanding of being is 
itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s being [and so] it is ontological…what 
we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein’s “being-ontological” is to be 
designated as something “pre-ontological”…[it signifies] “being in such a way 
that one has an understanding of being”.401 
 
The answer in the Kantbook was that Dasein is able to transcend entities toward their 
being in virtue of the ontological-synthetic activity of the transcendental power of 
imagination which forms the (temporal) horizon within which all entities could be 
encountered as such.  It is my contention here that the structure of transcendence formed 
by imagination as elaborated in the Kantbook is isomorphic with the structure of pre-
                                                 
401 SZ 12. 
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ontological disclosedness formed by the understanding [das Verstehen402] as elaborated 
in Being and Time.  As Dasein is able to transcend in virtue of the imagination in the one 
case, Dasein is able to have an understanding of being [Seinsverständnis] because the 
understanding [das Verstehen] is a fundamental existentiale and thus a “basic mode of 
Dasein’s being”, in the other case.403  The function of the understanding in Being and 
Time takes the place of the function of the “power of imagination” in the Kantbook.404 
     The structural similarities are evident in ¶ 31 of Being and Time.  Heidegger says that 
the understanding was implicit throughout the entire prior discussion of significance and 
the referential totality of availability [Zuhandenheit] which constitutes the worldhood of 
the world; that is, Dasein understands itself, “primarily and for the most part” in terms of 
its everyday dealings with available entities within the world.  “In the ‘for-the-sake-of-
which’, existing being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness is called 
understanding.”405  But the main theme of the section is the elucidation of understanding 
in terms of Dasein’s “ability-to-be [Seinkönnen]”; “In understanding lies existentially the 
kind of being that Dasein has, as ability-to-be”406.  All of Dasein’s understanding—both 
of itself and its world—is articulated in terms of the possibilities that the world affords 
and thus in terms of its possible ways to be (-in-the-world).  Heidegger says that 
“understanding is the being of such ability-to-be” and so the understanding is a 
                                                 
402 Notice that Heidegger uses a different term than Kant [der Verstand]. 
403 Of course, Verstehen as an existentiale is equiprimordial with another existentiale, namely 
Befindlichkeit, or “state of mind”, to which belong our “moods”, fundamental and otherwise.  I will be 
focusing solely on Verstehen here, but I will have to say a word about Befindlichkeit in a moment. 
404 Of course, this way of talking is predicated on my own order of presentation of the texts, not the 
chronological order.  The Kantbook post-dates Being and Time by about two years.   
405 SZ 143.   
406 SZ 143. 
  
231
“disclosive ability-to-be.”  Indeed, Dasein is its possibilities—understood existentially—
so Dasein is its “existential possibilities”.    
     In the Grundprobleme, Heidegger notes: 
Being is indeed also already unveiled in the understanding of being.  However, 
Dasein as existing doesn’t comport itself directly to being as such, not even to its 
own being as such in the sense that it would understand this ontologically, but 
rather Dasein is occupied with its own ability-to-be, and this ability-to-be is 
understood primarily as the ability-to-be of the being that I myself am.407   
 
That is, in any understanding of being, I am comporting myself to my own being and to 
the being of other entities always primarily through my ability-to-be, which means an 
understanding of the possibilities that the world affords me and thus in terms of the 
possible ways in which I “can be” in the world.  Now, Heidegger says that the 
understanding has in itself the structure of “projection”.  That is, the activity of 
understanding is precisely a matter of forming or framing those possibilities for myself.  
The understanding is the self-forming of Dasein’s own ability-to-be, which we can 
understand as the horizon within which Dasein understands its possibilities, its possible 
ways to be. In this forming of my ability-to-be, I can say that I am “imagining the 
possibilities” that the world, and my concrete situation within it, is now affording me, I 
am “picturing” the possibilities.   
     Heidegger had described the imagination in the Kantbook as the forming of a 
Spielraum within which entities could be encountered as the entities they are “in their 
own right”; and had written that “to hold oneself in advance in such a play-space, to form 
it originally, is none other than the transcendence which marks all finite comportment to 
beings”.  This language is carried over in the discussion of the projecting understanding.  
                                                 
407 GP 456-457.  
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“Projection is the existential constitution of the being of the play-space of factical ability-
to-be”.  In Being and Time, all comportment to entities within the world presupposes that 
the understanding forms its ability-to-be within the “imaginative” play-space in which the 
possibilities for being that the world affords show themselves. 
Because the understanding…is not just a type of knowing, but on the contrary is 
primarily a basic moment of existing in general, the explicit implementation 
[Vollzug] of projecting…must necessarily be construction.408     
   
    But, of course, this projection of possibilities is always, Heidegger says, “thrown”;   
that is, the imagining of possibilities formed in understanding one’s ability-to-be is never 
arbitrary, haphazard or “free-floating”, but rather precisely arises out of and is sensitive to 
the constraints of the factical situation.  The understanding is a “thrown projecting”.  This 
exactly mirrors the structure of transcendental imagination as simultaneously spontaneous 
and receptive.  In projecting possibilities onto the world, i.e. in “constructing” or creating 
possibilities for myself, I am also making myself beholden to the possibilities that the 
world actually affords in this situation.  “Projection, in throwing, throws before itself the 
possibility as possibility, and lets it be as such.”409  Understanding is an imagining or 
constructing of possibilities which are “delivered over to” or acquiescent to the world 
itself and the “actual” possibilities that it affords. 
     Lastly, understanding in its projective character, Heidegger says, “existentially 
constitutes [macht aus]” Dasein’s “sight [Sicht]”.410  He is referring here to the cluster of 
concepts which had been elaborated in the discussion of the worldhood of the world and 
of being-with.  Available [zuhanden] entities within the world—equipment—are objects 
                                                 
408 KPM 232-233. 
409 SZ 145, my emphasis. 
410 SZ 146.  
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of Dasein’s “concern [Besorgen]”, and our dealings with such objects “has its own kind 
of sight” which Heidegger calls “circumspection [Umsicht]”.  Likewise, our 
comportments to other “Daseins”—other human beings—are defined by our “solicitude 
[Fürsorge]”, which is in turn guided by a “kind of sight” which Heidegger calls 
“considerateness and forbearance [Rücksicht und Nachsicht]”.411  These are all ways in 
which other entities, both items of equipment and other human beings, are made 
encounterable as the particular type of entities they are.  Heidegger says that “all sight is 
[in its existential signification] grounded primarily in understanding”; and:  
In giving an existential signification to ‘sight’, we have merely drawn upon the 
peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets entities which are accessible to it to be 
encountered unconcealedly in themselves…we may formalize sight and seeing 
enough to obtain thereby a universal term for characterizing every access to 
entities and to being, as access in general.412 
 
Again, this is precisely the function of imagination as the essence of transcendence as 
described in the Kantbook.  The structure of transcendence, as “self-orienting turning-
toward which lets stand-in-opposition”, was intended precisely to make intelligible our 
access [Zugang] in general to objects qua objects.  The “existential kind of sight” which 
belongs to understanding has an inherent affinity to the “looks” which belong to the 
power of imagination.  They are both that on the basis of which Dasein has “access” to 
other entities, indeed to the being of other entities.  Comporting oneself to other entities 
“understandingly” is a matter of either circumpective concern or considerate (or 
forbearing) solicitude.  These forms of sight make possible Dasein’s first “seeing”—
encountering as such—available entities and other human beings as such; just as the 
imagination’s “pure looks” were conceived of as a sketching-out of the horizon of the 
                                                 
411 SZ 123.  
412 SZ 147, my italics.  
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range of possible empirical looks.  In a telling passage in the Kantbook which makes 
these affinities completely clear, Heidegger writes,  
The transcendental power of imagination projects, forming in advance the totality 
of possibilities in terms of which it “looks out” [“hinaussieht”], in order thereby 
to hold before itself the horizon within which the knowing self, and not only this, 
acts.413   
 
     The connection between the role of transcendental imagination in the Kantbook and 
the role of understanding in Being and Time, then, allows us to see how the crucial claim 
regarding self-constitution is expressed in the latter text.  “Existence” is the name 
Heidegger gives in Being and Time for Dasein’s sui generis mode of being.  So in 
understanding itself now in terms of its ability-to-be, Dasein constitutes itself as 
“existing”.  “The question of existence never gets straightened out except through 
existing itself”414, that is, in Dasein’s forming of an understanding of itself in terms of the 
possible ways for it to be in the world.  We can say that Dasein’s existence is self-
constituting, because Dasein is its possibilities which are formed within its understanding 
of its own ability-to-be.  Thus Dasein precisely determines itself, its own existence, in the 
forming of the possible ways in which it can be.  Heidegger says, “in determining itself as 
an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, 
in its very being, it somehow understands.”415  If Heidegger says that “by ‘existentiality’ 
we understand the constitution of the being [Seinsverfassung] of entities that exist” and 
that “the question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself”, 
this means that in existing, Dasein “realizes” its own existentiality; and since 
                                                 
413 KPM 154-155, my italics. 
414 SZ 12. 
415 SZ 43.  
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existentiality is the constitution of its being, Dasein constitutes its own being.  Dasein’s 
existence is self-constituting.    
     I will return in a moment to a comparison of Heidegger’s sense of the self-constitution 
of Dasein with Fichte’s, but I want to re-iterate here that for Heidegger, the structure of 
understanding which gives Dasein’s existence its self-constituting character is “thrown 
projecting”.  This means that understanding is as “receptive” as it is “spontaneous”.  
Furthermore, our understanding is for Heidegger equiprimordial with our “state-of-mind 
[Befindlichkeit]”, that is, with our “moods”; so both are co-constitutive of Dasein’s mode 
being.  Heidegger says that a “state-of-mind always has its understanding… 
understanding always has its mood.”416   There are two points to be made here.  Firstly, 
though it’s true that Heidegger’s account of state-of-mind emphasizes much more our 
“receptivity”—we characteristically simply “find ourselves” with or to be in a certain 
mood—and moods thus epitomize in a way our “facticity”, the fact that we are “delivered 
over” to being and thrown into existence, Heidegger doesn’t think that even our moods 
exactly “determine” us in any way.  Though we necessarily simply find ourselves in a 
mood, this means merely that we are never “moodless”, not that we have no control over 
our moods.417  Ostensibly, even if any change in mood is always only to, as Heidegger 
says, a “counter-mood”, the extent to which we have control over our moods will accrue 
to the fact that they are always accompanied by an understanding.  Secondly, even if 
Dasein is constituted partially by its state-of-mind—meaning that I cannot “choose to be 
moodless”—even if, that is, the fact that Dasein is always “saddled” with a mood and in 
this regard is “wholly thrown”, this fact does not threaten the claim that because Dasein 
                                                 
416 SZ 142.   
417 See the discussion at SZ 136. 
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is partially constituted by its understanding, the “spontaneity” of Dasein’s self-
constituting “activity” is absolutely essential.  The main point is after all that the essence 
of Dasein’s transcendence is that it is both spontaneous and receptive at the same time 
and in the same respect.418   
 
b)  Selfhood and Care 
 
Heidegger is entirely explicit in the Kantbook that what he and Kant share is a 
fundamental ontology whose central concern is an account of the “ontological 
constitution of the subjectivity of the subject”, and thus an ontological interpretation of 
selfhood and of being-a-self.   We have seen that within Being and Time, the former two 
terms—‘subjectivity’ and ‘the subject’—are exclusively understood within the context of 
a traditional ontological picture which construes the subject as a kind of thing-like 
substance, and thus avoided.  And the latter two terms—‘selfhood’ and ‘being-a-self’—
do not, at first reading, seem to hold the central place and to play the essential structural 
role that they do in the Kantbook.  But they are absolutely pervasive throughout Being 
                                                 
418 These remarks are à propos of some recent discussions of Heidegger’s debate with Cassirer at Davos.  
As Peter Gordon, for instance, makes clear in his illuminating book Continental Divide: Heidegger, 
Cassirer, Davos (Harvard, 2010), one of the main issues, if not the issue, at stake in this polemical 
exchange is precisely the issue of spontaneity and receptivity.   It’s true that, as Gordon points out, and as 
Carman has emphasized in his “Heidegger’s Anti-Neo-Kantianism” [in Philosophical Forum, Vol. 41, Nos. 
1 & 2 (Spring/Summer 2010): 131-142], Heidegger is very much interested in resisting the neo-Kantian 
tendency to downplay or dismiss the role of receptivity in Kant in favor of a thorough-going spontaneity.  I 
agree—this is why Heidegger emphasizes the acquiescence of transcendence the way he does—but I don’t 
think we should let this polemical context allow us to throw the baby out with the bath-water, as it were.  
Heidegger is not simply taking the contrary view, or making the “opposite” mistake, i.e. attributing all of 
Dasein’s constitution to receptivity rather than spontaneity.  It is important to maintain the sense in which 
Dasein’s “activity” is “spontaneous” not least in order to preserve the absolutely fundamental ontological 
asymmetry between Dasein’s mode of being and the mode of being of “things”.  
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and Time.  In this section I will indicate briefly this pervasiveness and thus how we can 
understand “selfhood” as a core concept within the latter text.   
     Unfortunately, as we have seen already, the section which promises to contain an 
explicit discussion and positive characterization of selfhood, ¶64, is mostly taken up with 
the negative critique of Kant; we are told that and why Kant “has by no means achieved 
an ontological interpretation of selfhood”.  But the point of this section is of course not at 
all to thereby abandon or dismiss the possibility of such an “ontological interpretation of 
selfhood”, but precisely to indicate how it is to be properly understood.  Since “the self 
belongs to the essential determinations of Dasein, while Dasein’s ‘essence’ lies in 
existence, then I-hood and selfhood must be conceived existentially”; and the task then 
becomes to “clarify the existentiality of the self”.419    
     First and foremost, this means understanding the selfhood of Dasein as a “being-in-
the-world”.   Of course, the thoroughly anti-Cartesian import of this claim that is the 
focus of most interpretations—that Dasein is not an isolated thinking thing in need of 
reconstructing its relationship to an external world—is completely apparent and 
appropriate.  But we are in a position now to see this claim through the lens of 
Heidegger’s idealist appropriation of Kant.  Being-in-the-world also means being among 
other entities whose mode of being is not mine, whose being I did not create, yet whose 
being I already understand.  It thus signals the finitude and dependence of being-a-self, 
and its essentially acquiescent nature.  This means that “the world belongs to being-a-self 
as being-in-the-world”420.  The indispensible point here is: Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
means being-a-self-in-the-world.  “In saying I, I have in view the entity which in each 
                                                 
419 SZ 318.  
420 SZ 146, my italics: “Welt gehört zu seinem Selbstsein als In-der-Welt-sein”. 
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case I am as an I-am-in-the-world…In saying I, Dasein expresses itself as being-in-the-
world.”421    
      This means that Dasein’s understanding has what we can call a hermeneutic-holistic 
structure.  Any understanding—and thus interpretation—of the world is at the same time 
an understanding and interpretation of the self—more specifically, possible ways of 
being-a-self.422  Likewise, any self-interpretation includes at the same time an 
interpretation of the world in terms of the possibilities that it affords.  As Heidegger says 
in the Grundprobleme, “[w]orld-understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-
understanding.  Self and world belong together in the one entity, in Dasein”.423  That 
Dasein is a being-in-the-world means that “the phenomenon of the world co-determines 
the constitution of the being of the I”424; this is already understood in conceiving of 
Dasein’s projective understanding as acquiescent to the world, as thrown.   But the self is 
always there too in any interpretation: because the “interpretation of self belongs to 
Dasein’s being.”425  While it is true that the “everyday” interpretation of the self has a 
tendency to understand itself wholly in terms of the world with which it is concerned, so 
that in “the ‘natural’ ontical way of talking of the I, the phenomenal content of the Dasein 
                                                 
421 SZ 321.  
422 This “hermeneutic holism”—that every self-interpretation or self-conception involves an interpretation 
or conception of the world and vice-versa—must sound a distinctly Hegelian note; and indeed, this 
represents another of the many ways in which Heidegger’s thought can be seen as drawing from the post-
Kantian Idealist tradition in general.  As already indicated (in the discussion of the relationship between 
subjectivity and temporality), there are also indications of Hegelian moments in this period which I am not 
exploring here.  Again, a fuller treatment of my topic would require including Hegel in the story as well.  
423 GP 422; see also 250: “World-understanding [Weltverstehen] is at the same time an understanding-of-
itself by Dasein [ein Sich-selbst-verstehen des Daseins]” 
424 SZ 321.   
425 SZ 312.   
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which is meant by [saying] I gets overlooked…this gives no justification for the 
ontological interpretation of the I to join in on the oversight”426.   
     Now, of course much of the Daseinsanalytik in Being and Time is given over to the 
claim that Dasein’s being-in-the-world has the (temporal) structure of what Heidegger 
calls “care”.  Simply put, this claim is that Dasein’s (projective) understanding of being—
both its own and that of other entities—is grounded in the ways in which the world 
matters to it.   But the world matters to Dasein not least because Dasein’s own being—
that is, being-a-self—matters to it; its own being is always an issue for it.  Again, 
Heidegger says that “care expresses itself with ‘I’”; and that “selfhood is to be discerned 
existentially only in one’s authentic ability-to-be-a-self [Selbstseinkönnen]—that is to 
say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s being as care.”427  The structure of care is the 
structure of the ability-to-be-a-self.  “Care already contains [birgt…in sich] the 
phenomena of selfhood”428; and “when fully conceived, the structure of care comprises 
[schließt…ein] the phenomenon of selfhood”429.  
    “In sich bergen” is a very interesting locution here, because beyond the simple 
meaning of “contains”, it can also mean—and it seems eminently plausible that 
Heidegger wants to evoke all of these meanings at once—“to protect” or “to rescue”—“to 
provide harbor in itself”—implying that conceiving of Dasein’s being as care is a way to 
recover being-a-self from the traditional ontological conception of it as a thing-like 
substance.  But it also implies a “hiding away”; as if (even the proper) conception of 
                                                 
426 SZ 322.  
427 Ibid., my italics.  
428 SZ 318, my italics.   
429 SZ 323, my italics.  
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Dasein’s being as care also serves to obscure or conceal the fact that Dasein’s being is 
also, after all, a being-a-self.  To say that a “fully conceived” care-structure amounts to 
the structure of Dasein’s being-a-self is to say that the care-structure as Heidegger 
elucidates it is as such elliptical.   Heidegger defines the care-structure as follows: 
The formally existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole must 
therefore be contained in the following structure: the being of Dasein means 
already-ahead-of-itself-being-in-(the-world) as being-among (entities encountered 
within the world).  This being satisfies the meaning of the term care, which is 
used purely ontologico-existentially.430 
 
“Fully conceived”, then, this structure reads “being-a-self-(which-is)-already-ahead-of-
itself etc.”  The phenomenon of selfhood is at were hidden away by the structure as 
Heidegger characteristically elucidates it.  It is true, as Heidegger says, that “care does 
not need a foundation [Fundierung] in a self”; but this is just because properly and fully 
construed, being-a-self is care, or “has the structure of care”. 
     Selfhood [Selbstheit], and being-a-self [Selbstsein], then, is a pervasive and 
fundamental concept within the metaphysics of Dasein in Being and Time as a whole.  
Heidegger’s existential “theory of selfhood” can be outlined in the following manner.  
Heidegger says that “Dasein’s selfhood [is] defined formally as a way of existing”.431  
There are two formal, a priori aspects or features of Dasein’s selfhood.  The first is 
“existentiality”, which we have already discussed.  Dasein is the entity for whom being 
(including its own) is an issue, and as such, it is never something merely occurrent 
[vorhanden], but fundamentally characterized by “possible ways for it to be”.  The 
second feature—mineness [Jemeinigkeit]—is closely intertwined with the first.  
Heidegger says the being of Dasein is “in each case mine”.  The being which is at issue in 
                                                 
430 SZ 192. 
431 SZ 267, first italics mine.  
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the ability-to-be-a-self is in each case Dasein’s own being, and the possible ways of 
existing are in each case Dasein’s own.  In existing, I am delivered over to my being, my 
ability-to-be, and my understanding of the latter thus defines my possibilities and my 
possible ways to be. 
     These features define the formal a priori structure of Dasein’s existence, the 
“existentiality of the self”.  Heidegger calls this the structure, admittedly potentially 
confusingly, the “authentic self” [das eigentliche Selbst], and it is this sense of selfhood 
which is “discerned in one’s authentic ability-to-be-a-self [eigentliches 
Selbstseinkönnen]”.  But existence “never gets straightened out except through existing 
itself”, so in fact there are two fundamental possible existentiell ways of existing, and 
thus of being-a-self, i.e. either authentically or inauthentically.432   “As modes of being, 
authenticity and inauthenticity…are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever 
is characterized by mineness”.433  We can say: it is the fact that Dasein is formally and a 
priori an “authentic self”, that is, is existentially defined by mineness—the ability-to-be-
a-self—that grounds the two possible existentiell, factical ways of being-a-self—namely 
authentic being-a-self and inauthentic being-a-self.   
     Now, of course, firstly and for the most part, Dasein in its everydayness exists as an 
inauthentic self.  “The question of the ‘who’ of Dasein has been answered with the 
expression ‘self’…[but] for the most part I myself am not the ‘who’ of Dasein, but rather 
the they-self [das Man-selbst]”.434  This is to say that in my everyday comportment to 
available entities with which I am concerned and to other Dasein with whom I am 
                                                 
432 SZ 12: “The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.  The 
understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call ‘existentiell’.” 
433 SZ 43. 
434 SZ 267. 
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“solicitous”—considerate or forbearing—according to anonymous public and culturally 
inherited norms and practices, I am simply acting “as one acts” under the circumstances; I 
am understanding the possibilities that the world affords in a way which is “indifferent” 
to my own particular and individualized ability-to-be .  Heidegger says here that Dasein 
has an “undifferentiated character”.  The possibilities I am sensitive to in these contexts 
are simply the possibilities available to “anyone” under these circumstances.  In so 
comporting myself, Heidegger says that I am “absorbed” in the world and in what I am 
doing.  In such everyday concernful comportment, Dasein “flees in the face of itself into 
the ‘they’”.   In such cases, the self—‘I myself’, the authentic self—is, Heidegger says, 
either “lost” or “forgotten”.   The latter expression is perhaps the more perspicacious; I 
am simply neglecting or not paying attention to my self and my own particularized 
ability-to-be in such contexts.  But neither expression should be understood to mean that 
the self has “gone out of existence”.435  What inauthentic Dasein has “lost” is its 
authentic-ability-to-be-itself, that is, of understanding itself according to its “ownmost” 
possibilities.  Das Man-Selbst is not any kind of strange collective entity which replaces 
the authentic self in everyday comportment, but rather the way in which the (authentic) 
self, or the self authentically understood, understands itself in everyday comportment.  It 
is a way of comporting which is a “fleeing into” or “falling back on” the average 
possibilities that the world affords according to public and inherited norms, in which the 
self says ‘I’ “fugitively”.      
   Heidegger says:  
                                                 
435 In passing, these remarks show how misleading Dreyfus’ latest way of talking about “expert or absorbed 
coping” is, insofar as his view is supposed to still be an expression of a Heideggerian view.  By the “latest 
way of talking” I mean, for instance, his 2005 APA Pacific Division Presidential Address and the 
subsequent exchange with McDowell published in Inquiry Vol. 50, No. 4.  See also fn. 460 below.    
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It has been shown that proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself but is 




Authentic being-a-self [das eigentliche Selbstsein] takes the definite form of an 
existentiell modification of das Man.437 
 
While most commentators on Being and Time are willing to assert that Heidegger is 
simply contradicting himself here438, we can see that there is no contradiction if we keep 
in mind the distinction between the formal existential structure of Dasein’s mineness—
the fact that Dasein’s being is fundamentally characterized by its ability-to-be-a-self—
and the factical existentiell possibilities it grounds—the possibility of both authentically 
being-a-self and of inauthentically being-a-self (or a “they-self”).   That the existential 
structure of Dasein’s understanding as ability-to-be-a-self grounds the possibility of 
inauthentically being a they-self means that the latter is an existentiell modification—a 
mode of being—of the former.   And because Dasein exists—understands itself—for the 
most part as a they-self, authentically being-a-self will always be an existentiell 
modification of such inauthentically-being-a-self.   None of which of course threatens the 
status of das Man as itself an existentiale.   
                                                 
436 SZ 317, my italics.  
437 SZ 267, my italics.  
438 The idea that there is a contradiction here is in evidence in a series of articles in Inquiry debating 
Dreyfus’ claim that das Man is the source of all intelligibility for Heidegger, primarily between Frederick 
Olafson, who attacks Dreyfus’ reading on a number of counts, and Taylor Carman, who is largely 
defending Dreyfus here.  See Olafson, “Heidegger à la Wittgenstein or ‘Coping’ with Professor Dreyfus” 
in Inquiry, 37, 45-64; Carman, “On Being Social: a Reply to Olafson” 37, 203-23; Olafson, “Individualism, 
Subjectivity, and Presence: a Response to Taylor Carman” 37, 331-7.  Dreyfus himself later contributes to 
this debate with “Interpreting Heidegger on Das Man”, 38, 423-30.   Dreyfus in particular explicitly 
acknowledges a contradiction and claims then that “we must simply choose” one and discard the other.  I 
discuss these issues in depth in an unpublished article “Intelligibility, Authenticity & Selfhood”. 
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This undifferentiated character of Dasein’s everydayness is not nothing, but a 
positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity.  Out of this kind of being [into 
being-a-self-authentically]—and back into it again—is all existing, such as it is.439 
 
What is important here, and what is hopefully by now clear, is that Dasein’s existing is 
always a matter of being-a-self, of one kind or another.   
 
c)  Care and the Unity of “Reason” 
 
There is one final feature of Heidegger’s conception of selfhood which is shared with 
Fichte’s idealist conception of subjectivity.  We have seen how Fichte thought that 
displaying the structure of the self-constituting character of the I was already enough to 
show how theoretical and practical subjectivity—and “reason” in its theoretical and 
practical employments—are essentially unified.  Heidegger too thinks that his analysis of 
the structure of Dasein’s existence as care demonstrates the unity between theoretical and 
practical comportment.   
     That addressing the unity of theoretical and practical conceptions of subjectivity is a 
concern of Heidegger’s is evident in his interpretation of Kant.  We have seen that 
Heidegger “risked” an interpretation in which the transcendental power of imagination is 
the origin not only theoretical reason but also practical reason.  Furthermore, in a 
somewhat cryptic marginal note in the Kantbook, Heidegger remarks that the third 
Critique, whose importance for this issue we have already discussed (particularly the 
claim regarding beauty as the symbol of morality in §59), bolsters his interpretation.  He 
writes that in forming his interpretation of Kant initially, he had considered and consulted 
                                                 
439 SZ 43.   
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the third Critique only “far enough to be able to see that it is not contradicted”; but that, 
after presumably considering it further, he finds in §59 of that work “the highest 
confirmation of the interpretation”.440   In discussing precisely this section in the first 
chapter, I showed how it represents the last and best attempt Kant makes at solving the 
problem of the unity of reason.  There, the “freedom of the imagination” was seen as a 
way of seeing the “supersensible that grounds nature” as related to the “supersensible that 
grounds (practical) freedom”, so that what I called the spontaneity of aesthetic freedom 
gave us a way to see the spontaneity involved in theoretical reason as analogous to the 
spontaneity involves in practical reason.  This made some headway in addressing the 
most intractable sense of the unity of reason for Kant, namely in providing a unified 
account of ourselves as both knowers and doers.   But for reasons I gave there, the 
connection could not go beyond that of an analogy, because even though reason in all its 
employments is understood as a self-activity, Kant remained barred from equating the 
spontaneity involved in theoretical knowledge with the spontaneity of practical freedom.  
In seeing the structures of both theoretical reason and of practical reason as rooted in the 
structure of transcendental power of imagination as spontaneous receptivity and receptive 
spontaneity, Heidegger saw a way through this problem.   
     Indeed, in the Grundprobleme, Heidegger identifies the failure to solve the problem of 
the unity of reason, to “determine originally the unity of the theoretical and the practical 
I”, as the “essential flaw in the problem of the I in Kant”.441   Heidegger here discusses 
Kant’s dual conception of the I as personalitas transcendentalis—the theoretical I—and 
as personalitas moralis—the practical I—and, admitting that the latter at least receives 
                                                 
440 Included as appendix I in newer editions.  KPM 250, my italics.   
441 GP 207.   
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some “ontological determination” as an end in itself, says that the “whole of the entity 
that we ourselves are [das Ganze des Seienden, das wir selbst sind]…and the mode of 
being of [its] original wholeness, remains ontologically in the dark.”442 
     It is precisely the goal of Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein, as it was for Fichte, to 
show the “wholeness and unity” in the mode of being of the entity that we ourselves are.      
In Being and Time, Heidegger remarks that  
‘Theory’ and ‘Practice’ are possibilities for being [Seinsmöglichkeiten] of an 
entity whose being must be defined as “care”.   
 
Care, as an original structural whole, lies existentially a priori “before”—and this 
means always already “in”—every factical “comportment” and “situation” of 
Dasein.  So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of “practical” 
comportment over the theoretical.443   
 
It is interesting here that Heidegger denies holding any kind of doctrine of the “primacy 
of the practical”, particularly given the emphasis in Being and Time itself on 
comportment to available entities over “knowing” the world as occurrent; indeed 
“knowing the world” is described as a “founded” mode of being-in-the-world, whereas 
practical comportment is not.  The Grundprobleme is perhaps more clear about why this 
is.  Both theoretical comportments toward the world—e.g. in all attempts to grasp entities 
within the world conceptually, in all attempts at explanation and clarification, in all 
attempts, in short, to know the world in the ordinary cognitive sense—and “practical-
technical” comportments—e.g. in all concernful everyday dealings with available 
“equipment”—are grounded in the disclosive activity of understanding as thrown 
projection.     
                                                 
442 GP 208.   
443 SZ 19.   
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In all comportment toward entities—whether it is specifically cognitive, which is 
most frequently called theoretical, or whether it is practical-technical—an 
understanding of being [Verständnis von Sein] is involved…Thus what is required 
is to find a sufficiently original concept of understanding [Verstehen] from which 
alone not only all modes of cognition but every comportment which relates itself 
to entities sightfully and circumspectively [sichtig-umsichtig] can be conceived in 
a fundamental way.444  
 
The activity of understanding as thrown projecting, like the transcendental power of 
imagination in the Kant-interpretation, in making possible all pre-ontological 
understanding of the being of entities, and thus all disclosive access to entities as such, is 
just this “sufficiently original concept of understanding”.  It is on the basis of this self-
forming of the horizon of transcendence that Dasein comports itself to any entity as such, 
indeed to the being of any entity, either as available or occurrent.  “Insofar as the 
understanding is a basic determination of existence, it is as such the condition of the 
possibility for all comportment, not only practical but also cognitive”.445 
     So the unity and wholeness of Dasein, of its possibilities to be both a knower and a 
doer, is grounded in the structure of its disclosive thrown-projecting activity of 
understanding, and thus in care.  This is not to assign a priority to “the practical”; both 
are equally possibilities for care, on the same level, as it were.  Despite the emphasis in 
Being and Time on the ways in which theoretical attitudes—comporting to entities as 
occurrent—sometimes result from “breakdowns” in one’s everyday comportment to those 
entities as available, the occurrentness of entities which makes such attitudes possible is 
not exclusively grounded in their “prior” availability.  These represent two possible ways 
of disclosing entities, and thus represent two possible ways for Dasein to be, i.e. a 
“knower” or a “doer”.   Both possibilities are grounded in care, so the possibility of 
                                                 
444 GP 390.  
445 GP 392.  
  
248
“knowing the world” is something that can matter to Dasein as well as the possibility of 





3)  Selfhood and Selbständigkeit: Heidegger’s Idealism 
 
This chapter has so far been devoted to displaying the affinities between Heidegger’s 
conception of selfhood and Fichte’s conception of subjectivity.  These affinities amount 
to Heidegger’s acceptance of the first constellation of claims that constituted Fichte’s 
idealism, that is, his “transcendentalism”.  Heidegger maintains, along with Fichte, that 
human subjectivity is an ontologically sui generis mode of being distinguished through its 
being self-constituting.  Additionally, the structure of subjectivity yields a unity “of the 
whole being”, that is, a unity which makes sense of both its theoretical and practical 
capacities.  But Heidegger also says of course that his interpretation of Kant, and a 
fortiori his understanding of his own fundamental-ontological project, “moves in the 
opposite direction from German Idealism”.  In this final section I want to elucidate this 
claim.  In particular, I want to show how and why Heidegger rejects the substance of 
Fichte’s claims regarding the self-sufficiency of reason and of subjectivity.  But in my 
discussion of Fichte, I focused in fact on the various ambiguities in the latter’s claims 
about the consequences of “transcendentalism”, which stood as obstacles to any 
interpretation of what exactly is supposed to be meant by the further idealist claims 
regarding self-sufficiency.  So, put more precisely, I will argue that Heidegger’s 
transcendentalism equips us with crucial distinctions which allow us to disambiguate 
these claims, and thus show that the strong interpretations of the idealist claims regarding 
self-sufficiency cannot possibly be true, or do not follow from the transcendentalist 
claims in the way Fichte seems to think they do.   
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     I identified the following ambiguities in Fichte’s idealism.  The first had to do with the 
sense of mind-dependence which was supposed to follow from the fact of the 
“transcendental circle”.  The second regarded what Fichte meant by intellectual intuition, 
that is, whether it was an activity which “always happens anyway” in consciousness, or 
whether it was a special accomplishment of the (idealist) philosopher.  This issue is 
further complicated by the question whether we can then understand the non-idealist 
philosopher as capable of spontaneity and thus as free, at all.  Heidegger’s 
“transcendentalism” yields fundamental distinctions which allow a resolution of these 
ambiguities and thus a clarification of what really follows from the transcendentalist 
claim.  These distinctions are 1) the ontological difference itself, in particular the 
distinction between the ontological and the ontic; and 2) the distinction between authentic 
and inauthentic understandings of being.  I will show how these distinctions map onto, 
disambiguate, and then allow us to evaluate, Fichte’s claims about self-sufficiency.   
 
a)  The Meaning of the “Transcendental Circle” Revisited 
 
The claim about the transcendental circle, itself a consequence of the ontological 
asymmetry between persons and things, was formulated by Fichte as the claim that 
everything is only “for the I”; he says that “all that is not-I is for the I only”.  I pointed 
out that in Fichte’s sense of intellectual intuition, as distinguished from Kant’s, what was 
created in the intuition was just this “for the I” feature of experience.  So intellectual 
intuition is a self-creative activity only in the sense that in this activity, the I creates its 
being-for-itself, its original self-relating, which is just what its being consists in.  I said 
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that this way of putting things could allow us a particular formulation of ontological 
asymmetry which reinforced a natural “realism” about the not-I: while the being of the I 
is unique in that the “I is only for itself”—that is, outside of a particular relation to an I, 
namely, to itself, there is no I at all, or at least not this particular I—“not-I’s” are 
precisely the “sorts of things” that can exist anyway outside of any relation to any I 
whatsoever.  But Fichte then seems to make much stronger claims about the dependence 
of not-I’s on the I on the sole basis of the transcendental circle.   
    There is a version of this circle which certainly holds for Heidegger as well.  “All that 
is not-I is for the I only” would mean that Dasein comports itself to all other entities—
entities that are not this particular Dasein—only through its own pre-ontological 
understanding of the being of those entities, and a fortiori its understanding of its own 
being.  This can be seen as a consequence of ontological asymmetry, because Dasein is 
the only kind of entity that has such an understanding of being at all.  Dasein in its 
transcending, existential activity creates this understanding of being, and because this 
understanding of being is always articulated in terms of Dasein’s own ability-to-be and 
thus Dasein’s possibilities and possible ways to be, possibilities in which Dasein’s own 
being as existence consists, Dasein then is self-creating in this sense.   The proper 
Heideggerian way to put Fichte’s point about “intellectual intuition” as an original self-
relating and thus self-intuiting activity would then be: Dasein’s self-forming transcending 
activity—conceived as either the activity of “imagination” or “understanding”—is 
ontologically but not ontically creative [schöpferisch].446   Dasein creates the horizon of 
all ontological understanding of being within which all comportment towards entities is 
                                                 
446 See KPM § 25.   
  
252
made possible, but thereby of course creates neither the entities themselves nor the being 
of the entities—only an understanding of the being of entities.  Dasein does not create the 
being of entities in the sense that it does not create or control the facts regarding “that and 
what entities are”, but rather creates the possibility of comprehending those facts as facts, 
of understanding “that and what entities are”, and thus creates the possibility of 
comporting itself to those entities which also exist in their own right.   
     Though they are not, I think, identical, we can see Heidegger’s famous hermeneutic 
circle as closely joined with this sense of the transcendental circle.   We can say that the 
“hermeneutic situation” Heidegger describes—whereby the idea of existence and of 
being in general must be “presupposed”, and whereby one must begin with the 
“everyday” and “inauthentic” and move toward the “authentic” and back again—is 
engendered by the “transcendental situation”.  Dasein finds itself in a hermeneutic circle 
on the basis of being in a transcendental circle.   
Because it is primordially constituted by care, any Dasein is already ahead of 
itself.  As being, it has in every case already projected itself upon definite 
possibilities of its existence; and in such existentiell projections it has, in a pre-
ontological manner, also projected something like existence and being.447  
      
The “circularity charge”—which leads to an admission of the hermeneutic circle—
Heidegger says, “comes from a kind of being that belongs to Dasein”, which is to say that 
Dasein has a “circular being [zirkelhaftes Sein]”.448  Dasein’s existence is always within 
the transcendental circle; so Dasein must acknowledge the hermeneutic circle because its 
own being involves a transcendental circle, a “projection of existence and being”.   
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     But Heidegger’s way of describing the situation of the transcendental circle avoids the 
ambiguities regarding the subsequent senses in which entities are “dependent” on Dasein 
in which Fichte was embroiled, and thus Heidegger improves on Fichte’s account.  
Dasein’s self-forming, self-intuiting activity is ontologically but not ontically creative, 
because it is also essentially acquiescent and thus finite.    Its projecting activity—which 
is ontologically creative—is always at the same time thrown.  Heidegger calls this 
Dasein’s “transcendental neediness [transzendentale Bedürftigkeit]” which represents 
“the innermost finitude that sustains Dasein”.449   But of course, in actuality there is a 
kind of mutual dependence here.  While Dasein’s projective understanding of being is 
dependent on entities, the being of the entities, which is revealed only in that 
understanding, is in some sense—to be specified in a moment—dependent on Dasein.  
This way of putting the claim—that Dasein’s thrown-projective understanding is 
ontologically but not ontically creative—helps us understand the locus classicus of 
Heidegger’s idealism: 
Indeed only as long as Dasein is, that is, the ontical possibility of the 
understanding of being is, ‘is there’ being.  If Dasein doesn’t exist, then 
‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’.  Such a thing is then neither 
understandable nor not understandable.  Then also intraworldly entities neither are 
discoverable, nor can they lie in hiddenness.  Then it can be said neither that 
entities are, nor that they are not.  Nevertheless, it can now be said—as long as the 
understanding of being, and thereby the understanding of occurrentness are—that 
then entities will continue to be.   
    As we have indicated, being—but not entities—are dependent on the 
understanding of being…450       
                                                 
449 KPM 236.   
450 SZ 212.  The translation is a slight modification of William Blattner’s in his article “Is Heidegger a 
Kantian Idealist?” in Inquiry, 37, 185-201.  I take my conclusions to be roughly in agreement with his.  
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the weak reading of mind-dependence in the discussion of Fichte, because what I called the weak reading 
was not just supposed to be trivially true—or true by a re-definition of being, as Blattner puts it—but based 
rather on, and supportive of, the substantial claims regarding ontological asymmetry and self-constitution 




Entities are not dependent on Dasein’s understanding of being, because that 
understanding is essentially acquiescent, and thus rather dependent on entities.  But the 
being of entities is dependent on Dasein’s understanding of being in the sense that the 
understanding of being provides the “ontological framework”—in Blattner’s words—for 
every question regarding the being of entities.  In the absence of Dasein, and thus in the 
absence of the “ontical possibility of the understanding of being”, any question regarding 
the being of entities is simply lacking in significance, as Blattner says.   
     This looks on the surface very similar to the reasons that motivated Fichte to call the 
thing-in-itself—or pure “being-in-itself”—“self-contradictory” and a “non-thought”.  
Such a characterization and dismissal of the thing-in-itself was meant to be a direct 
consequence of the circle.  This dismissal by itself made the very idea of entities—“not-
I’s”—existing independently of a relation to an I immediately suspect.  But from the 
Heideggerian perspective I have been developing—and the revised version of the circle I 
have ascribed to it—we needn’t say this at all.  We needn’t consider the very idea of the 
thing-in-itself to be self-contradictory.  To see why not, we need to briefly take a look at 
how Heidegger treats the idea of the thing-in-itself in the Kantbook.   
     Dasein is “within the circle” in virtue of its self-forming of the horizon of 
transcendence, and it is within this horizon that Dasein has “access to”, can encounter, 
objects as such, i.e. entities which can “stand-in-opposition” and which thus exist anyway 
and in their own right.  The self-forming of the horizon is ontologically creative but 
acquiescent and thus an essentially “finite knowing”.  This kind of self-intuiting activity 
is fundamentally distinguished from any intuitus originarius—“intellectual intuition” in 
Kant’s original sense—which is an “infinite” or “absolute” knowing.  For the latter—
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which we can say, by contrast, is “ontically creative”—the entity is not an object 
[Gegenstand] at all, but rather, as Heidegger says in the Kantbook, an “originated entity” 
[Ent-stand].    
Infinite knowing is an intuition that as such lets the being itself be originated (or 
lets the being itself come into being) [entstehen läßt].  Absolute knowing itself 
makes manifest the entity in letting-come-to-be, and possesses it in every case 
“only” as that which is originated in the letting-be-originated, i.e. as an originated 
entity…it is the entity as the entity-in-itself, which means, not as an object.451  
 
     Heidegger makes a distinction between the entity-“in-itself” [das Seiende “an-sich”] 
and the entity itself [das Seiende selbst].  Both appearance and “thing-in-itself” are 
characterizations of the same entity—the “entity itself”.   
Appearances are not merely illusions, but rather the entity itself.  This entity, 
again, is not something different than the thing-in-itself, but rather even this 
[thing-in-itself] is an entity.  The entity itself can be manifest without the entity 
“in-itself”—as an originated entity—being cognized.  The double characterization 
of the entity as “thing-in-itself” and as “appearance” corresponds to the twofold 
manner according to which the entity can stand in relation to an infinite and a 
finite knowing: the entity in being-originated [Entstand] and the same entity as 
object [Gegenstand].452 
 
The thing-in-itself—according to Heidegger’s reading of Kant—is not then self-
contradictory, but simply the entity itself “for” an infinite knower; it is the same entity 
which, “for us” as finite knowers, is an object.  The thing-in-itself is only “behind the 
appearances” in the sense that “finite knowledge as finite necessarily conceals at the same 
time, and it conceals in advance so that the “thing-in-itself” is not only imperfectly 
accessible, but is absolutely inaccessible to such knowledge by its very essence.”453  We 
can call the thing-in-itself a “non-thought” if we want, but not because it is self-
contradictory, like a round square, but because it, according to its essential 
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characterization, simply never enters as an item for consideration within fundamental 
ontology, which is rather an account of the essence of finite subjectivity.  And indeed—
unlike in Kant—it plays no systematic role, indeed no role whatsoever, in fundamental 
ontology as Heidegger construes it.  Heidegger introduces talk here of the entity or thing 
“in-itself” only in order to make the point that it is not what “transcendental philosophy” 
is, or ought to be, talking about, at all.  Transcendental philosophy is interested in the 
“entity itself”, but only insofar as it is an item “for us”, that is, an “appearance”, which 
does not deny that it is something “there” after all, existing in its own right.     
     The transcendental circle thus makes no claims, contra Fichte, about the “mind-
dependence” of entities, not even the “weaker” version of Fichte’s strong-interpretation, 
according to which the entity “makes no independent contribution” to its determination 
within cognition.  On Heidegger’s version of the circle it does, because all comportment 
to an entity is acquiescent to it, to the entity itself which it is in its own right.  So, in 
addition to all the affinities of Heidegger’s idealist account of subjectivity with Fichte’s, 
the former has the advantage of avoiding the ambiguities and, I argued, non-sequiturs 
regarding what Fichte thought followed from the transcendental circle regarding the 
mind-dependence of objects.  Indeed, it is just the insistence on acquiescence and thus on   
the idealist account of subjectivity being an account of finite subjectivity which blocks in 
advance all those ambiguities regarding both the meaning of the circle and, as we will 
see, the subsequent meaning of self-sufficiency.   
What does the struggle against the “thing-in-itself”, which was promulgated in 
German Idealism, mean, other than the growing forgetting of what Kant fought 
for: that the inner possibility and necessity of metaphysics, that is, its essence, are 
at bottom supported and preserved through the more original working out and 
increased preservation of the problem of finitude?454 
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b)  “Intellectual Intuition” Revisited 
 
Before moving on to the discussion of self-sufficiency, however, I want to discuss one 
further comparison between Heidegger’s and Fichte’s accounts of subjectivity.  We have 
seen the ways in which Heidegger’s account of the essential activity of subjectivity as the 
self-forming of transcendence is similar to Fichte’s account of self-positing as the activity 
of intellectual intuition.  Neither account falls foul of Kant’s denial of “intellectual 
intuition” because neither represents an immediate awareness of a thing-in-itself, as it did 
for Kant.  And both describe it as a sui generis activity of self-constitution.  But we saw 
how Fichte’s account of intellectual intuition is plagued with a twofold ambiguity.  
Firstly, intellectual intuition seems to be playing two distinct roles for Fichte.  On the one 
hand, intellectual intuition qua essential self-constituting activity had to be an activity that 
is “present in every moment of consciousness” and thus must be understood as an activity 
which is going on or happening anyway independently of whether or not one is aware of 
it as such.  On the other hand, Fichte describes it as a special accomplishment of the 
(idealist) “philosopher”, in which the latter becomes aware of her own “sheer activity”, of 
her own “absolutely spontaneous self-activity”.  Additionally, this seems to threaten the 
sense in which the philosopher’s intellectual intuition is an immediate awareness at all; 
and indeed Fichte at one point describes the philosopher’s acquaintance with it as “an 
inference from the obvious facts of consciousness”.   
     We could try, in the way I described in part two, to relieve the tension between these 
two descriptions by insisting that the philosopher’s intellectual intuition is the very same 
activity that happens anyway, but now performed in such a way that the activity becomes 
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at the same time an item of explicit awareness.  This attempted resolution appeals to two 
different “standpoints” within which intellectual intuition can “go on” or “happen”.  The 
difference is that in the first instance the intellectual intuition is performed within the 
“standpoint of life”, while in the second, the philosopher is assuming a “standpoint of 
speculation”.  The standpoint of life is assumed by both ordinary consciousness and by 
the “dogmatist”, and involves a forgetting about or neglect of “my own act of thinking” 
and thus a forgetting about “my freedom of thinking”. 
     But a further problem lay in Fichte’s description of the dogmatist, as within the 
standpoint of ordinary thinking, as “utterly lacking in absolutely spontaneous self-
activity”, which threatened to remove the essential spontaneity from the kind of ever-
present intellectual intuition which happens anyway in all subjectivity as such.  Even if 
this just means that the ordinary person or dogmatic philosopher is merely latently or 
potentially “free”, Fichte describes this situation as an “abolition of self-sufficiency”, 
which is transformed into “a mere illusion”.  But self-sufficiency itself is supposed to be 
an intrinsic feature of subjectivity, which Fichte conceived of as following from the 
nature of the transcendental circle.  If self-sufficiency is an intrinsic feature of 
subjectivity, then it follows that subjectivity which is defined by an intellectual intuition 
which happens anyway without any explicit awareness fails to be subjectivity qua self-
constituting at all.   
     As may be obvious by now, there is a close affinity between Fichte’s standpoints of 
life and speculation and Heidegger’s conception of understanding as either inauthentic 
(everyday, ordinary) or authentic.  These terms themselves in fact seem to be playing two 
roles in their own fashion.  In addition to inauthentic and authentic (existentiell) ways of 
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being-a-self, which we have explored, the distinction corresponds as well to two possible 
philosophical conceptions of subjectivity itself.   This is obvious in the hermeneutic 
method and architectonic of Being and Time as a whole.  At the beginning of that work, 
Heidegger says that fundamental ontology requires that we  
choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can 
show itself in itself and from itself.  And this means that it is to be shown as it is 
proximally and for the most part (zunächst und zumeist)—in its average 
everydayness.455 
 
This first way of access provides the “everyday conception of subjectivity”.  But then: 
Our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first 
instance, provisional…It is rather a preparatory procedure [which] will have to be 
repeated on a higher and authentically ontological basis.456 
 
It is clear that the methodological justification for starting with everydayness awaits the 
analysis of authenticity in Division II, in the opening section of which Heidegger says: 
In starting with average everydayness, our interpretation has heretofore been 
confined to the analysis of such existing as is either undifferentiated or 
inauthentic…“Existence” means an ability-to-be [Seinkönnen]—but also one 
which is authentic.  As long as the existential structure of an authentic ability-to-
be has not been brought into the idea of existence, the fore-sight by which an 
existential interpretation is guided will lack primordiality…One thing has become 
unmistakable: our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to 
primordiality.457 
 
 So the “standpoint of the fundamental ontologist” requires an “authentic view” on the 
structure of subjectivity, which becomes apparent only in Division II.        
     “Inauthentic being-a-self” corresponds to the standpoint of life in Fichte, assumed by 
the “dogmatist”.  In such existing, one is “forgetful” of the self and absorbed in the world 
of everyday comportments.  And there is a sense in which Dasein in such contexts, 
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existing through being-a-they-self, is “less free”, as are those assuming Fichte’s 
standpoint of life.  In the Grundprobleme, Heidegger describes such inauthentic self-
understanding in the following way: 
It is as though Dasein’s ability-to-be were projected by the things, that is, by 
Dasein’s dealings with them, and thus not primarily projected by Dasein itself out 
of its ownmost self, which nevertheless exists, as it is, always as dealing with 
things.458  
 
As being-a-self-in-the-world, and thus as an ability-to-be, Dasein is its possibilities which 
are thrown-projected on the world; the source of Dasein’s possibilities is its 
understanding, which is creative but essentially sensitive to entities within the world and 
the opportunities they afford.  In being-a-they-self, however, Dasein as it were forgets 
that the source of its possibilities is also its own existence as being-a-self-in-the-world 
and treats them as if their source were entirely the things themselves.  But as I have 
urged, such a way of being-a-self is to be understood as an existentiell modification of 
Dasein’s existential structure, which is always characterized by mineness.  It seems fair to 
call the character of mineness in inauthentic being-a-self “merely implicit”, as we did 
with Fichte, but that nowise threatens to undermine the fact that Dasein’s existing 
inauthentically still manifests the spontaneity (and receptivity of course) and self-
constituting character of all existence as such.   To employ another one of Heidegger’s 
ways of talking, inauthentic Dasein is still “choosing” itself, even if it is merely choosing 
to refuse to choose for itself.   
     Each existentiell way of being-a-self, each mode of self-understanding, represents a 
kind of “self-awareness”, and indeed, an “immediate” one.  This self-awareness means a 
self-disclosure of one’s ability-to-be.  “With its world, [Dasein] is there for itself”; and in 
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inauthentic existing, too, Dasein is there for itself “in such a way that it has disclosed to 
itself its ability-to-be in terms of the ‘world’ of its concern.” 459   This self-awareness is 
also a type of self-knowledge.  Through understanding, “Dasein ‘knows’ what it is 
capable of [woran es mit ihm selbst ist], inasmuch as it has either projected itself upon 
possibilities of its own or has been so absorbed in the they that it has let such possibilities 
be presented to it by the way in which the they has publicly interpreted things.”460     
     The “authentic view”, now, on the structure of subjectivity, that is, the full view which 
Being and Time as a whole is supposed to give us, in contrast to the “inauthentic view” 
which we receive in Division I, corresponds to one feature of Fichte’s “standpoint of 
speculation”.   Both are, respectively, standpoints within which we are supposed to 
develop “proper” philosophical pictures of the structure of subjectivity.  Heidegger’s 
“authentic view” itself—now in contrast to Fichte’s “standpoint of speculation”— is of 
course not any kind of immediate awareness of subjectivity and its essential self-activity, 
but it is not supposed to be.  It is based on phenomenological reflection on the “obvious 
facts” of—not of consciousness, as Fichte would have it, but of —existing.   It is 
authentic-being-a-self, as an existentiell way of existing, which corresponds to the other 
part of Fichte’s conception of “the philosopher’s intellectual intuition”.  It involves, as it 
must for Fichte, the very same activity that inauthentic-being-a-self involves, namely 
“existing”, projecting of possibilities based on Dasein’s essential ability-to-be.  The 
difference of course is just that the possibilities presenting themselves in authentic being-
a-self are not just structurally “mine”, but my “ownmost” possibilities.  “When Dasein 
thus brings itself back from the they, the they-self is thus modified in an existentiell 
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manner so that it becomes authentic being-a-self.”461  In authentic being-a-self, “Dasein 
projects itself upon its ownmost ability-to-be.”462  The picture of the difference we 
resorted to with Fichte, namely of an implicit self-awareness becoming explicit, might be 
somewhat misleading here, but it is unmistakable that authentic-being-a-self represents its 
own form of self-awareness.  Instead of “listening” to the they, authentic-being-a-self 
“pays attention to itself”, listens to its own “authentic self”, its “conscience”.  Heidegger 
says Dasein is then aware of itself “in its uncanniness”.463   The fundamental difference 
between these two sets of standpoints in Fichte and Heidegger is that for Fichte the 
standpoint of speculation reveals the “sheer activity” and “absolute spontaneous self-
activity” of subjectivity and thus its self-sufficiency, while for Heidegger both standpoints 
are “shot through and through” with finitude, both are essentially also acquiescent and 
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c)  The Meaning of Dasein’s Selbst-ständigkeit 
 
As we saw, for Fichte the self-sufficiency of the I followed directly from the claims of the 
transcendental circle, thus from the sui generis self-constituting structure of subjectivity.  
The discussion of Fichte in part two focused on the attempt to disambiguate Fichte’s 
claims about the meaning of the self-sufficiency which was supposed to be a consequence 
of these essential structural features of the I.  I want to conclude now with a discussion of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the sense in which Dasein is, or can be, selbständig.  This 
term, like “being-a-self”, is rarely explicitly thematized in Being and Time, but it is nearly 
as pervasive.  As such, it can seem jarring, and it isn’t often clear why Heidegger is 
mentioning it.  It seems to be in response to a question that wasn’t asked.  It is only 
within a context in which we see Heidegger engaging with the idealist conception of 
subjectivity that his insistence on the term makes sense.   
     For Fichte, the claim that reason is self-sufficient means that reason is not reliant on 
any resources outside of itself in order to guarantee that all of its demands are satisfiable.  
For Kant, though reason in its specific employments is self-legitimating, because he 
ultimately fails to give a unified account of reason as a whole grounded in the unified 
structure of the I, finite human reason must be seen as lacking self-sufficiency precisely 
because it is dependent on something outside itself as a guarantee that all its demands are 
simultaneously satisfiable, namely a divine reason.  Fichte thought that in grounding 
reason as a whole in the unified structure of the I, he had shown that reason itself, and 
thus the I, is self-sufficient.  This is why for him solving the problem of the unity of 
reason was itself a proof of self-sufficiency.  Taking the cue from Kant’s characterization 
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of reason as self-activity, Fichte grounded the claim to self-sufficiency on the claim that 
“I am only active”—the self-positing I is pure activity.  The strongest version of this 
claim, to which Fichte at times seems to be committed, is that the I is “only active” and 
nothing more, namely not passive in any apposite sense.  Reason is not dependent on 
anything outside itself, so the appearance of any such dependence within the ordinary 
standpoint of life amounts to a kind of illusion.  The receptivity of the I to the not-I is the 
result entirely of an (active) self-ascription.  Self-sufficiency, then, is an essential 
structural feature of subjectivity, which goes hand-in-hand with the structural feature of 
the I’s “transcendental circularity”.  He says: 
Briefly stated…nothing is absolute but pure activity, and all consciousness and all 
being is grounded upon this pure activity…nothing is purely true but my self-
sufficiency.464 
 
Reason is absolutely self-sufficient; it exists only for itself.  But nothing exists for 
reason except reason itself.  It follows that everything reason is must have its 
foundation [muss begründet sein] within reason itself and must be explicable 
solely on the basis of reason itself and not on the basis of anything outside reason, 
for reason could not get outside of itself without renouncing itself.465  
 
     The strongest claim of self-sufficiency then is that reason—and thus the I—is self-
grounding.  For Heidegger, the main result of the interpretation of Kant, namely that the 
structure of transcendence is rooted in the self-forming activity of the transcendental 
power of imagination, means that human reason has been shown to be essentially 
dependent, “transcendentally needy”, and thus in need of the world and other entities with 
which it shares the world, in order to perform its essential functions and thus in order to 
be what it is.           
                                                 
464 SE 17; SW IV: 12. 
465  IWL 59; SW I: 474.   
  
265
To human finitude belongs sensibility which signifies the acquiescent intuition.  
As pure intuition, i.e. pure sensibility, it is a necessary element of the structure of 
transcendence which distinguishes finitude.  Human pure reason is necessarily a 
pure sensible reason.  This pure reason must be sensible in itself…Now, if the 
transcendental power of imagination is to be the original ground of the possibility 
of human subjectivity, namely precisely in its unity and wholeness, than it must 
make possible something like a pure sensible reason.466  
 
Human reason remains pure because it is a priori; the forming of the horizon of 
acquiescence comes out of the self-activity of imagination itself, in advance, as it were, 
of actual acquiescence—“free from experience”.  But it is also sensible in its essence 
because it is always geared, so to speak, in and toward acquiescence; transcendental 
imagination, in forming the pure looks of objective experience, in terms of which all 
comportment to the world is itself possible, remains a faculty of sensibility.467 
     So the characterization of human reason as a pure sensible reason means that reason is 
dispossessed of such Fichtean claims to “mastery”.   
In man’s comportment toward entities that he himself is not, he already finds the 
entity as that from which he is supported, as that on which he has depended, over 
which in principle for all his culture and technology he can never become master.  
Dependent on the being he is not, man is at the same time basically not all-
powerful [nicht mächtig] over the being he himself is.468 
 
Nevertheless, the language of self-sufficiency is re-appropriated by Heidegger in Being 
and Time.  Often, but not always, Heidegger signals this re-appropriation, and thus a 
change in meaning, of the idealist conception of self-sufficiency by writing a dash, as in 
                                                 
466  KPM 172-3, my italics.   
467 Notice that this description of human reason as pure and sensible could suit Kant’s purposes just fine in 
the case of theoretical reason.  The latter, in all its employments, is always geared toward sensible 
experience.  All objective knowledge requires sensible content.  It is in the case of practical reason that this 
characterization seems threatening.  And it is this threat which causes Heidegger to famously claim that 
Kant “shrank-back” from the imagination or retreated from the prominent position he had assigned to it in 
the first edition, in order to “preserve the mastery of reason”, particularly in the practical sphere.  
Remember as well that it is precisely the “inadequacy” of Kant’s defense of practical reason that so 
troubled Fichte.    
468 KPM 228. 
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Selbst-ständigkeit, or by splitting up the constituent words, as in die Ständigkeit des 
Selbst.  The meanings of Ständig and Ständigkeit will have temporal connotations—
persistance, continuousness, permanence—and this justifies the usual translations as 
“constant” and “constancy”.  The re-appropriation is based on the discovered temporality 
of Dasein’s existence and of care.  And Heidegger’s usage is primarily aimed at a 
replacement of the traditional conception of identity and persistence grounded in the 
subjectum as underlying substance.  Because of ontological asymmetry, such identity and 
persistence must be conceived rather in terms of the temporality of the structure of 
existence. But the legacy of the idealist usage of this word echoes in it, or so I want to 
suggest, and traces of it remain here.  But in what sense?  Heidegger says: 
The ontological structure of the entity that in each case I myself am centers in the 
self-sufficiency [Selbständigkeit] of existence…now that selfhood has been 
explicitly taken back into the structure of care, and therefore of temporality, the 
temporal interpretation of self-constancy [Selbst-ständigkeit] and non-self-
constancy [Unselbst-ständigkeit] acquires an importance of its own.469   
 
     Fichte had wanted to see Selbständigkeit as a structural feature of subjectivity, in the 
sense that it meant that subjectivity is factically independent of anything outside of it.  As 
Heidegger suggests here, it remains a structural feature of existence, but only in a formal 
existential sense.  That existence, the structure of being-a-self, is characterized by 
Selbständigkeit means that there are two existentiell possibilities or ways of being-a-self 
afforded to Dasein, Selbst-ständigkeit and Unselbst-ständigkeit.  These correspond in turn 
to authentic and the inauthentic existentiell possibilities.   
                                                 
469 KPM 332, my italics. NB. There is no dash here, which I take to justify my keeping the translation here 
as “self-sufficiency”.  Heidegger also uses the word untampered with at 1) SZ 303, but this time in 
quotation marks:  “Sein ‘Bestand’ gründet nicht in der Substanzialität einer Substanz, sondern in der 
‘Selbständigkeit’ des existierenden Selbst, dessen Sein als Sorge begriffen wurde”; and at 2) SZ 375, now 
with no quotation marks: “Die Selbständigkeit is eine Seinsweise des Daseins und gründet deshalb in einer 
spezifischen Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit.”  Though for reasons that will be clear in a moment, it seems to me 
that Heidegger should be saying Selbst-ständigkeit here.    
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The Ständigkeit des Selbst as the supposed persistence [Beharrlichkeit] of the 
subjectum receives its clarification in terms of care.  The phenomenon of 
authentic ability-to-be also opens our eyes for the Ständigkeit des Selbst in the 
sense of having-won-a-standing [Standgewonnenhaben].  The Ständigkeit des 
Selbst in the double sense of continuing steadfastness is the authentic counter-
possibility to the Unselbst-ständigkeit of irresolute falling.  Existentially, Selbst-
ständigkeit signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness.  The ontological 
structure of such anticipatory resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the self’s 
selfhood.470   
 
     The self-sufficiency of Dasein is not a “constant” feature of all of Dasein’s existence, 
but rather a kind of special feature, or accomplishment, of anticipatory resoluteness—of 
authentic being-a-self.   It is “a way of being of Dasein, and is therefore grounded in a 
specific temporalizing of temporality”471, namely authentic temporalizing.   But because 
Dasein’s essential temporalizing [Zeitigung] means not just a forming of original time 
and the “in-time-ness” of its existence, but the way in which Dasein constitutes itself, or 
gives rise to itself, authentic Selbst-ständigkeit cannot just represent “self-constancy” in 
the sense of remaining itself or enduring through time, as if inauthentic Dasein didn’t 
persist as itself through time as well.  Selbst-ständigkeit and Unselbst-ständigkeit rather 
represent also two different ways in which Dasein can constitute its own existence.  And 
the Selbst-ständigkeit of authentic existence means that in constituting itself in this way, 
one is “able to stand on one’s own feet”, as we say, or “stand by oneself”, and “make up 
one’s own mind”.  Fichte writes: 
Anyone who is conscious of his own self-sufficiency and independence from 
everything outside of himself—a consciousness that can be obtained only by 
making something of oneself on one’s own and independently of everything 
else—will not require things in order to support his self, nor can he employ them 
for this purpose, for they abolish his self-sufficiency and transform it into a mere 
illusion.472  
                                                 
470 SZ 322. 
471 SZ 375; my italics.  
472 IWL 18-19; SW I: 433. 
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Fichte’s mistake from the Heideggerian perspective is the thought that “self-
sufficiency”—precisely in the sense of “being able to support oneself” and “being able to 
make something of oneself on one’s own”—requires independence from “everything 
outside of oneself”.  Nevertheless I want to suggest that it is precisely the meaning of 
these former designations which Heidegger wants to maintain in some form, that is, to 
transform.  As being-in-the-world, Dasein’s understanding—of itself, of others and of the 
world—is always a thrown projecting; and so Dasein depends on the world, on others, to 
be what it is, even when it is authentically being itself.  But in the possibility of so 
existing, which also belongs to it essentially, Dasein is able to hold onto, support, and 
maintain an existence which is “most its own”.   This does not mean that we are 
“masters” of our own being anymore than we are masters over others or over nature; what 
it means is that we are not “things”.   And this is the core of the idealist answer to Kant’s 
question “what is the human being?” which I have been tracing: an urging that we keep 
this, above all else, “steadfastly” in mind, whenever we question, out of wonder or 
bewilderment, in hopefulness or anxiety, about the being each of us is, about what or who 
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